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This doctoral study first explores the nature of terrorism in sub-
Saharan Africa and what distinguishes it from terrorism in other 
regions. Based on an interpretation of the political history of sub-
Saharan Africa, and certain aspects of violence in ethnically, politically 
and religiously motivated conflicts, terrorism in the region manifests 
in four broad categories or typologies i.e. anti-colonial terrorism, 
terrorism in national conflicts, terrorism in regional conflicts and 
jihadi terrorism. While anti-colonial terrorism is no longer manifest, 
jihadi terrorism presents sub-Saharan Africa with the most complex 
and serious security challenge in the history of its social and political 
development.  Generally, what makes terrorism in sub-Saharan 
African distinct is its inward-looking nature, even when it is directed 
towards distant targets geographically located outside the region.  
This is evidenced by the fact that no indigenous sub-Saharan Africa 
terrorist organization has so far ever been associated with a terrorist 
attack outside the region.  
 
Assuming that human rights violations co-vary with certain 
macrosocial conditions mutable in the structure of society, the main 
objective of the study was to establish the conditions or set of 
conditions necessary and or sufficient to facilitate or impede human 
rights when governments respond to terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In addition, the study also sort to uncover additional factors unique 
to social and political systems of sub-Saharan Africa, previously not 
predicted by theory and extant empirical studies but which come to 
bear on human rights outcomes in counterterrorist policies. Thus, 
relying on a theoretical model that isolates significant macrosocial 
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conditions suggested by theory (liberal democratic and constructivist 
theories) and extant empirical studies, the study employs a research 
design that combines Comparative Qualitative Analysis – QCA, 
specifically  Crisp Set Comparative Qualitative Analysis (csQCA) and 
an in depth case study of Mali to test five hypotheses in the form of 
necessary conditions that facilitate human rights, and uncover 
additional important factors unique in the structure of African 
societies.  
 
Based on this analysis, it was established that government preference 
for human over state security (here measured by more government 
expenditure on welfare than on military) and poor economic and 
administrative capacity (here measured by the absence of 
transparency and accountability coupled with a high level of 
corruption in the public sector) are necessary conditions that facilitate 
and impede human rights respectively in counterterrorist policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, it has been established that ancient 
African social norms, cultural practices and traditions that promote 
justice and human rights passed down the generations through 
socialization play an important role in facilitating human rights in 
counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The findings in this study have important ramifications for theorising 
the relationship between counterterrorism and human rights in sub-
Saharan Africa and for the design and implementation of 







Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht zuerst die Art des 
Terrorismus in Subsahara-Afrika und was ihn von Terrorismus in 
anderen Regionen unterscheidet. Basierend auf einer Interpretation 
der politischen Geschichte Subsahara-Afrikas und gewissen 
Gewaltaspekten in ethnisch, politisch und religiös motivierten 
Konflikten, lässt sich Terrorismus in der Region in vier breiten 
Kategorien oder Typologen unterscheiden: anti-kolonial motivierter 
Terrorismus, Terrorismus in nationalen Konflikten, Terrorismus in 
regionalen Konflikten und Jihad-Terrorismus. Zwar spielt anti-
kolonial motivierter Terrorismus keine Rolle mehr, aber Jihad-
Terrorismus stellt das komplexeste und ernsthafteste 
Sicherheitsproblem in der Geschichte Subsahara-Afrikas sozialer und 
politischer Entwicklung dar. Was Terrorismus in Subsahara-Afrika 
kennzeichnet, ist dass er nach innen gerichtet ist, selbst wenn er 
geographisch entfernte Gegner außerhalb der Region treffen soll. Dies 
wird dadurch veranschaulicht, dass bisher keine indigene Subsahara-
Afrikanische Terrororganisation mi einem Terroranschlag außerhalb 
der Region in Verbindung gebracht wurde. 
 
Davon ausgehend, dass Menschenrechtsverletzungen mit 
bestimmten makrosozialen Bedingungen zusammenhängen, die je 
nach Gesellschaftsstruktur variieren können, ist das Ziel der 
vorliegenden Studie, die notwendigen bzw. hinreichenden 
Bedingungen zu abzugrenzen, die Menschenrechte wahren bzw. 
einschränken, wenn Regierungen auf Terrorismus in Subsahara-
Afrika reagieren. Zudem versucht die vorliegende Studie, zusätzliche 
Faktoren zu identifizieren, die Alleinstellungsmerkmale sozialer und 
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politischer Systeme in Subsahara-Afrika sind, die durch 
entsprechende Theorien und empirische Studien bisher noch nicht 
vorhergesagt werden, aber beeinflussen, welchen Effekt Anti-Terror-
Strategien in der Region auf die Menschenrechtssituation haben. Die 
Studie baut auf einem theoretischen Modell auf, das maßgebliche 
makrosoziale Bedingungen isoliert, die aus (liberal-demokratischen 
und konstruktivistischen) Theorien und bestehenden empirischen 
Studien abgeleitet werden. Methodisch wird eine Comparative 
Qualitative Analysis (QCA), genauer gesagt eine Crisp Set 
Comparative Analysis (csQCA), mit einer detaillierten Fallstudie zu 
Mali kombiniert. 
 
Auf diese Weise werden fünf Hypothesen zu den notwendigen 
Bedingungen getestet, die die Wahrung von Menschenrechten 
sicherstellen, und zusätzliche wichtige Faktoren identifiziert, die für 
die Struktur Afrikanischer Gesellschaften einzigartig sind. 
 
Auf Grundlage dieser Analyse wird festgestellt, dass notwendige 
Bedingungen, die die Wahrung der Menschenrechte bei Anti-Terror-
Strategien in Subsahara-Afrika erleichtern bzw. erschweren, einerseits 
die Priorität der Regierung auf dem Schutz der Bevölkerung statt 
Schutz des Staates ist (gemessen als höhere Staatsausgaben für den 
Sozialstaat als für das Militär) sowie eine schwache ökonomische und 
administrative Kompetenz (gemessen als ein Mangel an Transparenz 
und Verantwortlichkeit, verbunden mit hoher Korruption im 
öffentlichen Sektor). Außerdem konnte festgestellt werden, dass 
historische Afrikanische Sozialnormen, kulturelle Praxis und 
Traditionen, die Gerechtigkeit und Menschenrechte vermitteln und 
von Generation zu Generation in der Gesellschaft weitergereicht 
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werden, eine wichtige Rolle spielen, um im Rahmen von Anti-Terror-
Strategien in Subsahara-Afrika Menschenrechte zu schützen. 
 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie haben auch bedeutsame Konsequenzen 
einerseits für die Theorie des Zusammenhangs zwischen Anti-Terror-
Maßnahmen und Menschenrechten in Subsahara-Afrika und 
andererseits für die Entwicklung und Implementierung von Anti-
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Sub-Saharan Africa is geographically and ethno-culturally the area of 
the continent of Africa that lies south of the Sahara Desert covering 
22,431,000 square kilometres1. In some instances, countries that make 
up the region vary according to different researchers and 
organisations. For example, the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) lists 50 countries including 
Mayotte and Réunion but excludes Sudan2. The World Bank and the 
African Union list 48 countries including Sudan but exclude Mayotte 
and Réunion3,4. However, while the World Bank includes Mauritania 
and excludes Djibouti, the African Union includes Djibouti and 
excludes Mauritania.  
 
The total population of the region according to the United Nations 
(UN) is approximately 1.2 billion people (about 60 percent below the 
age of 25 years) and projected to grow at an annual average rate of 
about 2.7 percent5. The World Bank (WB) estimates that the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of the region is approximately 1.75 trillion 
U.S. dollars and projected to grow at an annual average rate of about 
2.3 percent6.  
                                                 
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sub-Saharan_Africa#cite_note-2 . Accessed 30 May 
2020. 
2 https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/regional-groups/ . Accessed 31 May 2020. 
3 https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/ . Accessed 31 May 2020. 
4 https://au.int/en/member_states/countryprofiles2 . Accessed 31 May 2020. 







Other than Ethiopia which was never colonised, nearly two thirds of 
countries in the region attained independence in the 1960s. By early 
1980s, all countries had attained independence except for Namibia, 
Eritrea and South Africa which became independent in the 1990s and 
South Sudan which separated from Sudan in 2011. The social and 
political development of most countries in the region since 
independence has been punctuated by periods of internal conflicts 
(e.g. civil wars, coups and counter coups, ethnic violence, violent 
political protests, insurgencies) stimulated by conditions of state 
weakness; poor health of political systems and negative developments 
at the international stage. These conditions include for example, 
existence of large swathes of ungoverned spaces; inability of 
governments to effectively maintain a monopoly on violence; 
corruption and extensive criminalization of law enforcement 
agencies; poor service delivery; general disregard for the rules of the 
formal political and economic sectors; lack of social justice; non-
participatory political processes; civic lethargy; marginalisation and 
exclusion; cold war and great power politics, globalisation of war; 
regional competition among states etc. (Baynham, 1994, p. 41; Botha, 
2008a, pp. 35-36; Cilliers, 2003, pp. 98-102; Forest & Giroux, 2011, pp. 
7-9; Howard, 2010, pp. 960-982; Kimunguyi, 2011, pp. 3-4; Mair, 2003, 
p. 3; Omotola, 2008, p. 44; Shinn, 2003; Straus, 2012).  
 
For good measure, many major forms of large-scale organized internal 
violence are no longer active or significantly deescalated (Hamilton, 
2009, p. 43; Straus, 2012). However, this positive development that 
began in the early 1990s as a consequence of increased traction of 
                                                 
 . Accessed 31 May 2020. 
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democracy in the region, coincided with the arrival of Osama bin 
Laden in Sudan in late 19991 who established al Qaeda and used sub-
Saharan Africa as a laboratory for the manufacture, testing and 
launching of contemporary global jihadi terrorism (Bergen, 2002, 
2006; Dagne, 2002, pp. 8-16; Glickman, 2003, p. 167; Howard, 2010, p. 
964; Lesch, 2002; Lobel, 1999, p. 537; Lyman & Morrison, 2004, p. 78; 
Makinda, 2007, p. 17; Shinn, 2003; Taylor & Elbushra, 2006). Since 
then, and specifically after al Qaeda’s maiden attacks on U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, jihadi terrorism has become 
the region’s most complex and significant security threat. 
 
1.2. State of Art and Knowledge 
 
According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)7, successful 
incidents of terror attacks in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 227 
incidents in 1991 when Osama bin Laden first arrived in the region to 
1,338 incidents in 2017. This represents an increase of about 505 
percent in terror attacks. Currently, sub-Saharan Africa is dubiously 









                                                 
7 The GTD defines a terrorist attack ‘as the intentional, threatened or actual use of 
illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, 
or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation’. 
 4 
Figure 1.1 Terrorism by global region (1998 – 2017) 
 
 Source: Global Terrorism Database accessed on 26/02/2019 from 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/  
 
Despite the early signs that emerged in 1998 showing that terrorism 
in sub-Saharan Africa is a significant threat to global peace and 
security8, the region only attracted academic and policy attention 
after al Qaeda’s apocalyptic attack in the U.S. in September of 2001 
killing over 3,000 people (Dagne, 2002, p. 6; Dowd & Raleigh, 2013, p. 
499; Francis, 2013, p. 10; Glickman, 2003, p. 168; P. Kagwanja, 2006, p. 
81; Kingebiel, 2005, pp. 35-36; Mair, 2003; Rapoport, 2001; Strydom, 
2019, p. 80). Since then, there has been a diverse growing body of 
academic literature canvassing different areas of scholarly interest on 
terrorism, counterterrorism and human rights in the region.  
 
A few scholars have incorporated the history of terrorism in sub-
Saharan Africa in general accounts of the origin and evolution of 
                                                 
8 When al Qaeda attacked U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killing over 250 




















 Central America & Caribbean
Australasia & Oceania
 5 
terrorism in the world e.g. Atran (2003); Halliday (2004); Laqueur 
(1977); Rapoport (2001); Shughart (2006). Others in this category such 
as Makinda (2007) have been specific and give a systematic account of 
the history, classification and causes of terrorism in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 
Despite lack of agreement within both academic and policy 
communities on a universal definition of terrorism, a significant body 
of academic literature relevant to the understanding of terrorism in 
sub-Saharan Africa has delved into the debate e.g. (Ruby, 2002); Saul 
(2005); Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2004). Some 
scholars in this category have gone as far as prescribing minimum 
elements for an academic definition of terrorism e.g. Botha (2008b, p. 
30); Cilliers (2003, p. 91); Forest and Giroux (2011, p. 1); Ignatieff (2002, 
p. 1146); Kozera (2018, pp. 11-12); Laqueur (1999, p. 8); Saul (2008, p. 
196); A. P. Schmid (2011, 2012); Shanahan (2016); Warbrick (2004, p. 
989). A small number of publications have discussed the endless 
definitional problem from an African perspective e.g. Botha (2008a); 
Clapham (2003) while others have approached the debate from a 
human rights perspective e.g. Saul (2008). Generally, there is no 
shortage of academic literature canvassing the protean and endless 
problem of defining terrorism. Most publications on terrorism in sub-
Saharan Africa include a definition of terrorism in their introductory 
sections.   
 
Equally, there is a huge repository of scholarly literature on the nature 
and causes of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. Some texts offer a 
general overview of terrorism and counterterrorism in the region e.g. 
Botha (2008a); Busher (2014); Dagne (2002); Forest and Giroux (2011); 
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Glickman (2003); Mair (2003); Welfling (1979) while others such as 
Alexander (2015); Botha (2008b); Bullejos (2019); Dentice (2018); P. 
Kagwanja (2006); Kimunguyi (2011); Maïga (2016); Marc, Verjee, and 
Mogaka (2015); Shinn (2003) take a sub-regional focus. The bulk of the 
sub-regional literature is on East & Horn of Africa, and the Sahel 
Sahara & West Africa sub-regions. Understandably, the high 
concentration of publications focusing on these two sub-regions is 
because terrorism is more prevalent making in the two them ‘the axis 
of terrorism’ in sub-Saharan Africa.  A significant body of academic 
literature interested in the root causes of terrorism in sub-Saharan 
Africa canvases the problem from the lens of fragility, political terror 
and state terrorism e.g. Chauzal and van Damme (2015); Dagne (2002); 
Eck and Hultman (2007); Feldman (2009); Forest and Giroux (2011); 
Glickman (2003); Howard (2010); Leeson (2007); Sow (2018).  
 
Another thick layer of academic literature focuses on terrorist groups 
in the region e.g. Ajayi (1990); Barnes and Hassan (2007); Boeke (2016); 
Filiu (2017); Forest (2011); Laub and Masters (2015); Lebovich (2013); 
Pantucci and Jesperson (2015); Wise (2011). The most widely discussed 
terrorist groups are al Shabaab in East & Horn of Africa and Boko 
Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel 
Sahara & West Africa. Closely related to this category is a generous 
catalogue of literature concerned with the origin, nature and 
proliferation of violent extremism in the region e.g. Bergen (2002); 
Dowd and Raleigh (2013); Forest (2011); Lesch (2002); McCormack 
(2005); Menkhaus (2003); Ousman (2004); Taylor and Elbushra 
(2006); Warner (2017). Linked to the scholarship on terrorist groups 
is a small community of scholars who interrogate the symbiotic 
relationship between terrorism and organised crime e.g. Boeke (2016); 
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Briscoe (2014); Edwards and Gill (2002); Finckenauer (2005); Hübschle 
(2011); Miraglia, Ochoa, and Briscoe (2012); Onuoha and Ezirim (2013).  
 
Generally, how terrorism starts and persists in sub-Saharan Africa has 
received much academic attention than how it ends i.e. 
counterterrorism. See also Boeke (2014, p. 1). For example, even the 
recently published “Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism” edited by Andrew and Silke (2018) features no 
single case from Africa, let alone sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, 
some of the areas covered by academic publications on 
counterterrorism in the region can be highlighted. While some 
scholars have focused on regional counterterrorism initiatives with an 
emphasis on African Union led interventions e.g. Ewi and Aning 
(2006); Ford (2011); A. Keith (2007), others such as Anderson and 
McKnight (2015); Dersso (2009); Ellis (2004); P. Kagwanja (2006); 
Keita (1998); Khamala (2019); Kimunguyi (2011); Workneh (2019) have 
pursued a country or sub-regional focus. Others such as Chau (2008); 
Coolsaet (2010); Francis (2013); Karlsrud (2017); Lyammouri (2018); 
Piombo (2007); Rupesinghe et al. (2019); Stigall (2015) have focused on 
UN and foreign interventions, ostensibly those led by the United 
States, France and the European Union. A small body of literature 
approaches counterterrorism in sub-Saharan Africa from a broad 
overview e.g. Omotola (2008). Others e.g. Cigar (2014); Kozera (2018) 
examine the pros, cons and complexities of counterinsurgency 
(COIN) as a counterterrorism strategy, especially as it relates to the 
use of non-state armed actors. 
 
In general, research on terrorism, counterterrorism and human rights 
in sub-Saharan Africa is plagued by lack of valid and reliable data. In 
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many countries, information and data on security agencies and 
counterterrorism is shrouded in secrecy and often protected by 
legislation (Gupta, De Mello, & Sharan, 2001, pp. 752-753; Pyman, 2017, 
p. 513; Sidibe, 2018, p. 47; Sigsworth, 2019, pp. 3, 7; Thuo, 2009, pp. 155-
156). This problem is well illustrated by Shor (2011, p. 55) who while 
introducing the ‘Global Counterterrorist Legislation Database (GCLD)’ 
observes that African countries are highly represented among 71 
countries that no reliable information could be found.  
 
The problem of lack of valid and reliable data and information is 
compounded by the poor development of some aspects of 
counterterrorism. For example, there is almost no academic literature 
on probation as a rehabilitation measure for ex-terrorists in the 
region. Understandably, this is because in many countries, probation 
services are non-existent and where they exist they are poorly 
developed and underutilised.  
 
1.3. The Problem 
 
The most important task for both academic and policy research as far 
as terrorism and counterterrorism are concerned is developing a body 
of knowledge that increases understanding of the relationship 
between both phenomena and human rights. This is because, both 
terrorists and those who seek to end it through counterterrorist 
policies advance human rights arguments to justify their actions.  
 
Thus, caught in the middle of terrorism and counterterrorism, human 
rights form a critical space that determines the effectiveness of 
counterterrorist policies, depending on how governments adjust the 
contours of this space while responding to terrorism. See also Abadie 
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(2006); Hafner-Burton and Shapiro (2010); James A. Piazza (2015); 
James A Piazza and Walsh (2009, 2010); Shor, Charmichael, Nazif 
Munoz, Shandra, and Schwartz (2014); Walsh and Piazza (2010). Based 
on this understanding, empirical research on counterterrorism in sub-
Saharan Africa has the important role of establishing the factors and 
conditions that facilitate or impede human rights in counterterrorist 
policies. Despite this critical role located at the nexus of 
counterterrorism and human rights, the bulk of scholarly literature on 
the region focus only on human rights as a distinct area of scholarship.  
Another body of scholarship focuses on the causal relationship 
between human rights and terrorism. Only a few scholars e.g. Ford 
(2013); Sigsworth (2019) interrogate the impact of counterterrorism 
measures on human rights. Generally, publications that have 
interrogated the relationship between terrorism, counterterrorism 
and human rights in the region are largely descriptive and do not 
empirically test theoretical propositions. What exists in this direction 
are empirical studies e.g. Khan (2016); James A Piazza and Walsh 
(2009, 2010); Poe and Tate (1994); Saul (2008) that are of a global scope 
but relevant for the general understanding of terrorism, 
counterterrorism and human rights sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, only the study by Shor et al. (2014) seeks 
to establish the conditions that facilitate or impede human rights in 
counterterrorist policies but at a global level. Relying on regression 
analysis and a framework that brings together actor-oriented 
explanations and socio-cultural approaches, the study explores macro 
social conditions that predict states’ human rights behavior in relation 
to counterterrorist policies. Though the study sheds some useful 
insights relevant for the understanding of conditions that might 
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influence human rights in sub-Saharan Africa in times of 
counterterrorism, it does not consider the unique attributes of the 
region as a social and political system. In short, there is no or very 
little (if any exists) empirical research on the conditions that facilitate 
or impede human rights in counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 
In addition, despite being developed in the late 1980s by C. Ragin 
(1987), there is no or very little research on terrorism, 
counterterrorism and human rights in sub-Saharan Africa that 
employs QCA as a method of analysis. Most of the extant literature is 
made up of essays, single country case studies, few country 
comparative case studies or regional descriptive analyses. Yet QCA 
offers many practical benefits. For example, with QCA it is possible to 
identify conditions that facilitate or impede desired policy outcomes. 
Hence, it offers the chance that bad elements of a policy can be 
eliminated and good ones enhanced to increase effectiveness.  
 
Further, even though there is a plethora of literature on politically 
motivated ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, scholars have 
generally missed out on terrorism that occurs in the context of these 








1.4. Study Objective and Questions 
 
From the foregoing and based on the assumption that human rights 
violations co-vary with certain macrosocial conditions mutable in the 
structure of society (See also Park, 1987, pp. 405-406; Pearson, 2001, p. 
46), this doctoral study sort to establish the conditions or set of 
conditions that facilitate or impede human rights when governments 
respond to terrorism with counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The study sort to answer the following questions: - 
 
1. What is the nature of terrorism and counterterrorism in sub-
Saharan Africa and what distinguishes it from terrorism in 
other regions? 
2. What conditions or set of conditions are necessary and or 
sufficient to facilitate or impede human rights in 
counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa? 
3. What other factors and conditions not previously predicted by 
theory and empirical findings, unique to the social and political 
systems of sub-Saharan Africa appear to facilitate or impede 
human rights in counterterrorist policies in the region. 
 
1.5. Chapter Outline  
 
This dissertation is organised into seven chapters. Chapter two 
discuses in depth the nature of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa and 
highlights what distinguishes it from terrorism in other regions.  
 
Chapter three elaborates what is counterterrorism and discusses the 
various measures applied in sub-Saharan Africa within the framework 
of the two main approaches to counterterrorism i.e. military and 
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criminal justice approaches. The chapter then proceeds to elaborate 
the understanding of human rights in sub-Saharan Africa and 
describes the structure of their application, promotion and 
protection, before discussing the main human rights issues and 
concerns associated with counterterrorist policies in the region.  
 
Chapter four reviews the factors and conditions that are predicted to 
facilitate or impede human rights in counterterrorist policies. 
Specifically, the chapter examines prepositions advanced by liberal 
democratic and constructivist theoretical perspectives and extant 
empirical studies that have examined the relationship between 
terrorism, counterterrorism and human rights. Based on this review, 
the chapter identifies and isolates specific variables that measure 
macrosocial conditions that are hypothesised to be necessary to 
facilitate human rights in counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
Chapter five outlines the procedure for empirically establishing which 
of the macro social conditions or combinations of conditions 
hypothesised in chapter four are necessary to facilitate or impede 
human rights in counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Specifically, it describes the analytical design, selection of cases, 
selection and measurement of variables, sources of data, and methods 
of data collection and analysis. 
 
Relying on version 3.0 of the open source fsQCA software developed 
by C. C. Ragin and Davey (2016), chapter six begins with an analysis of 
necessary conditions followed by an analysis of combinations of 
conditions sufficient to facilitate or impede human rights in 
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counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter also 
analyses the case of Mali to illustrate the findings and uncover 
relevant additional variables not previously considered or predicted 
by theory and extant empirical studies but which come to bear on 
human rights outcomes in times of counterterrorism in indigenous 
African societies.  
 
In conclusion, chapter seven summarises the main findings of the 
study, discusses their implications for theory, methods and policy, and 
makes some recommendations for future academic and policy 
research as well as for the design and implementation of 



















2.  TERRORISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
 
“Terrorism is like pornography, difficult to describe and define 





2.1. Introduction   
 
Terrorism is an old phenomenon, dating back at least 2000 years, to 
early A.D.66-73 when it featured as a subordinate strategy in political 
and religious conflicts (Atran, 2003, p. 1535; Garrison, 2003, p. 39; 
Laqueur, 1977, p. 7; 1999, pp. 10-11; Rapoport, 2001, p. 419; Shughart, 
2006, p. 13; Silke, 2008, p. 19). As the concept, ‘terror’, it was first 
codified in early 18th century by Maximilien Robespierre to mean the 
systematic use of violence to attain political ends (Atran, 2003, p. 
1535). In 1795, Edmund Burke added the word ‘terrorist’ to the English 
lexicon and later defined as ‘systeme, regime de la terreur’ in the 
Dictionmaire of the academie franciase in 1798 (Atran, 2003, p. 1535; 
Halliday, 2004, p. 3; Laqueur, 1977, p. 6; Rapoport, 2001, p. 419; 
Shughart, 2006, p. 13).  
 
Despite having long history, there is no agreement among academic 
and non-academic communities on a common definition of terrorism. 
This is because the concept is plagued by indeterminacy, subjectivity 
and political disagreements over whether all forms of subversive and 
state violence should be included within the definition (Boeke, 2016, 
p. 916; Hoffman, 2004, p. 936; Khan, 2016, p. 7; Kielsgard, 2005, p. 281; 
Saul, 2008, p. 196). In addition, the way terrorism manifests is quite 
amorphous in nature. Warbrick (2004, p. 1001) for example observes 
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that it can range from a bomb attack by a single-issue-single-activist, 
to an elaborate violent campaign by an organised group seeking 
fundamental change. In many instances therefore, those who are 
considered terrorists in some quarters are considered liberators, 
freedom fighters, human rights champions, defenders of national 
interests etc. in other quarters. Nevertheless, for purposes of 
advancing academic research and discussion, many in the academic 
community including Botha (2008b, p. 30); Cilliers (2003, p. 91); Forest 
and Giroux (2011, p. 1); Ignatieff (2002, p. 1146); Kozera (2018, pp. 11-12); 
Laqueur (1999, p. 8); Saul (2008, p. 196); Warbrick (2004, p. 989) 
consider terrorism to mean the ‘use of violence or the threat of 
violence not motivated by financial gain by a state or non-state actor’, 
and any combination of at least two of the following elements:  
 
(a) to cause death, serious bodily injury or endanger life and 
property;  
(b) against civilians or non-combatants to create extreme fear;  
(c) calculated to seriously intimidate a population or part of a 
population;  
(d) unduly compel a government or an international organisation 
to do or to abstain from doing any act;  
(e) for a political, ideological, religious or ethnic purpose. 
 
The element of state or non-state actor distinguishes between state 
and non-state terrorism. See also Edwards and Gill (2002, p. 207); 
Finckenauer (2005, pp. 65-67); P. Williams (1997, p. 1) who make a 
distinction between terrorism and organised crime. 
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Though the definition outlined above is useful for empirical research, 
it cannot be blindly applied to the study of terrorism and conditions 
for human rights in counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa without 
considering the region’s unique attributes as a social and political 
system. This is because, as observed by Botha (2008b, p. 28); Sartori 
(1970); A. Schmid (2004), highly contentious concepts run the danger 
of ‘conceptual stretching’ or misrepresenting facts if applied in a 
generic manner to the understanding of observed phenomenon across 
different regions with taking into account geopolitical differences. 
Based on this understanding and an interpretation of certain unique 
aspects of violence that have featured in the history of the political 
development of region, terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa can be 
considered to manifest in four broad categories i.e.: 
 
(a) Anti-colonial terrorism;  
(b) Terrorism in national conflicts  
(c) Terrorism in regional conflicts  
(d) Jihadi terrorism.  
 
Makinda (2007)  employs a similar classification scheme but treats 
terrorism in the context of Israeli-Palestinian conflict and terrorism 
related to the rise of al Qaeda’s global jihadi ideologies as two distinct 
types. Here, it is argued that the two are not distinct because, to justify 
their actions, terrorists in both categories advance arguments that 
refer to social and political grievances of Muslims populations both in 
Palestine and globally. See also Atwan (2008); Glickman (2003, p. 165); 
Kimunguyi (2011, p. 10); McCormack (2005, pp. 2-4); Ousman (2004, 
p. 69) who link the emergence of al Qaeda and Islamism to issues 
affecting the Muslim world including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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This chapter discuses in depth the nature of terrorism and how it 
manifests in sub-Saharan Africa through the lens of the four categories 
outlined above. It also highlights what distinguishes terrorism in sub-
Saharan Africa from other regions.  
 
2.2. Anti-Colonial Terrorism  
 
According to several accounts, among them Halliday (2004, p. 4); 
Rapoport in Kaplan (2011, p. 6); Morgan (2004, p. 3); Shughart (2006, 
p. 14), terrorism as we know it today first appeared on African soil on 
the morning of 8th May 1945, when approximately 8,000 strong 
protesters demonstrated in the market town of S´etif, calling for the 
independence of Algeria from France, sparking off a wave of violent 
anti-colonial struggles both in and out of Africa. Thereafter, terrorist-
like tactics could be traced both to the colonial state, and the violent 
wing of the Pan-African anti-colonial struggle championed by Frantz 
Fanon and followed by the more radical liberation leaders9 (Cooper, 
1994, p. 1521; Ewi & Aning, 2006, p. 35; Friedlander, 1981, p. 281; 
Hübschle, 2011, p. 3; Omotola, 2008, p. 43; Shughart, 2006, p. 34; 
Wantchékon & García-Ponce, 2013, p. 7; Welfling, 1979, pp. 450-458). 
For example, in May 1983, the military wing of the African National 
Congress (ANC), Umkhonto we Sizwe detonated a street car bomb 
targeting South African Air Force personnel killing 19 people and 
injuring more than 200 others (Clapham, 2003; Forest & Giroux, 2011, 
p. 3; P. Kagwanja, 2006, p. 74; Presley, 1988, p. 505). In the 1950s, the 
Mau Mau movement in Kenya not only selected and killed British 
settlers commonly by six blows to the head and chopping their bodies 
                                                 
9 In 1884/85, the Berlin Conference set the rules of colonial occupation in Africa and 
by 1900 Africa had been curved up by European powers for colonial occupation 
(Ndege, 2009, p. 2; Welfling, 1979, p. 447)  
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into pieces,  it was  also notorious for burning to death African 
loyalists who collaborated with the British colonial administration 
(Cooper, 1994, p. 1522; Lonsdale, 1990, pp. 394, 398). Table 2.1 presents 
some of the prominent violent Pan-African anti-colonial movements 
whose strategies included terrorist-like tactics.  
 
Table 2.1: Violent anticolonial movements in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Colony  Colonial 
state 
Liberation movement  
Algeria France  Front de Liberation Nationale 
Guinea 
Bissau 
France  Portido Africano da 
Independencia da Guinie´ e Carbo 
Verde (PIACC) 
 
Carbo Verde France  Portido Africano da 
Independencia da Guinie´ e Carbo 
Verde (PIACC) 
 
Mozambique Portugal  Fronte de Liberatacåo de 
Moçambique (FRELIMO) 
 
Angola  Portugal  Movimento Popular de 
Liberataçao de Angola (MPLA), 
Frente de Nacional de Liberataçao 
de Angola (FNLA) and  Union 
Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola  
 
Zimbabwe  Britain  Zimbabwe African National Union 
– Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) 
Namibia Britain, 
Germany  
South West Africa National 
Union (SWANU) 
 
South Africa  Netherlands  African National Congress (ANC) 
Madagascar  France  Mouvement démocratique de la 
rénovation malgache (MDRM) 
Kenya Britain  Mau Mau 
Cameroon France, 
Britain  
Union of the Peoples of Cameroon 
(UPC) 
(Clapham, 2003; Forest & Giroux, 2011, p. 3; Glickman, 2003, p. 165; Presley, 1988, p. 
505; Tishken, 2008, pp. 262-269; Wantchékon & García-Ponce, 2013, p. 78). 
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Whether certain aspects of anti-colonial violence in sub-Saharan 
Africa and in deed the once colonised world were terrorist in nature 
depended on which side of the ‘colonial-anticolonial’ debate on one 
favoured (Friedlander, 1981, p. 282; Glickman, 2003, p. 165; Howard, 
2010, p. 964; Tishken, 2008, pp. 262-269; Wantchékon & García-
Ponce, 2013, p. 78). For example, ANC leader Nelson Mandela, 
imprisoned for terrorist acts by the apartheid regime in South Africa 
in 1964 and designated a ‘terrorist’ by Western states, embarrassingly 
remained on the U.S. list of designated terrorists until 2008, despite 
being released from prison in 1990 and becoming President of South 
Africa in 1994 (Busher, 2014, p. 2; Cronin, 2008; Mimi Hall, 2008; Villa-
Vicencio, 2014).  
 
Since all countries in sub-Saharan Africa have since gained their 
independence, it is only possible to assert that anticolonial terrorism 
is no longer tenable as a conceptual or empirical typology. In its place, 
what continues to manifest is what we can consider as its close cousin, 
and for the lack of a better concept we may refer to as ‘secession 
terrorism’. This brand of terrorism like activity occurs in places like 
the English-speaking regions of Bamenda and Buea in Western 
Cameroon, the Somali dominated Oromia region in Ethiopia and the 
Taureg dominated Northern region of Mali. In these places, 
insurgents continue to wage violent separatist campaigns against the 
state and employ varying terrorist like terrorist strategies.  
 
Despite coming to its logical conclusion, it may be argued that in the 
history of the study of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa or in deed 
elsewhere, it is only anticolonial terrorism that is known to have 
achieved its stated objectives i.e. national independence. This view 
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and the evidence supplied by the end of colonialism in the world 
challenges those who have claimed that terrorism as a strategy of 
waging conflict is prone to failure and has never archived its stated 
objectives e.g. Abrahms (2006); Fortna (2015); Freedman (2007). 
 
2.3. Terrorism in National Conflicts  
 
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have at one time or another 
been subject to viscous internal conflicts in which terrorist like 
activities are perpetrated by both state and non-state actors. Because 
of the regions high ethnic, religious and linguistic fractionalisation, 
many of these conflicts have ethnic and or religious dimensions that 
are deeply rooted in primordial political rivalries over power, territory 
and economic resources (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & 
Wacziarg, 2003, p. 163; P. Kagwanja, 2006, p. 84; Mair, 2003, p. 2; 
Ousman, 2004, p. 76; Shinn, 2003). However, despite the prevalence 
of ethicised violent conflicts in the region, terrorism in the context of 
these conflicts has received far much less academic attention. For 
example, referring to this type of terrorism as ‘ethnic terrorism’ 
Kaplan (2011, p. 6) notes that accounts of the evolution of terrorism 
such as Laqueur (1977, 1986, 1996, 1999); Rapoport (2001); Shughart 
(2006) fail to account for this dimension of terrorism prevalent in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
Some of the countries that have experienced the most vicious 
ethnically motivated political violence in the region include: Angola, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leon, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Liberia and Zimbabwe. In most 
of these conflicts, terrorist tactics have included e.g. burning live 
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victims to death, mutilation of body parts, decapitation, mass rape, 
kidnapping for ransom, kidnapping children and forcing them to 
become child-soldiers, porters, and/or sexual slaves, bombing and 
destruction of infrastructure etc.10 (Apuuli, 2004, p. 395; Chau, 2008, 
pp. 29, 34; Cilliers, 2003, p. 100; Collier & Vicente, 2012, pp. 33-36; 
Dunn, 2004, pp. 138-142; Margaret Hall, 1990, p. 52; Howard, 2010, p. 
964; Johnson, 2014, p. 300; A. Keith, 2007, p. 149; Lemarchand, 1995, p. 
8; Robinson & Ghahraman, 2008, p. 981; T. Young, 1990, pp. 497-498).  
 
These aspects of violence are not qualitatively different from some of 
the methods employed by terrorist groups proscribed by the UN 
Security Council.11  For example, the radical Sunni Islamist group, 
Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as the Islamic 
state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) carries out public decapitation of its 
victims in various countries. See Friis (2015); Zech and Kelly (2015). 
Similar methods have been employed by Mungiki in ethnically 
motivated political violence in Kenya (P. M. Kagwanja, 2003; Klopp & 
Kamungi, 2007). The only tactical difference between ISIS and 
Mungiki is that, while the former employs an elaborate propaganda 
strategy aimed at disseminating the images to as far and wide an 
audience as possible to generate mass fear and terror, the latter does 
not. In addition, there is no qualitative difference between ethnic 
                                                 
10 For example, burning of 80 students of the Kichwamba Technical College in the 
Kabarole district of Uganda in 1998 and the burning of post-election violence victims 
in a church and a house in Kenya in 2008. See Forest and Giroux (2011, pp. 8-9); P. 
Kagwanja (2006, p. 78); Klopp and Kamungi (2007). Forest also cites the example of 
48 explosive devices detonated in and around Kampala, killing approximately 50 
people and injuring an estimated 200 others between 1998 and 2001 by Allied 






violence in sub-Saharan Africa in which terrorist like activity occurs 
and racial violence in places like Europe and the U.S. in which armed 
groups such as Black Panthers, Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nation, Posse 
Comitatus, neo-Nazi are known to have committed terrorist acts 
including but not limited to mass shootings and detonation of bombs 
See alsoKaplan (2011, p. 6); Laqueur (1999, pp. 29-30, 87, 107-108).  
 
The argument that communal level conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, 
especially ethnic motivated conflicts account for much of terrorism 
activity in the region finds empirical support in data compiled by 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), of the Department of Peace 
and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD).  
 
UCDP defines three types of intrastate conflicts: non-state conflicts 
(communal and organized armed violence where none of the parties 
is the government of a state); one-sided violence (intentional attacks 
on civilians by governments and formally organized armed groups) 
and dyadic conflicts (armed attacks where at least one party is the 
government of a state).   See Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 
(2017); (Eck & Hultman, 2007; Harbom, Melander, & Wallensteen, 
2008; Pettersson & Eck, 2018; Sundberg, Eck, & Kreutz, 2012).  
 
The GTD broadly defines a terrorist attack ‘as the intentional, 
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state 
actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through 
fear, coercion, or intimidation’. However, recognising the problems of 
applying a generic definition of terrorism, the GTD allows researchers 
to truncate data based on a criteria terrorism that best suits their 
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research needs. Counting only successful attacks of essentially no 
doubt of terrorism that resulted into at least ten deaths and including 
only countries with full data for all variables, correlation analysis in 
table 2 shows that the only significant association (r = .83, p = .00, 1-
tailed) is between communal and organized armed violence where 
none of the parties is the government of a state (non-state conflicts) 
and terrorism.  
 
This result suggests that most terrorist violence in sub-Saharan Africa 
occurs in the context of communal violence over local issues such as 
ethnicity, religion, local politics, shared resources etc. This result is 
supported by Bertram and Ellison (2014) who in their study “Sub 
Saharan African Terrorist Groups’ use of the Internet” find that out of 
112 terror related websites studied, 72 (64.3%) were linked to quasi 
legitimate guerrilla groups, insurgent groups, organised criminal 














Table 2.2: Intrastate conflicts and terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa (1998 – 
2017) 
 
Country Name Non-state One sided Dyadic Terrorism 
Burundi 4 17 20 18 
Cameroon 2 2 5 30 
Central African Republic 18 24 9 36 
Chad 5 2 16 16 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 48 85 29 72 
Cote d'Ivoire 9 10 6 2 
Ethiopia 45 7 38 15 
Guinea 3 2 2 3 
Kenya 36 8 3 21 
Mali 15 1 23 11 
Nigeria 117 17 13 389 
Senegal 1 4 5 2 
South Sudan 22 9 10 34 
Sudan 75 25 46 48 
Uganda 24 4 27 28 
Total  424 217 252 725 
Multiple R 0.83 0.19 0.02  
R Square 0.68 0.04 0.00  
Standard Error 18.98 21.44 13.95  
Observations 15.00 15.00 15.00  
t Stat 5.27 0.71 0.05  
P-value 0.00 0.49 0.96  
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, retrieved from https://ucdp.uu.se/  (Allansson 
et al., 2017; Eck & Hultman, 2007; Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 
2002; Harbom et al., 2008; Pettersson & Eck, 2018; Sundberg et al., 2012). National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). 




An important aspect of terrorism in the context of intrastate conflicts 
in sub-Saharan Africa is terror perpetrated by agents of the state or 
simply state terrorism. Because modern states are based on the 
Weberian concept of state monopoly of the legitimate use of violence 
justified by the need protect society from evils and anarchy, states 
even at the UN are unable to agree on a common definition of 
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terrorism, even though some or their agents commit very atrocious 
acts (Claridge, 1996, pp. 48-52; M. Weber, 2009).  It is not surprising 
therefore that in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the regional body ‘the 
African Union’ opted for a vague definition of terrorism contained in 
article 1(3)(a) of the ‘OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism’12 by leaving the final responsibility of 
determining what is terrorism to individual states and national laws.  
 
According to Claridge (1996, pp. 48-52) and Kimunguyi (2011, p. 3), we 
may consider state terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa to mean ‘the 
systematic use or threat to use violence by agents or proxies of the 
state’ plus any configuration of the following elements: 
 
(a) operating with resources of the state;  
(b) for unlawful political objectives;  
(c) calculated to generate fear and communicate a message to a 
wider group than the intended victims who at the time of the 
act are neither armed nor organised for aggression.  
 
Moore (2002, p. 885) adds that state terrorism also includes turning a 
blind eye to the actions of state agents in circumstances where the 
state stands to benefits from unrestrained action even if there is no 
official extant state terror policy.  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa,  the systematic use of violence or threat of 
violence on civilians based on ethnicity, religion, political persuasion 
or region has for a long time (especially the period before the early 




1990s) formed part of the policy and political strategy of many 
governments, often in the pretext of either maintaining civic order or 
countering terrorism (Botha, 2008b, p. 31; Busher, 2014, p. 2; 
Hamilton, 2009, p. 39). This type of violence manifests in various 
forms e.g. facilitating armed militia to intimidate voters and silence 
dissent; use of government aircraft to bomb civilian populations 
perceived to support opposition; brutal crackdowns against and 
targeted killings of opposition leaders; instigating and facilitating 
deadly ethnic violence for political expediency; creation of secret 
police squads with legal discretion to detain, invade, kill, and torture 
at the state’s behest for purposes of terrifying opposition voices etc. 
See Adar and Munyae (2001, pp. 8-9); Cilliers (2003, p. 100); Dersso 
(2009, p. 6); Flint (2009, pp. 19-37, 46); Forest and Giroux (2011, p. 5); 
Howard (2010, p. 964); Kimunguyi (2011, p. 5); Leeson (2007, p. 693); 
Ogbonnaya (2016, p. 187); Stanton (2004, pp. 1-2); Tiba (2007, p. 513); 
Wolf (2006, pp. 134, 198).  
 
In some countries, state terrorism has led to social and political 
outcomes of significant historical proportions. For example, in what 
became the first African trial of an entire regime before a national 
court, former Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Mengistu Haile Mariam’s 
government (1974-1991) was charged and sentenced before the 
Ethiopian Federal High Court for among other charges the summary 
execution of 60 prominent individuals on 23 November 1974 (Forest & 
Giroux, 2011, p. 5; Makinda, 2007, p. 17; Tiba, 2007, p. 513). The former 
President of Sudan, General Omar al-Bashir, became the first sitting 
Head of State to be indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
for crimes against humanity for the genocide in Darfur13.  In Somalia, 
                                                 
13 See https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/pages/alleged-crimes.aspx  
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the reign of terror presided over by former President Said Barre (e.g. 
the indiscriminate bombing of Issaq-inhabited northern Somalia - ‘the 
Isaaq Genocide or the Hargeisa Holocaust’ - between 1987 and 1989 
killing an estimated 50,000-100,000 people) led to collapse of the state 
in 1990 followed by the birth of al Shabaab which has risen to become 
one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most viscous terrorist group (Barnes & 
Hassan, 2007; Dersso, 2009; Gettleman, Mazzetti, & Schmitt, 2011; 
Menkhaus, 2003; Murunga, 2009; Ogbonnaya, 2016, p. 187; Powell, 
Ford, & Nowrasteh, 2008; Wise, 2011).  
 
Though correlation analysis in table 2.2 suggests that there exist only 
small and insignificant associations between terrorism and 
intentional attacks on civilians by governments and formally 
organized armed groups i.e. one-sided violence (r = .19, p = .49, 1-
tailed); and between terrorism  and armed attacks where at least one 
party is the government of a state i.e. dyadic conflicts (r = .02, p = .96, 
1-tailed), instances of state terrorism as described by Claridge (1996, 
pp. 48-52) and Kimunguyi (2011, p. 3) have been documented in the 
context of communal and organized armed violence where none of 
the parties is the government of a state. Some of these instances 
involve state sponsored armed militias (surrogate armies) or the state 
turning a blind eye to activities of armed groups when it stands to 
benefit politically.  For example, the government of Sudan sponsored 
the Janjaweed (devils on horseback) militia’s brutal campaign of 
slaughter and rape in Darfur (2003-04) targeting civilians from three 
non-Arab ethnic groups (the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa) for alleged 
insurgency against the government Flint (2009); Howard (2010, p. 
964); A. Keith (2007, p. 149). At various times, the government of Mali 
sponsored Songhay and Fulani militias (Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso 
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respectively) in the fight against Taureg insurgents in the north while 
allowing them to profit from illegal enterprise in exchange of returned 
rents and loyalty (Amadou, 2019; Bøås & Torheim, 2013; Kozera, 2018, 
p. 20). 
 
Descriptive analysis of data obtained from the Political Terror Scale 
(PTS) further illustrates the veracity of state terrorism in sub-Saharan 
Africa. See table 2.3. Since the early 1980s, Social Scientists have relied 
on the PTS to empirically determine whether states violate 
international human rights standards. The PTS defines political terror 
as the violation of basic human rights to physical integrity of the 
person by agents of the state within territorial boundaries of the state.  
The scale is based on a 5-point score where 5 represents countries in 
which terror has expanded to the whole population since leaders place 
no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue 
personal or ideological goals. A score of 1 or 2 represents countries in 
which political terror is non-existent or limited. According to the PTS, 
out of 45 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for which data is available 
for the period 1998 – 2017, over two thirds or 33 countries have average 
scores that range between 3 and 5. This implies that in these countries, 
political terror and violation of basic human rights to physical 









Table 2.3: Political terror in sub-Saharan Africa (1998 – 2017) 




Burkina Faso 2 
Burundi 4 
Cameroon 3 
Central African Republic 4 
Chad 4 
Comoros 2 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 5 
Congo, Rep. 3 
Cote d'Ivoire 3 























Sierra Leone 3 
Somalia 4 
South Africa 3 







Source: Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, and Daniel Arnon. 2017. 




A feature of terrorism in the context of intrastate conflicts in sub-
Saharan Africa that transcends both state and non-state terrorism is 
assassination of opponents. Many of the political assassinations that 
have occurred in the region took place between the 1960’s soon after 
independence of most states and the early 1990’s. Much of this period 
was also characterised by cold war politics during which foreign 
sponsored coups and counter coups were a recurring feature of 
political contests over power and influence in the region. See 
Baynham (1994, p. 41); Straus (2012, p. 179). Examples of high profile 
assassinations include: Patrice Lumumba once Prime Minister of 
Congo in 1961;  President Sylvanus Olympio (Togo, 1963); Pierre 
Ngendandumwe and Joseph Bamina, Prime Ministers (Burundi, 1965); 
Pinto Gama Pinto a prominent member of Parliament (Kenya, 1965); 
Federal Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Johnson 
Aguiyi-Ironsi, military head of state (Nigeria, 1966); Tom Mboya 
prominent minister and trade unionist (Kenya, 1969); J. M. Kariuki a 
prominent member of Parliament (Kenya, 1975); Presiden Murtala 
Ramat Mohammed (Nigeria, 1976); Steve Biko anti-apartheid activist 
(South Africa, 1977); President Captain Thomas Sankara (Burkina 
Faso, 987); Foreign Minister Dr. Robert Ouko (Kenya, 1990) among 
others. See Mazrui (1968, pp. 41-42); Tamarkin (1978, p. 298); Wilkins 
(1989, p. 376). The most catastrophic was the assassination of Juvenal 
Habyarimana (President of Rwanda) and his counterpart Cyprien 
Ntaryamira (President of Burundi) on the evening of 6 April 1994. The 
fatal downing of the presidential plane triggered a genocide that 
claimed hundreds of thousands of lives in 100 days and whose roots 
lay in decades of ethno-political tensions between Hutu and Tutsi 
communities (Lemarchand, 1995, p. 8; Robinson & Ghahraman, 2008, 
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p. 981). Besides these specific examples, diverse sources indicate that 
since 1828, at least four kings and twenty-one presidents/heads of 
state have been assassinated in sub-Saharan Africa14. According to the 
GTD, between 1970 and 2017, a total of 1,101 assassination incidents of 
essentially no doubt of terrorism took place in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
2.4. Terrorism in Regional Conflicts  
 
Less common in sub-Saharan Africa today is terrorism that occurs in 
the context of regional conflicts. The few documented instances have 
mainly involved states in Eastern, Horn and Central sub-regions. For 
example, between 1989 and 1999 Sudan was accused of engaging in 
subversive activities against regimes in Algeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya 
and Tunisia e.g. failed assassination attempts against the presidents of 
Tunisia in 1991 and Egypt in 1995 (Dagne, 2002, pp. 8-16; Howard, 2010, 
p. 964; Lesch, 2002, pp. 203-204; Lyman & Morrison, 2004, p. 78; 
Shinn, 2003). Also, it is in Sudan that Osama bin Laden founded his 
terror organisation al Qaeda during his stay there between 1991 and 
1994 on invitation of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, then leader of Sudan's 
National Islamic Front (NIF) and very close associate to then Sudan's 
military ruler General Omar Hassan al-Beshir (Lesch, 2002; Makinda, 
2007, p. 17).  
 
State sponsored subversive activities have been implicated in conflicts 
involving Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. For example, Ethiopia 
and Kenya on the one side, have at different times traded accusations 
and counter accusations with Somalia. The two states have for a long 
time accused Somalia of acting as a contagion state and supporting 
                                                 
14 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_assassinated_in_Africa 
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subversive in their territories perpetrated by irredentist Somali armed 
groups agitating for secession to join their kin and kith in Somalia 
(Adamu, 2009, p. 5; Castagno, 1964, pp. 166-184; Dagne, 2002, p. 18; 
Dersso, 2009, pp. 25-26; Yousaf & Wakhu, 2020, pp. 7-12). In similar 
fashion, a border dispute15 was the cause of accusations and counter 
accusations of subversive activities between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
leading to Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006 with U.S. backing 
which kicked out al-Shabaab and the ICU from Mogadishu accusing 
Eritrea of involvement with al-Shabaab and plots against African 
leaders gathering in Addis Ababa  (Abbink, 2003, pp. 413-415; 
Clapham, 1998, p. 1; Dersso, 2009, p. 36; Forest & Giroux, 2011, p. 5; 
Wise, 2011, p. 2). Accusations of terrorist like subversive activities have 
also featured in contestations between Sudan and Uganda, Uganda 
and South Sudan,  Rwanda and Uganda,  Rwanda and Democratic 
Republic of Congo (Apuuli, 2004, p. 394; Uwiringiyimana, 2019).  In 
the mid to late-1990’s eight militaries from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, 
Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe got involved in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in what has been described as the most 
epic regional conflict in sub-Saharan and came to be dubiously 
referred to as  ‘Africa’s world war’ or ‘Africa’s great war’ (Lamb, 2011, p. 
43; Lyman & Morrison, 2004, pp. 84-86; Prunier, 2008; Shearer, 1999). 
 
                                                 
15 The disputed border, a straight line between the rivers Mareb and Takazze and 
the village of Badme,  led to a brutal war between the two states in May 1998 that 
ended with a peace agreement in December 2000, which the established of the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) and later the disputed region 
awarded to Eritrea in 2002 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague 
(Abbink, 2003, pp. 407-408; Clapham, 1998, p. 1). Ethiopia never recognised the 




2.5. Jihadi Terrorism 
 
Currently, Jihadi terrorism is the most complex and serious security 
threat in sub-Saharan Africa. It manifests as a local brand of global 
jihad popularised by Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda outfit. 
Essentially therefore, Jihadi terrorism is a type of international 
terrorism. The widely used definition of international terrorism is the 
one supplied by “the Palermo Convention” ("United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime," 2004, p. 6). 
According to this definition, international terrorism is a terrorist act 
that is committed in  
 
(a) more than one state;  
(b) one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, 
direction or control takes place in another state;  
(c) one state but involves an organized criminal group that 
engages in criminal activities in more than one state or  
(d) one state but has substantial effects in another state. 
 
Though jihadi terrorism began to gain currency as a terrorist 
phenomenon and academic attention as an analytical typology in the 
early 1990s, it is an old phenomenon which Halliday (2004, p. 4); 
Rapoport (2001); Shughart (2006, p. 14) trace to the Iranian revolution 
in 1979 and credit its introduction at the international stage to the 
hijacking of an El Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv on 22nd  July 1968 by 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Arguably, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is one of the most significant precursors to Jihadi 
terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa (Atwan, 2008). According to P. 
Kagwanja (2006, p. 74), sub-Saharan Africa’s early contact with 
aspects of terrorism related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates 
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back to the 1940s during the colonial era when leaders of two Israeli 
groups that employed terrorism to fight for a state of Israel (the Irgun 
and Stern Gang) were detained in Kenya. Thereafter, only a few 
incidents that took place in the 1970s and 1980s can be accounted for. 
The most dramatic incident was the hijacking of a French plane from 
Athens to Kampala in 1976 in a collaborative effort between the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Uganda’s ldi 
Amin Dada (Makinda, 2007, p. 17). Table 2.4 lists terrorism incidents 
on sub-Saharan African soil related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 
Table 2.4: Terrorism incidents in SSA related to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict 



































Own table adapted from Cass (2013, p. 11); Forest and Giroux (2011, p. 2); Halliday 
(2004, p. 1); Hoffman (2004, p. 304); P. Kagwanja (2006, p. 74); Kimunguyi (2011, p. 
5); Laqueur (1977, 1986, 1996, 1999); Lyman and Morrison (2004, p. 75); Makinda 
(2007, p. 17); Morgan (2004, p. 4); Omotola (2008, p. 43); Piombo (2007, p. 4); 
Rapoport (2001); Shinn (2003); Shughart (2006); Silke (2008, p. 28). https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm. PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of 




Since the 1986 attack in Sudan targeting the U.S., there is no evidence 
of any terrorist attack linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on sub-
Saharan Africa soil. The main reason why this conflict has so far had a 
brief terrorism foot print in sub-Saharan Africa is that unlike other 
places (e.g. the Middle East), many states in the region and their 
Muslim populations have consistently remained politically on the 
periphery as far as the conflict is concerned (Gasiorowski, 2016; 
Glickman, 2003, p. 74; P. Kagwanja, 2006, p. 165; Makinda, 2007, p. 15). 
 
What has replaced the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a source of 
terrorism with religious dimensions in sub-Saharan Africa is jihadi 
terrorism inspired by jihadi ideologies popularised by Osama bin 
Laden and his al Qaeda outfit. Jihadi ideologies are based on Islamism 
which unlike Islamic fundamentalism seeks the introduction of Islam 
in politics and society with the objective of creating modern Islamic 
states and at best a caliphate through jihad and martyrdom as the vital 
means of achieving this objective (P. Kagwanja, 2006, p. 75; 
Kimunguyi, 2011, p. 8; Ousman, 2004, pp. 72-77). The fact that Osama 
bin Laden used Sudan as a haven where he founded al Qaeda and 
planned the organisation’s maiden attacks on August 7, 1998 targeting 
U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam killing over 250 people 
and injuring over 5,000 makes sub-Saharan Africa the laboratory 
where al Qaeda inspired global jihadi terrorism was manufactured, 
tested and launched to the world. See Bergen (2002); Bergen (2006); 
Dagne (2002, pp. 8-16); Glickman (2003, p. 167); Howard (2010, p. 964); 
Lesch (2002); Lobel (1999, p. 537); Lyman and Morrison (2004, p. 78); 
Makinda (2007, p. 17); Shinn (2003); Taylor and Elbushra (2006).  
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According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), terrorism 
incidents in sub-Saharan Africa increased by 578% from 227 incidents 
in 1991 (when Osama bin Laden’s arrived in Sudan) to 1,539 incidents 
in 2018. The most affected sub-regions are Eastern & Horn of Africa 
and Western Africa. As shown in figure 2.1, these two sub-regions have 
higher total and Muslim populations which create an environment 
where the diffusion of Islamist ideologies becomes faster and easier 
translating into more incidents of jihadi terrorism.  
 
Figure 2.1: Proportion of Muslim population and terrorist attacks by sub-
region.   
 
Source: The CIA World Fact book 2019 Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/; National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). 
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See also Ogbonnaya (2016, pp. 190-191); Warner (2017, p. 28)  who 
relies on extant data  to show that there are more Islamist terrorist 
organisations in East and West Africa than any other part of sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
Some scholars such as Ellis (2004, p. 459); Forest (2011, p. 11); Glickman 
(2003, p. 168); Howard (2010, p. 961); Hübschle (2011, p. 10); P. 
Kagwanja (2006, p. 75); Kimunguyi (2011, pp. 2-3); Lyman and 
Morrison (2004, p. 77); Omotola (2008, pp. 44-45); Shinn (2003)  argue 
that Eastern & Horn of Africa and Western Africa sub-regions record 
higher incidents of terrorism generally and jihadi terrorism 
specifically because they share geographical proximity and bonds of 
history with the Middle East, facilitating the movements of jihadi 
militants across the two regions, exposing them to sectarian conflicts 
propagated by Islamism.  
 
Several factors make Jihadi terrorism the most complex security 
problem in the history of the social and political development of sub-
Saharan Africa. Its metamorphosis is a function of unknown variables 
except for two constants i.e. the commitment to Islamist ideologies 
and the goal of establishing a sub-Saharan Africa Islamic theocracy or 
caliphate. The formation and reformation of jihadi terrorist groups is 
an endless cycle determined by any configuration of hostilities, 
collaboration, mergers and splits. See Bassou (2018); Boeke (2016); Dao 
(2019); Gilmour (2019); P. Kagwanja (2006, p. 75); Kimunguyi (2011, p. 
8); Lounnas (2018); Ousman (2004, pp. 72-77); Roberto, Closs, and 
Ronconi (2013); Sangaré and McSparren (2018); Sow (2018); Stewart 
(2013); Wojtanik (2015). Table 2.5 illustrates some features of the 
complex nature of jihadi terrorist groups in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The complexity of jihadi terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa is 
compounded by the ability of local terrorist groups to fight multiple 
local versions of global Jihadi influenced by competition between al 
Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known 
as the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). These versions incorporate 
and exploit a universe of  local opportunities, issues, agendas, 
concerns, conflicts, criminal enterprise, community relations and 
kinships etc. (Bassou, 2018, pp. 3, 10; Boeke, 2016, pp. 923-927; Briscoe, 
2014, p. 41; Bullejos, 2019, pp. 65-66; Dentice, 2018, p. 2; Lebovich, 2013; 
Lecocq et al., 2013, p. 21; Lounnas, 2018, p. 14; Sigsworth, 2019, p. 8; 
Tronc, Grace, & Nahikian, 2019, p. 13). For example, al-Shabaab’s ‘Gaidi 
Mtaani’ – ‘Terrorist on the Street’ – a Swahili propaganda magazine is 
devoted to the effective propagation of the idea that Kenya’s security 
policies are merely a continuation of colonial oppression of Muslims 
and specifically those of Somali origin (Anderson & McKnight, 2015, 
pp. 22-23). See also BBC (2014); Jazeera and Agencies (2014). Anderson 
and McKnight (2015); Barnes and Hassan (2007); Boeke (2016); Dersso 
(2009) highlight instances of involvement of AQIM and al Shabaab in 
criminal enterprise, establishment of deep kinship ties through 
marriage (offering camouflage and enhanced recruitment 
opportunities), tax collection and provision of public services etc.  
Another example is the intensifying low level ancestral ‘tit-for-tat’ 
inter communal ethnic conflicts in central Mali and northern Burkina 
Faso by jihadi terrorist groups transforming them into deadly ethno-
religious conflicts (News, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; Sangaré & McSparren, 
2018, p. 15).  
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Table 2.5: Formation and reformulation of terrorist groups in SSA 
 










Split of Islamic State in Somalia 
(ISS) and the Islamic State in 
Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda (ISISSKTU) from al 
Qaeda aligned al-Shabaab in 2015; 
Split of Movement for Unity and 
Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA, 
2011) and those who Sign in Blood 
(2012) from AQIM; Split of al 
Qaeda aligned Ansari in full 
‘Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis 
Sudan’ from ISIS aligned Boko 
Haram (2012); Split of Ansar al 
Deen (“Defenders of the Faith”); 
Taureg nationalist movement 
MNLA  
Merger of AQIM 
splinters MUJAO and 
Katibat Islamist al-
Mulathameen (Masked 
Brigade, or al-Mua'qi'oon 
Biddam -Those Who 
Sign with Blood) to form 
al-Murabitun in 2013   
Ras Kamboni Brigade of 
Sheikh Ahmed Madobe 
fell out with Al-Shabaab 
in Somalia and the 
Taureg rebel movement 
MNLA fell out with the 
coalition of terrorists 
made of AQIM, Ansar 
Dine and MUJWA that 
had pushed it out of 
Kidal, Gao and 
Timbuktu. Both Ras 
Kamboni Brigade and 
MNLA joined CT efforts 







   
AQIM, Ansar al-Din, the 
Macina brigade and Al-
Mourabitoun merged in 
2017 to form the Jamaat 
Nusrat al-Islam Wa al-
Muslimin (JNIM), a 
group that analysts 
described as the largest 
and most powerful 
gathering of terrorists in 
the history of sub-
Saharan Africa  
Collaboration between 
Al-Murabitun and 
AQIM in attacks on 
the Grand Bassam 
hotel in Cote, d’Ivoire 
(2016), Splendid hotel 
in Burkina Faso (2016), 
and Radisson Blu hotel 
in Mali Bamako (2015) 
which killed in total at 
least 67 people   
Source: Own table. See Anderson and McKnight (2015); Arieff (2013, p. 10); Australia (2018); Bassou (2018, p. 7); Boeke (2016, 
p. 915); Briscoe (2014, p. 45); Bullejos (2019, p. 66); Dentice (2018, p. 6); Filiu (2015, pp. 108-109; 2017, p. 170); Izak (2018, p. 307); 
Laub and Masters (2015, p. 4); Lounnas (2018, p. 12); Maïga (2016, pp. 3, 7); Ogbonnaya (2016, pp. 190-191); Pantucci and 
Jesperson (2015, p. 25); Sigsworth (2019, p. 8); Stewart (2013, pp. 41-44); Warner (2017, p. 29); Zenn (2014, p. 2).  
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Despite these complexities, some in the scholarship contend that 
chances of jihadi terrorism spreading in sub-Saharan Africa or 
developing into a genuine indigenous variant are remote. Ousman 
(2004, p. 96) argues that most if not all states in sub-Saharan Africa 
are secular compelling all religions to operate within established legal 
and constitutional margins which confer to the state organizational 
monopoly over social, economic and political lives of diverse groups 
and guarantee greater freedom for religious expression. Forest and 
Giroux (2011, pp. 6, 12); Glickman (2003, p. 165); Mair (2003, p. 2); 
McCormack (2005, pp. 4-5, 9-13); Ousman (2004, pp. 96, 99)  contend 
that the high degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity 
in sub-Saharan Africa generates competition and sometimes rivalry 
among different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups rendering the 
objective of political mobilization under the banner of one religion 
neither desirable nor feasible. Others observe that Islam in Africa, 
which is predominantly Sufi, was largely peacefully spread 
incorporating in its way local African traditions of tolerance and 
moderation (Forest & Giroux, 2011, p. 6; Francis, 2013, p. 10; Glickman, 
2003, pp. 74, 165; P. Kagwanja, 2006, p. 165; Mair, 2003; McCormack, 
2005, p. 4; Schulz, 2012, p. 6; Stewart, 2013, pp. 25-27).  An example 
that renders support for this reasoning is the splinter of al-Qaeda 
aligned Ansari in full ‘Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguards 
for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa)’ from ISIS aligned Boko 
Haram in 2012, condemning Boko Haram’s style of operations as 
inhuman and damaging to Muslims, accusing it of killing innocent 
Muslims, non-Muslims and security operatives while vowing to 
‘restore the dignity of Muslims in black Africa (Pantucci & Jesperson, 
2015, p. 25; Sigsworth, 2019, p. 8; Warner, 2017, p. 29). Others argue 
that sub-Saharan Africa is fairly insulated from Jihadi terrorism 
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because the region’s Muslim population and states have historically 
remained on the periphery of major issues such as the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict affecting the global Muslim Umma  (Gasiorowski, 
2016; Glickman, 2003, p. 74; P. Kagwanja, 2006, p. 165; Makinda, 2007, 
p. 15).  
 
However, signs of jihadi terrorism spreading outside its traditional 
bases in West and East sub-Saharan Africa have been observed. For 
example, since October 2017, over 100 people have been killed in 
brutal violence including the beheadings of women and children in 
Cabo Delgado in the northern province of Mozambique allegedly by a 
group calling itself Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamâ often abbreviated to al-
Sunnah (Aljazeera, 2020; Fabricius, 2018). Following the "massacre" in 
April 2020, the government of Mozambique admitted for the first time 
the presence of ISIL-affiliated fighters in the country (Aljazeera, 2020; 
BBC, 2020). According to Aljazeera (2020), Islamic State Central Africa 
Province (ISCAP) which is affiliated to ISIL, claimed some of the 
attacks in Cabo Delgado, posting images of killed soldiers and  
weapons seized.  
 
The emergence of ISIL affiliated Islamic State Central Africa Province 
(ISCAP) and Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamâ in Cabo Delgado which has a 
Muslim population of about 58% compared to 18% for the country 
(Fabricius, 2018) renders further support to the reasoning that higher 
Muslim populations make the diffusion of Islamist ideologies faster, 
easier and subsequently a higher incidence of jihadi terrorism. Besides 
conditions of state weakness and poor health of political systems, 
another factor that may facilitate the spread of Jihadi terrorism in sub-
Saharan Africa is the existence of a variety of inadequately protected 
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potential international targets e.g. business interests, citizens, 
diplomats, international organizations such as UN complexes in 
Kenya and Ethiopia etc. (Botha, 2008a, pp. 35-36; 2008b, p. 29; Cilliers, 
2003, pp. 95-99; Forest & Giroux, 2011, pp. 7-9; Howard, 2010, pp. 960-
982; Kimunguyi, 2011, pp. 3-4; Mair, 2003, p. 3; Omotola, 2008, p. 44; 




What manifests as terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa is summarised as 
in figure 2.2 below 
 
Figure 2.2: Terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Source: Own figure 
Notes:  
1. Less prevalent e.g. Sudan vs Uganda, Uganda vs South Sudan, 
Rwanda vs Uganda, Rwanda vs Democratic Republic of Congo, 
‘Africa’s world war’ or ‘Africa’s great war’  
2. Less prevalent. Only two known states: Sudan (Welcomed and used 
by Osama bin Laden as a base to establish al Qaeda) and Iddi Amin’s 
Uganda (support for the hijacking of a French plane from Athens to 
Kampala in 1976 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP). 
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3. Driven by Islamism, an ideology that seeks the establishment of 
Islamic theocracies using jihad as the vital means. Most complex 
security challenge in the history of the political development of sub-
Saharan Africa. Main groups: AQIM, al Shabaab, Boko Haram, JNIM. 
High overall and high Muslim populations are key in the diffusion. 
Signs of spread from traditional bases in Eastern and Western Africa 
to Southern Africa have emerged.  
4. Mainly driven by ethnically motivated political violence. Also 
features political assassinations. Methods do not differ from those 
applied by UN proscribed terrorist groups e.g. decapitation  
5. Autocratic governments that brutally crack down on opposition, 
including official state terror policy. State sponsorship for non-state 
armed groups that commit vicious atrocities. Turning a blind eye to 
terror by agents of the state in situations where the state stands to 
benefit politically. 
 
What makes terrorism in sub-Saharan African distinct is that it is 
essentially inward-looking even when it is directed towards distant 
targets geographically located outside the region.  The fact that there 
no indigenous sub-Saharan Africa terrorist organization that has so 
far been associated with a terrorist attack outside the region, explains 
why major global powers have for a long time procrastinated and seen 
the region as an insignificant distant threat to global peace and 
security. See Dagne (2002, p. 6); Dowd and Raleigh (2013, p. 499); 
Francis (2013, p. 10); Glickman (2003, p. 168); P. Kagwanja (2006, p. 81); 
Kingebiel (2005, pp. 35-36); Mair (2003). For example, the United 
states of Africa Command (U.S. AFRICOM), which is designed for 
military relations with African nations came into being in 200716, a 
decade after al Qaeda first attacked U.S. interests in sub-Saharan 
Africa and surprisingly, 5 years after its apocalyptic attack in the U.S. 
in September 2001 killing over 3,000 people (Rapoport, 2001; Strydom, 
2019, p. 80).  
 
                                                 
16 See https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command  
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Even though sub-Saharan Africa does not manufacture and export its 
own indigenous brand of terrorism, it acts as a logistics haven where 
foreign terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah, ISIS/ISIL, Taliban 
and al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) exploit 
enabling conditions (state weakness and poor health of political 
systems) to engage in criminal enterprise (money Laundering, trade 
in mineral such as tanzanite and diamond and trade in cocoa, 
smuggling of drugs through west Africa to Europe) to finance and plan 
offshore attacks (Danjibo, 2013, p. 20; Glickman, 2003, p. 167; 
Hübschle, 2011, p. 10; Mair, 2003, p. 3). These are the conditions that 
enabled Osama bin Laden to use sub-Saharan Africa as a base for the 















3. COUNTERTERRORISM AND RELATED 
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Having established what manifests as terrorism and its distinctive 
character in sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter examines how terrorism 
ends in the region and discusses the human rights issues and concerns 
that arise.  
 
Specifically, the chapter briefly elaborates what is counterterrorism 
and discusses the various measures applied in the region within the 
framework of the two main approaches to counterterrorism i.e. 
military and criminal justice approaches. The chapter then proceeds 
to elaborate the understanding of human rights in sub-Saharan Africa 
and describes the structure of their application, promotion and 
protection, before discussing the human rights issues and concerns 
that are associated with counterterrorist policies in the region.  
 
3.2. Approaches to Counterterrorism 
 
The problems that plague a common definition of terrorism extend to 
counterterrorism. This is because states, which bear the responsibility 
of protecting society from terrorism sometimes in the course of 
counterterrorism commit human rights violations used by terrorists 
to justify their actions (Andrew & Silke, 2018, p. 8; Busher, 2014, p. 2; 
Claridge, 1996, pp. 48-52; Field, 2017; Ford, 2013, p. 3; Sigsworth, 2019, 
p. 6; M. Weber, 2009).  
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In sub-Saharan Africa, counterterrorism generally means the whole 
range of government measures designed to prevent, deter, pre-empt, 
and respond to terrorism and deal with its consequences (Andrew & 
Silke, 2018, p. 8; Kozera, 2018, pp. 11-12).  These measures are broadly 
categorised into two main approaches i.e. military and  criminal 
justice (Andrew & Silke, 2018, p. 8; Sigsworth, 2019, p. 5). Military 
approaches rely on the use of armed force by military and civilian 
security agencies to directly combat threats through security 
operations (Kielsgard, 2005, p. 252; Sigsworth, 2019, p. 6). Criminal 
justice approaches are based on the notion of ‘criminal justice’ which 
entails the principle of fairness; cultural beliefs about right and wrong 
and the structure, function and decision processes of the criminal 
justice system (formal legal systems and informal social institutions 
that deal with enforcement of criminal law and the efficient and 
effective control and management of crime and criminal offenders) 
(DiIulio, 1992, pp. 6, 10; Farrell & Koch, 1995, p. 55; Ford, 2011, pp. 13-




The military approach incorporates several measures which include 
but not limited to peacekeeping; preventing state support for 
terrorism by threat of military intervention; developing state 
preventive capacity through military aid and cooperation; assisting in 
the orderly distribution of humanitarian aid; special operations or 
day-to-day activities in risky regions; drone warfare; targeted killing 
or capture suspected key leaders of terrorist groups (cutting off the 
snake’s head) etc. (Kielsgard, 2005, p. 252; Kozera, 2018, pp. 11-12; 
Sigsworth, 2019, p. 6). Military measures are most effective in pre-
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empting imminent threats of attacks and or when civilian authorities 
are unwilling or unable to intervene  (Kielsgard, 2005, p. 252; 
Sigsworth, 2019, p. 6). In most cases, military and security agencies 
exercise expanded powers grounded in laws that are shrouded in 
secrecy under the rubric of essential secrecy (Gupta et al., 2001, pp. 
752-753; Pyman, 2017, p. 513; Sidibe, 2018, p. 47; Sigsworth, 2019, p. 7; 
Thuo, 2009, pp. 155-156). In sub-Saharan Africa, military measures are 
applied within the framework of regional and international peace 
support operations; special security operations and 
counterinsurgency. 
3.2.1.1. Peace Support Operations (PSO) 
 
Peace support operations (PSO) are applied within the structure of 
the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African 
Union (AU) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
 
The Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is the central organ of 
the African Union (AU), assumes the overall responsibility for 
counterterrorism through the department of Peace and Security17. 
Integral to the operations of APSA are the African Standby Force 
(ASF)18; the African Centre for the Study and Research on 
Terrorism (ACSRT) and the Peace Fund.   
 
ASF is made up of civilian and military components stationed in their 
countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment in case of grave 
circumstances within a member state. The force derives its right to 
                                                 
17 See https://au.int/en/psc  
18 Comprise of civilian and military components stationed in their countries of 
origin, ready for rapid deployment. 
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intervene from the Constitutive Act of the AU. The ACSRT acts as the 
secretariat of the AU counterterrorism structure and is responsible for 
centralizing information, empirical research relevant to 
counterterrorism policy and development of continental 
counterterrorism capacity building programs. Established by the 2004 
AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the 
ACSRT is headed by a Director who is also the continental Special 
Representative for Counterterrorism Cooperation. The Peace Fund 
which covers mediation, preventive diplomacy, institutional capacity 
building and peace support operations, is credited through member 
state contributions drawn from the 0.2% levy charged on member 
states to finance the overall AU budget (Ogbonnaya, 2016, pp. 194-
195). Some of the AU peace support operations that have featured in 
the region include:  
 
− The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which is 
ongoing and whose key responsibility is to degrade the threat 
posed by Al-Shabaab. AMISOM was created by the AU-PSC on 
19th January 2007 to replace the Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia 
(IGASOM)19. 
−  The African Union–United Nations Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID)  
− The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)20.  
− Sub-regional stand by forces modelled along the design of the 
African Standby Force (ASF). These include: The Economic 
                                                 
19 See https://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/  
20 https://au.int/en/psc  
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Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force; 
the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF); the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Standby force and 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Standby force.  
 
Within the framework of United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
peace support operations (PSOs) take the shape of multi-dimensional 
international missions. Examples in sub-Saharan Africa include:  
 
− The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), established in accordance with 
UN Security Council resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012, to 
replace the African-led International Support Mission in Mali 
(AFISMA)21 in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 
2100 of 1 July 201322; the United Nations Mission in the Sudan 
(UNMIS);  
− The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and  
− The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).  
 
Whereas UNMIS, UNMISS and MONUSCO have mainly engaged 
in counter-insurgency operations against local rebel groups, 
MINUSMA is mainly engaged in degrading the capacity proscribed 
and declared jihadi terrorist groups e.g. AQIM, Ansar Deen, 
MUJAO, JINM etc. Based on the level of risk and number of troop 
deaths MINUSMA is considered the deadliest UN mission so far 
                                                 
21 AFISMA composed of forces drawn primarily from ECOWAS which never 
deployed 
22 See https://minusma.unmissions.org/en/history  
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(Boeke, 2016, p. 915; Boeke & de Valk, 2019, p. 1; Boutellis & Zahar, 
2017, pp. 2, 10; Briscoe, 2014, p. 44; Karlsrud, 2017, p. 1219; Laub & 
Masters, 2015, pp. 6-7; Sangaré & McSparren, 2018, p. 15; Stigall, 
2015, pp. 15-16; Tull, 2019, p. 405).  
3.2.1.2. Special Security Operations (SSO) 
 
Special security operations are either state or multi-state joint special 
security operations.  
 
State special operations fall into two categories i.e. national and 
international. National special counterterror operations feature 
highly trained small special units of the national police services and 
the military. Examples include, the Kenya Anti-Terrorism Police Unit 
(ATPU); the Forces Spéciales Anti-Terroristes (FORSAT) of Mali, the 
Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force (JATF) of Uganda  and the Joint 
Military Task Force of Nigeria (Anderson, 2014, p. 2; Dao, 2019, p. 93; 
Mwamburi, 2016, p. 78; Oppenheimer, 2005, p. 119; Tour, 2018, p. 37).  
 
International state special military counterterror operations in the 
region are dominated by France and the U.S. This is despite countries 
such as Britain and China which have military bases in Kenya and 
Djibouti respectively. French operations include: Operations Serval 
(Mali, 2013); Licorne (ivory coast, 2002-14); Èpervier (chad, 1986-2014); 
Sabre (Burkina Faso, 2012-2014) all of which were moped up into 
operation Barkane (Sahel, 2014). U.S. special counterterror operations 
in the region include: the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP) established in 2005 and the U.S. Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) established in 2007 with its base in Djibouti 
(Boeke, 2014, p. 19; Boeke & de Valk, 2019, p. 11; Diarra, 2012, p. 20; Laub 
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& Masters, 2015, pp. 6-7; Lecocq et al., 2013, p. 23; Venter, 2018, p. 19). 
Some scholars raise concerns over foreign military operations in the 
region. For instance, Busher (2014, p. 2); Ford (2013, pp. 1, 4); Shuriye 
and Ibrahim (2013) argue that such interventions are not only a 
continuation of colonial legacies but are also informed by selfish and 
narrow economic and national security interests. For example, 
Shuriye and Ibrahim argue that France military interventions in the 
Sahel Sahara and largely West Africa are motivated by the need to 
prevent terrorist sanctuaries from thriving close to its uranium 
exploits in Niger.  
 
Multi-state joint special operations are carried out by countries facing 
terrorism threat that transcend their common borders. Examples 
include:  
 
− the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) established by 
Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger against Boko Haram;  
− the G5 Sahel Joint Force made up of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania and Niger established in 2014 with support of 
France against AQIM, Ansar  Deen, MUJAO and JINM and  
− the Common Operational Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 
(CEMOC) made of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger 
established in 2010 against AQIM (Boutellis & Zahar, 2017, p. 9; 






3.2.1.3. Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a comprehensive civilian and military 
strategy designed to simultaneously degrade terrorist networks and 
win the support of local populations (hearts and minds) by addressing 
the root causes of terrorism (Boeke, 2014, p. 6; Kozera, 2018, pp. 11-12). 
As observed in section 2.3 of chapter two, much of the post-colonial 
political development of sub-Saharan Africa has been plagued by 
viscous internal conflicts in which terrorist tactics have formed part 
of the violent strategy of insurgent and rebel movements. In many of 
the affected states e.g. Angola, Burundi, DRC Congo, Liberia, Mali, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leonne, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda 
etc. counterinsurgency by the military has formed the traditional 
response to violence generally and terrorist like violence specifically. 
In some instances, governments and international partners 
collaborate with ‘friendly’ non-state armed groups in 
counterinsurgent operations. For example: 
  
− the joint operation against al Shabaab by the Kenya Defence 
Forces (KDF), the Somalia National Army (SNA) and al 
Shabaab splinters Ras Kiamboni Brigade, Ahlu Sunna wal 
Jamma, Azaaniya, Gedo Forces and Harti Group; 
− the joint operation by the Taureg Mouvement National Pour la 
Liberation de l’Azawad’(MNLA), the French military and Mali’s 
military also known as Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMA) in 
northern Mali against a coalition of jihadi terrorist groups and 
− the joint operation by Somali armed groups opposed to al 
Shabaab, the Ethiopian military and the U.S. in 2006 that drove 
al Shabaab out of Mogadishu  
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See Arieff (2013, p. 10); Boeke (2016, p. 923); Chauzal and van 
Damme (2015, p. 40); Dao (2019, pp. 73-74); Gettleman (2011); Kone 
(2017, p. 58); Kozera (2018, p. 20); Laing (2015); Maïga (2016, pp. 3, 
7); Sow (2018, p. 25); Stewart (2013, pp. 41-44); Thurston (2013, p. 
5).   
 
In other instances, states avoid direct confrontation and instead 
engage the services of non-state armed groups (surrogate armies) 
to carryout COIN operations in locations where they have limited 
operational capacity or do not want to conceal their involvement. 
For example, the Janjaweed (devils on horseback) militia’s used by 
the government of Sudan against three non-Arab groups (the 
Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa) in Darfur and the Ganda Koy and 
Ganda Iso militia used by the government of Mali against Taureg 
rebels in the north of the country (Amadou, 2019; Bøås & Torheim, 
2013; Flint, 2009; Howard, 2010, p. 964; A. Keith, 2007, p. 149; 
Kozera, 2018, p. 20).  
 
3.2.2. Criminal Justice 
 
Unlike the military approach, the criminal justice approach does not 
treat terrorism as a military problem requiring the use of armed force, 
rather, it treats terrorism as a serious crime proscribed in 
international laws, national criminal laws and extant anti-terrorism 
conventions (Ford, 2011, pp. 12-14; Kielsgard, 2005, pp. 253-254). The 
ordinary mode of implementing criminal justice measures is through 
the Criminal Justice System (CJS) i.e. the aggregate of all operating, 
administrative and technical support agencies (police, courts, 
 54 
corrections, community) that regulate potential, alleged and actual 
criminal activity within limits designed by law i.e. within the rule of 
law-RoL (Bernard & Engel, 2001, p. 2; Sanders, Young, & Burton, 2010, 
pp. 1-2; Schmalleger et al., 2014, pp. 5, 14). In other words, CJS agencies 
are responsible for the administration of justice which includes but 
not limited to detection, apprehension, detention, pre-trial release, 
prosecution, adjudication, post-trial release, correctional supervision, 
rehabilitation & reintegration of accused persons or criminal 
offenders back to the community and protection victims of crime 
(DiIulio, 1992, pp. 6, 10; Ford, 2011, pp. 13-14; Schmalleger et al., 2014, 
p. 5). In sum, the criminal justice approach to counterterrorism  
encompasses the full range of legislative and institutional measures 
aimed at countering terrorism within the framework of the rule of law.  
 
3.2.2.1. Legislative Mechanisms  
 
Because criminal justice is anchored on the rule of law (RoL), 
legislative mechanisms are the foundation of criminal justice (CJ) 
approaches to counterterrorism. They entail the development of 
effective and efficient laws that define and criminalise acts of 
terrorism, guide the implementation of counterterrorist policies as 
well as the prosecution and rehabilitation of former terrorists. They 
are based on the principle that, because terrorism is an attempt to 
break the law and disrupt public order through use or threat to use 
illegitimate violence, the fight against forces threatening the law must 
be fought within the law (Mersel, 2005, p. 91; M. Weber, 2009). In sub-
Saharan Africa, legislative mechanisms take the shape of regional, 
international and national legal frameworks.  
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3.2.2.1.1. Regional and International Legal Frameworks  
 
Through ratification, regional and international legal frameworks 
provide a legal basis for cooperation on issues such as extradition, 
prosecution, imprisonment, intelligence, exchange of information, 
creation of lists of suspected terrorists, their financier and adherents 
for targeted sanctions (severance of diplomatic relations, travel bans, 
asset freezes, arms embargo), border security, control of trafficking in 
arms etc. (Argomaniz, 2011, p. 10; Boeke, 2014, p. 6; Coolsaet, 2010, pp. 
857-873; Foot, 2007, p. 491; Ford, 2013, pp. 5, 12; Khan, 2016, p. 7; 
Kielsgard, 2005, pp. 253-254; Rosand, 2003, pp. 335-338; Sigsworth, 
2019, pp. 6, 12; Warbrick, 2004, pp. 993-1015). 
 
The legal framework for counterterrorism at the regional level consists 
of three key instruments:   
 
− the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) resolution 
AHG/Res.213 (XXVIII) of 1992 on the Strengthening of 
Cooperation and Coordination among African states;  
− the OAU resolution AHG/Del.2 (XXX) of June 1994 on the 
Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations and  
− the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism and its additional Protocol.  
− the African Model Law on Counter-Terrorism adopted in July 
2011. This model law provides a continental legal standard to 




These instruments define and denounce extremism and terrorism; 
provide a framework for interstate cooperation in areas such as 
extradition, extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal 
assistance; address concerns over protection of human rights, state 
security, state jurisdiction over terrorism-related offences, financing 
of terrorism and risks of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction  (Ewi & Aning, 2006, p. 36; P. Kagwanja, 2006, pp. 79-80; 
Sturman, 2002, pp. 103-104).  
 
At the international level, states in the region have at their disposal 
nineteen UN International legal instruments for the prevention of 
terrorism which have been in force since 1963. However, ratification 
of these instruments in sub-Saharan Africa varies between states and 
in some states quite poor. See table 3.1. See also Ewi and Aning (2006, 
pp. 35-36); Ford (2011, pp. 35-40).  
 
Only four of the UN instruments have been ratified by at least half of 
the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Four countries (Eritrea, Somalia, 
including Zambia and Zimbabwe) which also have no specific 
legislation on terrorism have not ratified any of the nineteen UN 
international instruments.  
 
Several explanations can account for the poor ratification record for 
some of the instruments. The most obvious reason is the lack of 
agreement among states on a universal definition of terrorism. 
Second, in some places, because power is highly personalised and 
abused, and for fear of accountability, ratification of some the 
instruments is unattractive to some governments. Third, colonial 
experiences of most African states make governments sensitive to 
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ideas crafted in foreign capitals and generally averse to some political 
developments taking place at the international stage. Fourth, the 
technical nature of some instruments does not for the time being 
correspond with economic and technological realities of many states 
in the region rendering their ratification irrelevant. For example, the 
“1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material” has 
been ratified only by Nigeria and South Africa. This makes sense 
because, all things being constant, they are the only states in the 
region with the economic capacity to develop viable nuclear 
programmes. See also Ford (2011, pp. 14-16).  
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Table 3.1:Ratification UN CT international legal instruments in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Instrument  No.   
− 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft  1 
− 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons  1 
− 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation  2 
− 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material  2 
− 2014 Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft  4 
− 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection  4 
− 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages  6 
− 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation  6 
− 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft  7 
− 2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf  7 
− 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings  7 
− 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation  10 
− 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft  12 
− 2005 Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material  12 
− 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism  14 
− 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism  24 
− 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf  32 
− 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation  35 
− 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation  41 
Source: 
1. UN-CTC  https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/resources/international-legal-instruments/  
2. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): https://www.iaea.org/resources/legal/treaties  
3. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):  https://www.icao.int/Secretariat/Legal/Pages/TreatyCollection.aspx  
4. International Maritime Organization (IMO): http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx   
5. UN Treaty Collection: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx?clang=_en  
Note: all accessed on 04/12/2019 
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3.2.2.1.2. National Legal Frameworks 
 
National legal frameworks consist of the whole bundle of national 
criminal laws relevant to counterterrorism. They are guided by 
standards set by the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) 
and UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 
(2004) adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter (Ford, 2011, p. 24; 
Sigsworth, 2019, p. 5; Sturman, 2002, p. 104). These standards require 
that UN member states draft comprehensive national and regional 
strategies; develop legislation to criminalise acts and the financing of 
terrorism; implement legislation through law enforcement and 
criminal justice processes; cooperate internationally; ensure that any 
counterterrorism measures taken comply with all state obligations 
under international law, international human rights standards, 
refugee and humanitarian law (Andrew & Silke, 2018, p. 8; Ford, 2011, 
pp. 7-9; Sigsworth, 2019, p. 5; Whitaker, 2007, p. 1018).  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, compliance with these legal standards is varied 
and in some instances unsatisfactory (Ford, 2011, p. 39; Whitaker, 
2007, p. 1019). For example, data on the number of legislation on 
terrorism complied by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC)23 and the Center for Strategic & International Studies 
(CSIS)24 shows that while most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have 
at least one specific anti-terror legislation explicitly focusing on 
terrorism, seven countries have no single legislation. See figure 3.1. 
 
                                                 




According to Ford (2011, p. 39), countries with no legislation on 
terrorism either see their generic criminal code as sufficient; do not 
believe counterterrorism is of sufficient priority or lack technical 
capacity.  
 
Figure 3.1: Anti-terror legislations by state in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: (SHERLOC, 2019; Studies & CSIS, 2018) 
 
Notes: 
− No legislation: Eswatini, Liberia, Rwanda, São Tomé & Príncipe, Togo, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe;   
− 1 – 5: Somalia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Comoros, Gabon, 
Lesotho;  
− 6 – 10: Angola, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Malawi, Mauritania, Botswana, 
Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea;  
− 11 – 15: Benin, Cabo Verde; Central African Republic, Madagascar, Senegal, 
Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria;  
− 16 – 20: Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Djibouti, Ghana, Mali, Ethiopia;  
− 21 – 25: Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Mauritius;  
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3.2.2.2. Institutional Mechanisms 
3.2.2.2.1. Police   
 
The primary role of police is to maintain public order and safety by 
enforcing the law. In the context of counterterrorism, police work 
entails but not limited to extraditing and prosecuting terrorism 
suspects; protecting potential targets; gathering intelligence and 
exchanging information on terrorists; providing border security and 
control of trafficking in arms; conducting investigation and forensics 
etc.  
 
As observed by Cilliers (2003, p. 98); Forest and Giroux (2011, pp. 7-9); 
Glickman (2003, p. 167); Kimunguyi (2011, pp. 3-4); Omotola (2008, p. 
44); M. Weber (2009), because terrorism thrives where the state is 
absent25, weak or fails to excise its monopoly over legitimate use of 
violence, effective police organisations as far as counterterrorism is 
concerned are those that are well funded, adequately equipped, 
sufficiently populated, well distributed, properly trained and maintain 
an appropriate culture (Kleck & Barnes, 2010; Wellford, 1974; Wilson 
& Boland, 1978).  
 
The U.N. Secretary-General’s report to the twelfth United Nations 
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice  suggests that 
every country should have a minimum of 300 police officers per 
100,000 inhabitants.  See Nations (2010, p. 19). Because countries in 
the region do not allow open access to information and data on the 
profile of security agencies, it is not easy to establish whether 
                                                 
25 For example, Diarra (2012, pp. 9, 16) observes that withdrawal of security forces 
from northern Mali freed the region for criminal activities and the entrenchment of 
terrorist elements.  
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countries in sub-Saharan Africa meet this minimum threshold. Even 
when information and data is made publicly available, it is usually 
accompanied by caveats on usage and difficult to verify  (Sigsworth, 
2019, p. 3). Generally, useful publicly available primary information 
and data on counterterrorism in sub-Saharan Africa is shrouded in 
secrecy and legal protection (Gupta et al., 2001, pp. 752-753; Pyman, 
2017, p. 513; Sidibe, 2018, p. 47; Sigsworth, 2019, pp. 3, 7; Thuo, 2009, 
pp. 155-156).  
 
Nevertheless, based on UN reports, national police websites and 
strategic plans, data on the size of police organisations is available for 
twenty-seven countries for different years as displayed in table 3.2. 
The data also includes successful attacks of essentially no doubt of 
terrorism for the subsequent year for which data on the size of the 
police force and total population are available. Lagging of police data 
allows for accurate inferences on the association between the size of 
the police force and the observed incidence of terrorism. This is 
because we expect that if police organisations are effective in 
preventing terrorism, future attacks in the subsequent year are also 





















Mauritius 2012 12,475 1,255,882 993 0 
South Sudan 2012 52,000 10,113,647 514 10 
Botswana 2012 8,500 2,039,551 417 0 
Eswatini 2012 4,164 1,079,288 386 0 
Cabo Verde 2015 1,825 524,743 348 - 
South Africa 2012 156,489 52,834,005 296 9 
Gambia, The 2012 5,000 1,905,011 262 0 
Zimbabwe 2008 28,772 12,379,549 232 0 
Nigeria 2013 360,000 171,765,769 210 622 
Kenya* 2013 75,325 45,519,889 165 95 
Burundi 2014 16,173 9,844,297 164 83 
Uganda* 2015 44,897 36,912,148 122 5 
Lesotho 2012 2,404 2014990 119 0 
Zambia 2018 19,000 17,351,822 109 0 
Liberia 2012 4,100 4,135,659 99 0 
Guinea 2012 10,000 10,652,029 94 2 
Ghana 2012 23,000 25,996,449 88 0 
Tanzania 2015 45,487 51,482,633 88 2 
Cote d'Ivoire 2008 15,770 19,605,569 80 0 
Comoros 2012 500 723,871 69 0 
Togo 2012 4,000 6,773,807 59 0 
Niger 2012 8,700 17,795,191 49 3 
Mali 2012 7,000 15,979,499 44 31 
Somalia 2012 5,532 12,715,510 44 189 
Madagascar 2015 8,272 24,234,088 34 1 
Cameroon 2013 3,839 22,077,298 17 56 
Rwanda 2013 530 10,811,543 5 2 
Source: UN Survey on Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems 
(UN-CTS), World Bank; ((START), 2018). Data marked with an asterisk (*) is 
obtained from national police sources (the Kenya Police Strategic Plan 2013/14-
2017/18 available at http://www.nationalpolice.go.ke/downloads/category/14-nps-
strategic-plan.html and the Uganda Police force statistical abstract, 2015 available at 
https://www.upf.go.ug/download/2015-upf-statistical-abstract-final/. Both 
accessed on 21/12/2019. 
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Correlation analysis finds no clear association between the number of 
police officers per 100,000 inhabitants and the incidence of terrorism 
(r = .01, p = .49, 2-tailed) in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is 
important to note that extant studies such as Kleck and Barnes (2010); 
Nations (2010, p. 20); R. J. Sampson and Cohen (1988); Wellford (1974); 
Wilson and Boland (1978) that have empirically investigated the 
relationship between the size of police organisations and the level of 
crime have produced mixed and inconclusive results.   
 
Nonetheless, data in table 3.2 shows that except for South Sudan, the 
other three countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Mauritius, Botswana, and 
Eswatini) that meet the suggested minimum threshold of 300 police 
officers per 100,000 inhabitants did not experience any terrorist attack 
in the subsequent year for which data for their police organisations 
was available.  Notwithstanding, scarcity of data and lack of clarity on 
the relationship between variables that measure key characteristics of 
police organisations and serious crime, it appears that the quality and 
performance of most police organisations in the region cannot 
guarantee effective counterterrorism.  
 
According to the first edition (2016) of the World Internal Security and 
Police Index (WISPI)26 (Abdelmottlep, 2016, pp. 2, 12), seven out of ten 
worst performing police organisations in the world are sub-Saharan 
African. The report observes that police organisations in the region 
have the lowest level of responsiveness to internal security issues; are 
under-resourced and stretched by terrorist organisations and 
insurgencies.  
                                                 
26 WISPI ranks countries according to their ability to provide security services and 
boost security performance in general (Abdelmottlep, 2016, p. 1). 
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According to the 2019 World Justice Project rule of law index27 
(Project, 2019), the effectiveness of criminal investigation systems in 
sub-Saharan Africa is below average (0.42/1.00). This indicates that 
generally, many police organisations in the region cannot guarantee 
effective investigations that yield robust evidence that enables courts 
to secure fair, just and successful convictions in terrorism related 
cases. The import is that with poor evidence, procedural justice is 
miscarried giving way to violation of rights of accused persons and 
victims of terrorism.  
 
According to the 2016/2018 Afrobarometer survey, only 28.5 percent 
of citizens in sub-Saharan Africa highly trust the police and even 
smaller proportion 8.0 percent, think that police are not involved in 
any form of corruption28. These statistics generate genuine concerns 
because as noted by Cilliers (2003, p. 91); Edwards and Gill (2002, p. 
207); Finckenauer (2005, p. 65); Ignatieff (2002, p. 1146); Miraglia et al. 
(2012, p. 6); P. Williams (1997, p. 1), terrorist networks like other 
criminal organisations, rely on corruption to nullify government and 
operate unhindered by law enforcement officers who are willing to 
turn a blind eye or look the other way for their personal gain. The 
perception that police officers in sub-Saharan Africa are involved in 
corruption suggests that local communities would not have faith that 
crucial actionable information on terrorists that they share with the 
police will be handled with confidence; guarantee the safety of 
informers and lead to successful convictions. At stake are police-
                                                 
27 See https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-
index-2019/current-historical-data   
28 See Afrobarometer Data, Round 7, 2016/2018, available at 
http://www.afrobarometer.org  
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community partnerships commonly known as community policing 
e.g. as applied with varying degrees of success and challenges in 
Nigeria and Kenya (Ejiogu, 2019; Ndono, Muthama, & Muigua, 2019). 
 
During the field visit in Mali for this research in May 2019, one 
respondent observed that: 
 
‘It’s easy, we must dispense justice to avoid the 
impunity and bad governance. The militaries and the 
population trust each other to fight insecurity because 
terrorists are hidden among the population. We must 
create a climate of confidence between armies and 
population, and the population must know that 
armies are there to protect them and not to persecute 
them’. 
 
Despite the challenges, there is some progress. For example, the 2018 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)29 shows that large and 
fast improvements across the security and justice sector have been 
recorded since 2014, See Foundation (2019, p. 50). In Kenya for 
example, the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA)30 and 
the National Police Service Commission31 are recent constitutional 
bodies established to provide among other things: civilian oversight, 
ensure due process, respect for human rights and exercise disciplinary 
                                                 
29 The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), created at Harvard’s Kennedy 
School of Government, evaluates African countries according to fifty-seven variables 
producing overall rankings of governance attainment. Its purpose is to diagnose 
(Rotberg, 2009). See http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/methodology  
30 see https://www.ipoa.go.ke/ . See also the African Policing Civilian Oversight 
Forum (APCOF) which is a coalition of police oversight bodies and practitioners in 
Africa: http://apcof.org/  
31 See https://www.npsc.go.ke/index.php/about-us 
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control over police officers. In Ghana, constitutional reforms (Article 
203,13), reconstituted the Police Council, making it an independent 
body in charge of ensuring the effective and efficient administration 
of the Ghana Police Service (Bryden & Chappuis, 2015, pp. 19-35). At 
the regional level, the African Police Organisation (AFRIPOL)32 and 
the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) ensure 
coordination and cooperation among national police organisation on 
matters counterterrorism. 
3.2.2.2.2. Courts  
 
In modern democracies, the main responsibility of the judiciary is to 
review legislation, policies and actions of other arms of government 
(legislature and executive) to ensure that they comply with the law 
(Fabbrini, 2009, p. 666; Krebs, 2016, p. 42; Mersel, 2005, pp. 68, 91; 
Scheinin, 2016). As guardians of the constitution, courts set limits on 
counterterrorism measures by clarifying, tracking and interpreting 
applicable sources of authorization (the constitution, statutes, 
international laws, human rights laws  and administrative regulations) 
for executive power or action  (Benvenisti, 2007, pp. 1, 7-8; Boateng & 
Adjorlolo, 2018, p. 1692; Fabbrini, 2009, pp. 666, 694; Krebs, 2016, pp. 
42, 49-51; Mersel, 2005, pp. 90-92; Murray, 2016, p. 91; Scheinin, 
2016)33. They also facilitate international counterterror cooperation 
anticipated in ratified instruments and mutual legal arrangements 
and assess such cooperation against possible human rights abuses 
                                                 
32 See https://afripol.africa-union.org/  
33 According to Fabbrini (2009, p. 693), the rights protection role of courts can be 
seen through a three tier lens. When the judiciary adopts a very limited public 
security scrutiny, the protection of fundamental rights is minimal. When courts 
engage in a middle review scrutiny, tackling the manifest error of appreciations of 
the political branches of government, protection is intermediate. When courts 
exercise a strict, high level scrutiny, rights are fully protected. 
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(Benvenisti, 2007, p. 1; Murray, 2013, p. 194). When implementing 
counterterrorism measures, it is common for states to invoke national 
security interests, especially when military approaches are involved. 
In such circumstances, courts assess on a case by case basis any 
measures deemed by the executive as necessary to deal with grave 
risks to society, and make a proportional determination on the 
balance between national security interests and human rights 
concerns (Benvenisti, 2007, pp. 4-5; Khamala, 2019, p. 79; Krebs, 2016, 
p. 49; Mersel, 2005, pp. 92-93, 103, 110; Scheinin, 2016). In this regard, 
courts either weigh up the conflicting risks and interests or review 
how the executive performed this delicate balancing act (Benvenisti, 
2007, pp. 7-8). Terrorism challenges democracy because it seeks to 
replace politics (the means through which democratic societies 
maintain control over human violence through dialogue, discussion, 
debate, protest, the arts etc) with violence alone (Ignatieff, 2002, p. 
1162). In times of counterterrorism therefore, courts play the crucial 
role of maintaining democracy by ensuring that governments do not 
fight terrorist violence with violence alone i.e. ensuring that the fight 
against terrorism is fought within the law (Boateng & Adjorlolo, 2018, 
p. 1692; Fabbrini, 2009, p. 690; Ignatieff, 2002, p. 1162; Mersel, 2005, p. 
69; Scheinin, 2016). In sum, since the ordinary mode of enforcing the 
International Bill of Human Rights is through the laws and 
constitutions of states which are the first recourse to address any 
violations, courts are the gatekeepers of human rights in 
counterterrorism, because they ensure that these legislations are 
obeyed to the latter (Brown, 2016, pp. 13, 32). 
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In the fight against terrorism, courts must be and be seen to be 
independent and impartial for them to be effective and efficient34 
(Krebs, 2016, p. 43). In the context of counterterrorism, judicial 
independence and impartiality is particularly important because as 
noted by  Andrew and Silke (2018, p. 8); Busher (2014, p. 2); Claridge 
(1996, pp. 48-52); Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Field (2017); Ford (2013, 
p. 3); Krebs (2016, p. 73); Sigsworth (2019, p. 6); M. Weber (2009), 
terrorists rely on violations and injustices committed by the state to 
justify their actions. Thus, as the last layer of protection, it is pertinent 
that courts must be seen to protect citizens against state injustices 
without fear or favour.  
 
According to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) first 
published in 2008, judicial governance in Africa can be measured 
using three indicators i.e. independence of the judiciary, 
independence & transparency of the judicial process and access to 
Justice. The IIAG index shows that since 2008, there is progressive 
overall improvement in judicial governance in sub-Saharan Africa on 
all the three indicators, though significant variations exist between 
countries (Foundation, 2019, p. 43). The number of countries that have 
shown consistent improvements in all the three indicators of the IIAG 
index is four times (15) the number of countries that have shown 





                                                 
34 The universally accepted minimum standards for achieving judicial 
independence are contained in the “UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary”. See Nations (1988).   
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Improved 21 44 26 
 
15 
deteriorated 27 4 22 
 
4 
No data 1 1 1 
 
1 
Own table adapted from Foundation (2019, p. 43). Note: tallies are based on average 
scores between 2008 and 2017.  
 
According to the 2016/2018 Afrobarometer survey, only 28.6 percent 
of citizens in sub-Saharan Africa highly trust the judiciary and a 
smaller proportion 11.0 percent think that magistrates and judges are 
not involved in any form of corruption35. These statistics are 
problematic. The implication is that, convicted terrorist and their 
families are highly likely to perceive that their right to a fair and just 
legal process was violated, and those acquitted or yet to be arrested 
are highly likely to be emboldened by the knowledge that they can 
easily corrupt their way through the judiciary to freedom. In a 
nutshell, perceptions of mistrust and corruption in the judiciary play 
into the hands of terrorist propaganda and complicate genuine 
counterterrorism efforts. See also Boateng and Adjorlolo (2018). 
 
The deficiencies that affect judicial independence and impartiality in 
many countries in the region are tied to colonial legacies that saw 
post-independence governments inherit and maintain autocratic 
institutions for purposes of continued control e.g. poor funding; 
                                                 




deliberate understaffing; appointment of staff through personal ties 
intimately linked to the executive etc. (Affichard, 2019, pp. 7, 10-11; 
Hamilton, 2009, pp. 39-40; L. C. Keith & Ogundele, 2007, p. 1066; 
Mingst, 1988, p. 137; Shen-Bayh, 2018, p. 9). In some jurisdictions, 
courts are severely affected by operational problems e.g. long 
processing times (which goes hand in hand with a substantial backlog 
of cases) and empty or incomplete files due to poor prosecution 
practices (e.g. poor investigations that fail to meet the high 
evidentiary threshold required in serious criminal cases) leading to 
low conviction rates (Affichard, 2019, pp. 7, 10-11; Hamilton, 2009, pp. 
39-40; Nozawa & Lefas, 2018, p. 9).  
 
The challenges notwithstanding, some progress is notable beginning 
with the rapidly increasing process of democratisation in most of sub-
Saharan Africa that began in the early 1990’s (Boateng & Adjorlolo, 
2018, p. 1691; Hamilton, 2009, p. 43; Straus, 2012). If all things remain 
constant, increased democratisation gives hope that gains in judicial 
governance as indicated by the IIAG index will continue to make 
visible human rights foot prints in counterterrorist policies across the 
region. Specific judicial reforms include for example, establishment of 
specialized judicial units to address backlog of cases in Burkina Faso 
(Crime, 2018, p. 7) and constitutional reforms that established the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to promote an independent, 




                                                 
36 See http://www.jsc.go.ke/  
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3.2.2.2.3. Corrections  
 
In many places, corrections are made up of prison and probation 
organisations. Prisons ensure the safe custody of persons lawfully 
convicted of crime; facilitate their rehabilitation in custody and 
reintegration back into the community. Probation organisations 
ensure the rehabilitation of offenders within the community and 
facilitate their reintegration back into the community when they leave 
prison. The universally acknowledged minimum standards for the 
management of correctional facilities and the treatment of prisoners 
and offenders in the community are outlined in the UN Standard 
Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules)37; the 
UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson 
Mandela Rules)38 and the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women 
Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders39. 
These standards ensure that all prisoners and offenders are treated 
with the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human 
beings. 
 
In the counterterrorism network, correction organisations are critical 
nodes because they cure, sanitise and delink former terrorists from 
terrorist networks. While there is a significant body of scholarly 
literature focusing on the role of prisons as counterterrorism agencies 
(especially literature on radicalisation), not much has been discussed 
on the role of probation organisations. The problem is compounded 
in sub-Saharan Africa by scarcity of data and information due to 
                                                 






difficulties of access. Even the data portal of the United Nations Office 
for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which collects and centralises global 
data and information on drugs, crime and terrorism has no data on 
probation services for any country in the world. Responding to an 
email request for data on probation in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
UNODC observed that:  
 
‘We do not collect data on probation. We only collect 
data on prosecuted, brought before criminal courts, 
convicted and brought into formal contact.’ 
 
The scarcity of empirical literature on probation is partly because 
unlike prisons services, probation services in sub-Saharan Africa are 
not well developed. In Nigeria for example, Yekini and Salisu (2013, p. 
101) observe that while the law allows for the use of probation 
sentences, there are no adequate institutional facilities to drive it and 
its application by courts is rather restricted to juvenile offenders. 
According to the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice 
Research Institute, only four countries in Africa (all in sub-Saharan 
Africa) have designated probation and parole organisations i.e. 
Botswana, Kenya, Seychelles and South Africa40. Arguably, Kenya’s 
Probation and Aftercare Services (PACS) is the most advanced 
probation organisation in sub-Saharan Africa41.   
 
The data on prisons on the UNODC data portal obtained through its 
questionnaire system is available for only a few countries42. According 
to Telisinghe et al. (2016), by the end of 2016 there were at least 2,490 
                                                 
40 http://www.unicri.it/ 
41 See http://www.probation.go.ke/  
42 See https://dataunodc.un.org/ 
 74 
prison facilities in sub-Saharan Africa. Conditions in most of these 
facilities are some of the poorest in the world43 e.g. severe 
overcrowding; lack of sanitation and access to proper medical care; 
few rehabilitative, educational or vocational programmes and 
opportunities; physical and psychological abuse; lengthy legal 
processes; increased violence etc. The average daily census of prison 
detainees in sub-Saharan Africa is about 150 per cent (See table 3.4) 
comprising mainly of remand detainees (Abdelmottlep, 2016, p. 12; 
Nations, 2010, p. 21; Telisinghe et al., 2016, pp. 3-4).  Prison 
overcrowding means that more funds go to the management of high 
prison populations as staff become demoralised by poor pay, training, 
housing, equipment etc.  It also means that rehabilitation 
















                                                 
43 https://www.penalreform.org/where-we-work/africa/  
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Angola 22826 34 2014 106 47·1 167 21 
Benin 7247 9 2012 77 74·9 364 0 
Botswana 3960 23 2015 192 24·5 92 0 
Burkina Faso 6251 25 2014 34 48·0 171 3 
Burundi 8646 11 2014 93 47·5 214 18 
Cabo Verde 1434 5 2013 286 29·6 122 0 
Cameroon 25914 78 2013 115 59·9 138 30 
Central African 
Republic 
764 5 2015 16 70·2 .. 
36 
Chad 4831 45 2011 39 63·4 232 16 
Comoros 233 3 2014 31 55·8 388 0 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 21711 120 2013 32 82·0 271 72 
Congo, Rep. 1240 12 2014 27 60·0 483 3 
Côte d’Ivoire 10850 34 2014 52 42·0 218 2 
Djibouti 600 2 2014 68 50·0 171 .. 
Equatorial Guinea 1000 15 2014 129 .. .. 0 
Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 
Eswatini 3616 12 2014 289 18·1 127 0 
Ethiopia 111050 126 2012 128 14·0 .. 15 
Gabon 3500 9 2013 210 33·0 .. 0 
Gambia, The 1121 3 2014 58 22·2 173 0 
Ghana 14534 43 2016 53 18·7 147 0 
Guinea 3110 31 2014 26 65·0 175 3 
Guinea- Bissau 92 3 2013 .. majority 102 1 
Kenya 54154 108 2015 118 40·4 202 21 
Lesotho 2073 12 2014 92 19·5 71 0 
Liberia 1719 15 2014 39 83·0 138 0 
Madagascar 18719 82 2013 83 53·0 181 0 
Malawi 12156 30 2014 73 16·1 174 0 
Mali 5209 58 2014 33 52·8 222 11 
Mauritania 1768 18 2014 44 41·0 102 1 
Mauritius 2137 10 2016 159 41·1 117 0 
Mozambique 15976 184 2015 57 32·9 195 0 
Namibia 3560 13 2015 144 6·6 96 0 
Niger 7424 38 2014 39 53·4 60 14 
Nigeria 56620 240 2014 31 69·3 114 389 
Rwanda 54279 14 2015 434 7·1 96 2 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
201 1 2014 101 10·9 77 
0 
Senegal 8630 37 2014 62 41·4 117 2 
Seychelles 735 3 2014 799 15·5 143 0 
Sierra Leone 3488 19 2015 55 54·3 195 5 
Somalia 3450 .. 2012 .. .. .. .. 
South Africa 159563 236 2015 293 27·1 133 0 
South Sudan 6504 80 2015 52 28·9 329 34 
Sudan 19101 125 2013 50 20·4 255 48 
Tanzania 34196 126 2014 69 50·1 120 2 
Togo 4493 12 2014 64 65·2 165 0 
Uganda 45092 247 2015 115 55·0 273 28 
Zambia 18560 88 2015 125 23·2 229 0 
Zimbabwe 18857 46 2015 145 17·1 111 0 
Source: ((START), 2018; Telisinghe et al., 2016, pp. 3-4) 
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Prison radicalisation is the most significant problem for prison 
authorities in sub-Saharan Africa as far as counterterrorism is 
concerned. It is a process in which an individual's convictions and 
willingness to seek deep and serious changes in society increase 
through the effective socialisation and re-socialisation of criminal and 
extremist culture in prisons (Mulcahy, Merrington, & Bell, 2013, p. 5; 
Santoro, 2018). Overcrowding compound the problems associated 
with prison radicalisation and according to Rope and Sheahan (2018, 
p. 28); Walmsley (2003, p. 73) make prisons to become ‘the university 
of crime’ where violent extremism is taught as one of the courses. To 
illustrate the grave danger posed by prison radicalisation, Paul and 
Virgili (2019, p. 3) cite the case of two terrorist attacks that took place 
in Europe in 2018 (Liège in Belgium and Strasbourg in France) 
perpetrated by individuals radicalised in prison. In addition, a recent 
study of ‘violent extremism and radicalization among youth in Kenyan 
prisons’ by Kahara (2017, p. 70) found that at least 26% of ex-inmates 
had been approached by people they believed to be terrorists or 
violent extremists during their time in prison.  
 
Besides the challenges posed by prison radicalisation, prisons face the 
grave danger of imminent attacks from terrorists because they hold 
terrorists in their custody. For example, on 1 June 2013, the Movement 
for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and the Signed-in-Blood 
Battalion attacked the main prison in Niamey, Niger facilitating the 
escape of 22 inmates including their members (Arieff, 2013, p. 7; 
Briscoe, 2014, p. 22; Filiu, 2015, pp. 107, 109; Lebovich, 2013; Marc et al., 
2015, p. 44; Marchal, 2013; Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013, p. 5; Stewart, 2013, 
pp. 41-44; Stigall, 2015, p. 10; Venter, 2018, p. 79). In 2010, 2011 and 2012, 
Boko Haram militants attacked Bauchi, Yola and Kogi prisons in 
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Nigeria, liberating at least 100 militants and hundreds of prisoners, 
some of who were forcefully conscripted into the group  (Ajayi, 1990, 
p. 106; Cook, 2011, p. 12; Sodipo, 2013, p. 1). Insufficient numbers (low 
prison officer to inmates’ ratio) of demoralised, poorly trained, 
equipped and paid prison officers are un able to respond to such 
attacks and their aftermath e.g. prison riots.  
 
In sum the main challenge for counterterrorism in sub-Saharan Africa 
as far as prisons are concerned is prison overcrowding which breeds a 
host of other problems mainly radicalisation of violent extremist 
culture and human rights violations. Demoralised prison staff become 
a threat to human rights in prison. 
3.2.2.2.4. Preventing or Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) 
 
Measures for preventing or countering violent extremism (P/CVE) are 
designed to address the root causes of terrorism e.g. prevalence of 
prolonged explosive unresolved conflicts; mass poverty; expansive 
inequality; porosity of national borders; despotic colonial legacies; 
dehumanization of victims of terrorism; absence of the rule of law; 
ethnic, political and religious discrimination and exclusion; lack of 
good governance and corruption etc., all  summarised into state 
weakness and poor health of political systems  (Assembly, 2006, p. 51; 
Boateng & Adjorlolo, 2018, pp. 1692, 1694; Gebeye, 2019, p. 338; L. C. 
Keith & Ogundele, 2007, p. 1066; Mingst, 1988, p. 137; Shen-Bayh, 2018, 
p. 9). See also the Fragile States Index (FSI)44 which shows that in 2018, 
sub-Saharan Africa was home to 18 of the world’s 25 most fragile 
                                                 
44 The FSI is based on 12 social, economic and political indicators which detail the 
pressures and vulnerabilities faced by countries. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/. 
Accessed on 9/03/2019. It is the most well-known country fragility index used by 
researchers (Boeke & de Valk, 2019, p. 4). 
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states. There are regional initiatives designed to broadly address 
macrosocial conditions that breed terrorism and violent extremism. 
For example:  
 
− AU’s 50-year development blueprint “Agenda 2063”;  
− the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD);  
− the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM);  
− the Panel of the Wise (PoW);  
− the African Centre for the Study and Research on 
Terrorism (ACSRT);  
− the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS);  
− the African the Peace Fund; 
− the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) etc.   
 
See also Ford (2011, p. 32); Ogbonnaya (2016, pp. 185-188); Omotola 
(2008, p. 47).  
In addition, there exists a web of sub regional bodies and regional 
economic communities (RECs) and policy frameworks that contribute 
to preventing or countering violent extremism. These include for 
example:  
 
− the Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CAEMC),  
− the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Capacity-
Building Programme against Terrorism (IGAD/ICPAT) 
together with its  Committee on Early Warning and Response 
(CEWARN)45;  the East African Community (EAC);   
                                                 
45 Ford (2011, p. 32) observes that, compared with other sub-regional organisations, 
IGAD has been more proactive, since its June 2003 Addis Ababa Conference on 
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− the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering 
Group (ESAAMLG);  
− the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA);   
− the Economic Community of Central African states (ECCAS);   
− the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS);   
− the Southern African Development Community (SADC);  
− the Association of Regional Magistrates in Southern Africa 
(ARMSA);  
− the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU);  
− the African Development Bank (ADB) etc.  
 
A key challenge for RECs is the tendency towards sub-regional 
isolation and lack of synergy on a broad range of policy concerns and 
interests. In some instances, both regional and internal political 
dynamics limit the full potential for development outcomes limiting 
potential gains that can be appropriated for human rights and 














                                                 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, leading the way among sub-regional 
organisations on counter-terrorism strategy  
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3.3. Human Rights Issues and Concerns  
 
3.3.1. Conceptual Understanding   
 
Unlike terrorism and counterterrorism, the concept of human rights 
in sub-Saharan Africa is an old one; attracts less controversy and does 
not generally differ from modern international understandings of 
human rights.  
 
Traditional African societies had their own conceptions of justice and 
human rights (based on indigenous customs, ethics, religion and 
social practices) that did not permit many of the violations prohibited 
in the modern structure of human rights e.g. violations against the 
integrity of the person, life and community etc. (Motala, 1988). Even 
the notion of protecting and promoting human rights when society is 
facing grave danger had relevance in many ancient African societies 
long before the arrival in sub-Saharan Africa of contemporary 
understandings of terrorism, counterterrorism and human rights. For 
example, the Mande people ancient oral constitutions, the Charter of 
Mandé (1222) and the Charter of Kurukan Fuga (1236) advocated for 
the right to life; the preservation of its physical integrity; justice for 
victims of murder and the humane treatment of offenders and 
enemies (Amselle, 2013, pp. 81, 84-85; Diabaté, 2018; Motala, 1988; 
Nesbitt, 2014, p. 13; UNESCO, 2006; R. Weber, 2010, pp. 136-137). See 
articles 5 and 41 of the Charter of Kouroukan Fuga in annex 2. Based 
on such examples, it is evident that modern conceptions of human 
rights fairly resonate with what many societies in sub-Saharan Africa 
have long considered to be individual and communal rights.  
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Thus, we may consider human rights in sub-Saharan Africa to mean a 
set of ‘universal’ (applicable to all peoples regardless of sex, race, 
nationality and economic background at all times, in all places), 
‘incontrovertible’ (not subject to any political machinery) and 
‘subjective’ (properties of individual subjects who possess them due to 
their capacity for rationality, agency and autonomy) ethical principles 
designed to ensure the equal worth of everyone as the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world (Brown, 2016, pp. 24-28; 
Gearty, 2007, p. 343; Hoffman, 2004, p. 939; Ignatieff, 2002, p. 1137; 
Ishay, 2004, p. 159; Jawad, 2015, p. 104; Landman, 2003, pp. 6-10; 
O'Byrne, 2014, pp. 26-27; Panikkar & Panikkar, 1982, p. 83; Pearson, 
2001, p. 44). They are anchored on the notion that human beings will 
not do certain things to fellow human beings no matter what because, 
by everyone’s human dignity46, each human being has moral ties and 
responsibilities to all others and is entitled to certain minimum 
inalienable standards of treatment and equality (Brown, 2016, pp. 24-
28; Hoffman, 2004, p. 939; Ignatieff, 2002, p. 1137; Jawad, 2015, p. 104; 
Landman, 2003, pp. 6-10). As presently understood, Brown (2016, p. 
28); Landman (2003, p. 9); Maïga (2016, p. 7). Note that these rights 
consist of: - 
 
− civil and political rights i.e. right to life, liberty, personal 
security, equality & due process before the law, religious 
freedom, speech and expression, assembly & association, vote 
& political participation;  
                                                 
46 Human dignity is a special equal status that generates a basis on which all people 
can exact mutual respect because of their inherent features as human beings who 
have human potential, qualities and capacities (Brown, 2016, pp. 38-47; Panikkar & 
Panikkar, 1982, p. 78),  
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− economic, social and cultural rights i.e. right to a family, 
education, health & wellbeing, work & fair remuneration, form 
trade unions & free associations, leisure time, social security, 
benefit of culture, indigenous land, rituals and shared cultural 
practices, speak one’s own language and mother tongue 
education and  
− solidarity rights i.e. right to public goods such as 
development and environment)  
 
According to Brown (2016, pp. 51-56), global developments have 
expanded the scope of human rights to include certain specific rights 
such as rights accorded to women, children and persons with 
disabilities; rights related to sexual orientation; rights of prisoners, 
migrants and stateless people and the right of "all peoples" to self-
determination. How academic and policy communities approach 
human rights issues in counterterrorism is shaped by opposing 
arguments over the merits and demerits of limiting rights and 
freedoms in the fight against terrorism.  
 
One group of scholars argues that because terrorists not only violate 
but also exploit rights and freedoms of a free society to circulate, evade 
detection and plan attacks, as a necessary lesser evil and unfortunate 
cost of counterterrorism, terrorism tempts societies to limit rights and 
freedoms (Flynn, 2007, p. 2; Gearty, 2007, pp. 351-358; Ignatieff, 2002, 
pp. 1138, 1156-1137; Jawad, 2015, p. 104; Kielsgard, 2005, pp. 260-261; 
Omotola, 2008, p. 42; Saul, 2008, pp. 199-200; Walsh & Piazza, 2010, 
p. 3). See also Eubank and Weinberg (2001); Eyerman (1998); Li (2005); 
James A Piazza (2008); A. P. Schmid (1992); Wade and Reiter (2007) 
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who find and suggest that democracies experience more terrorist 
attacks.  
 
Another group of scholars argues that respect for human rights does 
not inhibit legitimate and effective counterterrorism, instead it makes 
it easier for government authorities to collect intelligence on terrorists 
and mobilise domestic and international support (Gearty, 2007, p. 352; 
Hoffman, 2004, p. 934; Walsh & Piazza, 2010). This group contends 
that limiting rights in the pretext of being a lesser necessary evil, risks 
lesser evils quickly giving way to greater ones with physical integrity 
rights (torture, imprisonment without due process, disappearances  
and extrajudicial killings etc.) facing highest risk of abuse (Abadie, 
2006; Gearty, 2007, p. 352; Hafner-Burton & Shapiro, 2010; James A. 
Piazza, 2015; James A Piazza & Walsh, 2009, 2010; Shor et al., 2014; 
Tosini, 2007). In addition, it is argued that since human rights are 
indivisible, interconnected, complementary and mutually reinforcing, 
it is impossible to talk of upholding certain rights exclusive of others 
because protection of any right is contingent to the protection of other 
rights even when responding to grave threats such as terrorism47 
(Brown, 2016, p. 29; Landman, 2003, p. 10; Warbrick, 2004, p. 999)  
 
Striking a balance between the two opposing perspectives is the 
notion that because during counterterrorism the ability to fully 
implement one right may temporarily conflict with the ability to fully 
implement another, states can limit certain rights (e.g. the rights to 
freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement, and the 
right to respect for one's private and family life) in accordance with a 
                                                 
47 Civil and political rights secure social and economic rights, and social and 
economic rights make possible the meaningful exercise of civil and political rights 
(Brown, 2016, p. 75).  
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limited and lawful mandate (Brown, 2016, p. 75; Jawad, 2015, p. 107). 
However, it is acknowledged that certain rights are more fundamental 
e.g. rights not to be tortured or enslaved which are not to be derogated 
without substantially demonstrating to accountable bodies (judiciary 
and elected legislature) that the impact of terrorism threatens 
organized life, national security, public safety, public order, health, 
morals, and the human rights and freedoms of others48 (Brown, 2016, 
p. 68; Flynn, 2007, pp. 2-3; Ford, 2011, p. 26; Hoffman, 2004, pp. 951-
952; Ignatieff, 2002, p. 1140; Jawad, 2015, p. 108; Warbrick, 2004, p. 
999). The universally accepted grounds for temporary derogation of 
rights are outlined in article 29(2) of the UNDHR.  
 
Regardless of how states approach the issue human rights in 
counterterrorism, they bear the principal responsibility for any 
violations that occur. Mutua (2008, p. 30) argues that because human 
rights police the space between the state and the individual and not 
between individual citizens, it’s the sole duty of the state to ensure 
that violations do not occur. In addition, because it is only state parties 
that sign the International Bill of Human Rights and many other 
universal instruments relating to human rights, only states bear the 
principal responsibility for any violations (Brown, 2016, p. 29; 
Landman, 2003, pp. 9-11; Mutua, 2008, p. 30; A. Peters, 2015, p. 13; Saul, 
2008, pp. 198-199). It therefore means that only individuals in first 
order and human peoples, families and communities in the second 
order are the bearers of human rights, including terrorists (Brown, 
2016, pp. 51-57, 118; Ignatieff, 2002, p. 1138). The notion that even 
                                                 
48 Ignatieff (2002, p. 1142) cautions that the real danger for human rights as far as 
derogation and declarations of emergency are concerned, even when done within a 
limited lawful mandate, is the manipulation of opinion and the manufacture of 
danger by executive authorities who are seeking more power.  
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terrorists are possessed of rights is based on the principle that once 
rights are distinguished from deserving and of moral worth, they are 
the entitlement of even those who despise the very idea of rights 
(Ignatieff, 2002, p. 1138).  
 
3.3.2. Promotion and Protection Architecture  
 
The ordinary mode of implementing human rights in 
counterterrorism in sub-Saharan Africa is through the International 
Bill of Human Rights, regional legal instruments relevant to human 
rights and national constitutions and laws. These are enforced by 
national, regional and international court systems and promoted by 
national, regional and international human rights institutions.  
 
According to Brown (2016, p. 45); Erastus-Obilo (2008, pp. 1-7); Jawad 
(2015, p. 104); Kielsgard (2005, p. 272); Landman (2003, p. 13); Mihr and 
Gibney (2014, p. xxxi); Pearson (2001, p. 44), the International Bill of 
Human Rights is made up of: - 
 
− the United Nations Charter of 1945; the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UNDHR) of 10 December 1948;  
− the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
came into force on 23 March 1976 and its two Optional 
Protocols, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which also came into force on 3 January 1976 
and  
− core regional human rights treaties i.e. the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights; the American Convention on 
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Human Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights  
 
Regional legal instruments relevant to human rights include:  
 
− the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (also known 
as the Banjul Charter);  
− the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance;  
− the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa;  
− the Constitutive Act of the African Union;  
− the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human 
and Peoples' Rights and 
− the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and 
African Union Convention Governing Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa.  
 
Despite being African, not all the instruments have received full 
ratification. Only the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
has received full ratification and only six countries (Burkina Faso, 
Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritania, Rwanda, South Africa) have ratified all 








Figure 3.2: Ratification of key African human rights treaties by states 
 
Source: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
https://www.achpr.org/resources. Accessed on 20/03/2020.  
Notes:  
A.  African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights;  
B. AU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa;  
C. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;  
D. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance;  
E. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa;  
F. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.  
 
 
Nearly two decades since they were adopted, two instruments i.e. the 
2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa and the 1998 Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights have not been ratified 
by any state. As far as the protection and promotion of human rights 
in counterterrorism is concerned, it is worrying that the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
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yet to be ratified by any state. This is worrying because, designed to 
be the last gatekeeper in the region when human rights come under 
the threat of counterterrorism (Benvenisti, 2007, pp. 1, 7-8; Boateng & 
Adjorlolo, 2018, p. 1692; Fabbrini, 2009, pp. 666, 694; Krebs, 2016, p. 
42; Mersel, 2005, p. 92; Murray, 2016, p. 91), lack of ratification 
deprives the court important legal mandate to try human rights cases 
brought to its attention. This effectively reduces the regional court to 
a toothless institution that can only make non-binding legal opinions 
on matters that come before it49. Generally, ratification of 
international instruments is poor among sub-Saharan Africa 
countries. See also Ewi and Aning (2006, pp. 35-36); Ford (2011, pp. 35-
40). In addition to the Court, the African Union Commission; the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the 
Pan-African Parliament complete the regional institutional 
framework for the protection and promotion of human rights. See also 
Aidoo (1993, p. 710); Ford (2011, p. 27); Motala (1988, pp. 374, 395); I. T. 
Sampson (2015, p. 35).  
 
At the national level, all countries in sub-Saharan Africa have 
constitutions and national laws that protect human rights in varying 
degrees based on either French Civil Law (francophone countries) or 
British Common Law (Anglophone countries). In many countries, the 
institutional architecture is made up of national human rights 
institutions (NHRI), state line agencies and a network of local and 
international human rights NGOs. NHRIs are statutory bodies 
established by governments to promote and protect human rights. As 
at 24 June 2020, only 27 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had NHRIs50. 
                                                 
49 https://en.african-court.org/index.php/about-us/jurisdiction  
50 See https://www.achpr.org/nhris 
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In some countries NHRIs are constitutional bodies and therefore 
enjoy higher levels of autonomy and protection e.g. the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights (KNHCR) in Kenya51. Human 
rights NGOs form an important network of domestic political actors 
that facilitate the vertical internalization and incorporation of human 
rights norms in countries, influencing compliance by the state 
(Guzman, 2002, pp. 1835-1839; Kingsbury, 1998, p. 356; Moore, 2002, 
p. 880; Raustiala, 2000, p. 406; Simmons, 1998, p. 87).  For example, 
NGOs that have been granted observer status by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) participate in 
the commission’s proceedings and draw its attention to violations of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) taking 
place in their countries. According to the ACHPR, eight countries 
i.e.  Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia and South Sudan were unrepresented 
by human rights NGOs at the commission as at the end of March 2020. 











                                                 
51 See https://www.knchr.org/ 
 
 90 
Figure 3.3: Terrorism and Human Rights NGOs with observer status at the 
ACHPR. 
 
Source: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
https://www.achpr.org/statistics accessed on 20/03/2020; Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD). Terrorism (1998 – 2017). NGOs (March 2020) 
 
Evidently, there is a higher concentration of both human rights NGOs 
and terrorism incidents in Eastern and Western sub-regions. This 
further highlights the close association between human rights and 
terrorism.  
 
3.3.3. Concerns and Violations  
 
Much has been done by states and the regional body the AU to combat 
terrorism and address its root causes, including human rights 
concerns. Even though there is visible progress in democratisation 
and the respect for human rights since the early 1990s (Aidoo, 1993, 
pp. 705-708; Boateng & Adjorlolo, 2018, p. 1691; Chabal, 1998, p. 292; 
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variations exist between states and signs of overall decline are 
emerging.  
 
Figure 3.4 displays the trend in average scores for the Freedom House 
human rights index for sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1998 – 2017. 
The Freedom House is a widely-used measure of human rights in 
academia.  It rates countries and territories on a combined average 
score for Political Rights (PL) and Civil Liberties (CL) based on a three-
tier scale where: free = 1.0 - 2.5; partly free = 3.0 - 5.0 and not free = 5.5 
- 7.0. This scale implies that when the score is equal to or above 3.o 
human rights cannot be guaranteed when governments respond to 
terrorism.  
 
Between 1998 and 2005 (the year with the best average score of 3.91) 
human rights in the region enjoyed increasing space as depicted by 
the falling PR and CL lines. Since 2005, the space occupied by human 
rights in the region began to consistently shrink as depicted by the 
rising PR and CL lines. This implies that since 2005, the chances that 
states in the region will violate human rights when implementing 
counterterrorist policies are steadily increasing. This grim empirical 
fact is best illustrated in figure 3.5 which compares the share of 
terrorism incidents contributed by each group of countries, grouped 
by Freedom House human rights classification (free, partially free and 






Figure 3.4: Political rights and civil liberties in sub-Saharan Africa (1998 – 
2017).  
 
Source  (House, 2018) 
 




























Free Partlly Free Not Free
Countries Terrorism
 93 
Figure 3.5 shows that countries which are ‘not free’ experience three 
times as much terrorism incidents as countries which are ‘partly free’. 
The comparative data offers more support to Gearty (2007, p. 352); 
Hoffman (2004, p. 934); Walsh and Piazza (2010) and others who have 
found and argued that respect for human rights in counterterrorist 
policies, especially physical integrity rights, increases rather than 
reduces their effectiveness. Notwithstanding extant empirical 
evidence calling for increased protection of human rights in 
counterterrorism as a strategy for enhancing their effectiveness, 
numerous instances of violations have been documented by local and 
international human rights NGOs e.g. Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch in the region.  
 
Military and security agencies engaged in counterterrorism 
sometimes target and capture or kill leaders of terrorist groups in a 
strategy commonly known as ‘cutting off the snake’s head’ in military 
jargon (Andrew & Silke, 2018, p. 8; Bayard de Volo, 2015, pp. 229, 231; 
Boeke, 2014, p. 17; Kozera, 2018, pp. 11-12).  For example, the U.S. Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) commonly uses drones to kill senior al 
Shabaab leaders in Somalia52. Special security operations commonly 
led by anti-terror police units have been accused of summary killings 
of suspected terrorists’ leaders in Kenya, Mali and Nigeria (Ayodeji, 
2016; Bayard de Volo, 2015, pp. 229, 231; Boeke, 2014, p. 17; Kozera, 2018, 
pp. 11-12; Mazetti & Schmitt, 2011; O'Connell, 2011; Pantucci & 
Jesperson, 2015; I. T. Sampson, 2015, pp. 27, 52-29). In such instances, 
suspected terrorists are killed in an extrajudicial manner, depriving 
them of their rights to life and equal due process before the law. In 




addition, because the strategy is plagued by difficulties in precise 
targeting, there are instances where innocent civilians are killed 
(Boeke, 2014, p. 17) depriving them of their right to life and personal 
security.  
 
In some instances, military and security agencies carry out security 
operation aimed at flushing our terrorist elements and their 
sympathisers from suspected hide out locations. Often these 
operations are accompanied by numerous accounts of human rights 
violations. For example, Associated-Press (2013); BBC (2015); Busher 
(2014, p. 2); Carrier (2016); International (2010, 2014b); Wanyeki (2015) 
observe that special security operations mounted by Kenyan security 
agencies in the predominantly Somali inhabited Eastleigh suburb of 
Nairobi following the Westgate Shopping Mall attack on 21 September 
2013, which killed at least 67 people and the Garissa University College 
attack on 2 April 2015 which killed at least 148 people, mostly students 
were marred by accusations of :-  
 
− police harassment, extortion, torture, arbitrary arrests and 
intimidation; 
− illegal searches and violation of privacy; 
− forced encampment (forced return to designated refugee 
camps);  
− ill treatment of Somali refugees and threats of relocating them 
back to Somalia etc.  
 
Similarly, Ayodeji (2016); International (1991a, p. 2; 1991b, pp. 1-2; 
1994a, p. 1; 1994b, p. 1; 2012a, p. 6; 2012b, p. 5; 2012c, p. 13; 2012d, p. 1; 
2012e, pp. 4-5; 2013a, p. 17; 2013b; 2013c, p. 8; 2013d, pp. 17-18; 2014a, p. 
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6; 2017, p. 7); Pantucci and Jesperson (2015); Sigsworth (2019, p. 14) 
note that Côte d’Ivoire security agencies; Mali’s Forces Spéciales Anti-
Terroristes (FORSAT) and Nigeria’s Special Joint Military Task Force 
(JTF) have been accused of mounting special security operations 
marred by accusations of :-  
 
− extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, lack of 
investigation into deaths and barriers to complaints;  
− intimidation, rape, forced evictions and house burning;  
− incommunicado, arbitrary and unlawful detention in unofficial 
places;  
− denied rights under arrest e.g. access to lawyers, family 
members and medical care;  
− flouting of due process e.g. delayed prosecution;  
− absence of witness protection and support;  
− racial and indiscriminate attacks on Tuareg, Arabs and Peul 
civilian population;  
− arrests and intimidation of journalists;  
− inhumane and degrading methods of interrogation; 
− detaining child soldiers with adults without any rehabilitation 
safeguards in place etc.  
Where counterinsurgency has incorporate the non-state armed actors 
(surrogate forces or militias) e.g. the MNLA, Ganda Koy and the 
Ganda Izo in Mali. Dao (2019, pp. 73-74); International (2012b, p. 12; 
2012c, p. 20; 2012e, p. 6; 2014a, p. 11); Lyammouri (2018, p. 3); 
Rupesinghe et al. (2019, p. 4) observe that in many occasions, 
governments and their international partners have limited control 
over these actors who often sacrifice protection of civilians and human 
rights at the altar of unclear agendas including indiscriminate 
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reprisals against specific populations, extortion, confiscating property 
of victims, recruitment and use of child soldiers, sexual violence 
against women and girls etc. See also Cigar (2014); Kozera (2018) who 
discuss in detail the pros and cons of incorporating surrogate armies 
in counterinsurgency operations against terrorists. 
 
All countries in sub-Saharan except seven (Eswatini, Liberia, Rwanda, 
São Tomé & Príncipe, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have at least one 
anti-terror legislation (see figure 3.1). Whitaker (2007, p. 1021)53 notes 
that most anti-terror legislations in sub-Saharan Africa: -   
 
− define terrorism broadly;  
− emphasise anti-state activities;  
− are used by governments to label whole organisations as 
terrorist groups;  
− expand law enforcement powers e.g. enhanced surveillance; 
reduce procedural requirements such as obtaining court 
approval;  
− allow for lengthy pre-trial detention of suspects;  
− allow interception of private communication;  
− impose mandatory sentences on those convicted etc.  
 
Such broad and sometimes vague provisions create avenues for 
human rights violations in counterterrorist policies or in the name of 
counterterrorism. In some instances, they embolden state agents who 
either harbour sadistic passions or have insatiable appetite for the 
                                                 
53 Whiteker cautions that enacting anti-terror laws must be approached with care to 
avoid the risk that those targeted by special laws regard the move as an 
acknowledgement that they are 'not really' criminals but political offenders.  
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abusing power. For example, Foot (2007, p. 499); Ford (2013, pp. 2, 7-
9); Hoffman (2004, p. 946); Khamala (2019, p. 80); Khan (2016, p. 7); 
Kielsgard (2005, p. 263); Omotola (2008, p. 42); Sigsworth (2019, p. 6); 
Whitaker (2007, pp. 1026-1028); Workneh (2019) observe that in the 
wake of the U.S. sponsored global war on terror (GWT), governments 
in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia used the rhetoric of GWT to 
acquire tools of abuse for the survival of state power and advancement 
of interests of incumbent leaders, commonly reigning hard on 
political opposition labelling and prosecuting them as terrorists under 
anti-terrorism laws.  
 
In some countries, anti-terror legislations are scattered across 
different statues. For example, after a sharp increase in terrorist 
attacks from zero in 1998 to 57 in 2018, Burkina Faso become the 
country with the highest number of anti-terror legislations in the 
region by enacting 33 legislations scattered across different statutes. 
See (START) (2018); SHERLOC (2019); Studies and CSIS (2018). Such 
a high number of legislations scattered across different statutes is a 
recipe for lack of clarity and conflict between legislations. In chapter 
3, it was noted by Benvenisti (2007, pp. 1, 7-8); Boateng and Adjorlolo 
(2018, p. 1692); Fabbrini (2009, pp. 666, 694); Krebs (2016, pp. 42, 49-
51); Mersel (2005, pp. 90-92); Murray (2016, p. 91); Scheinin (2016) that 
as guardians of the constitution, courts set limits on counterterrorism 
measures by clarifying, tracking and interpreting applicable sources of 
authorization (the constitution, statutes, international laws, human 
rights laws  and administrative regulations) for executive power or 
action. In the case of Burkina Faso for example, it may not be clear 
which legislations guide which specific counterterror measures and in 
the worst-case scenario, legislations may conflict and contradict each 
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other. Such circumstances are likely to breed chaotic counterterrorist 
policies and miscarriage of justice. Ambiguity and conflict of 
legislations creates grey areas where human rights violations by the 
state can easily thrive. Terrorists and their lawyers may also exploit 
the same grey areas to evade criminal responsibility. 
 
Measures for preventing or countering violent extremism (P/CVE) are 
also prone to human rights abuses. For example, Sigsworth (2019, p. 
6) observes that when the ‘extremism’ net is cast too wide as to target 
entire racial, ethnic or religious groups, the rights of legitimate actors 
within these groups may be affected in ways that might stigmatise 
them. During a research visit in Mali in May 2019, one key respondent 
observed that: 
 
It’s easy, we must dispense justice to avoid the 
impunity and bad governance. The militaries and the 
population trust each other to fight insecurity because 
terrorists are hidden among the population. If the 
armies consider these same population as terrorists, 
the struggle is going to be very difficult. We must 
create a climate of confidence between armies and 
population, and the population must know that 
armies are there to protect them and not to persecute 
them. 
 
Obviously, when preventing or countering violent extremism (P/CVE) 
programmes target entire racial, ethnic or religious groups, not only 
do members of such groups feel stigmatised and their human dignity 
violated, they also become reluctant to cooperate with authorities. As 
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a result, useful actionable community intelligence that may aid 
pragmatic counterterrorism is likely to get lost. In addition, members 
of targeted communities may reject well-intended social programmes 
e.g. programmes aimed at addressing poverty, exclusion, social 
justice, illiteracy etc. 
 
As noted in chapter 3, some prison facilities in the region face the 
double challenge of being responsible for the safe custody of highly 
contagious terrorism suspects in conditions of overcrowding. See 
Abdelmottlep (2016, p. 12); Nations (2010, p. 21); Telisinghe et al. (2016, 
pp. 3-4). This creates the possibility that prison radicalisation i.e. the 
diffusion of radical ideologies within prisons is potentially faster and 
more effective. To forestall this danger, prison authorities hold 
terrorism suspects and convicts in isolated, highly secured and 
anonymous prison blocks with little or no social interaction and 
limited or no access to rehabilitation programmes. Generally, 
overcrowding also means that things like medical care, sanitation and 
diet etc. are in insufficient and of poor quality. 
 
3.4.  Conclusion   
 
Counterterrorism entails the whole range of government measures 
designed to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism and 
deal with its consequences. In sub-Saharan Africa, these measures 
broadly fall into two main approaches i.e. military and criminal 
justice. Military approaches rely on the use of armed force by military 
and civilian security agencies to directly combat threats through 
security operations. They take the form of regional and international 
peace support operations, special security operations and 
 100 
counterinsurgency. Criminal justice approaches are based on the 
notion of ‘criminal justice’ and rely on enforcement of the law by 
criminal justice agencies i.e. parliament, police, courts, corrections 
and other government and community agencies involved in 
preventing or countering violent extremism (P/CVE).  
 
The ordinary understanding of human rights as conceived by early 
traditional societies in sub-Saharan Africa fairly corresponds with 
contemporary notions of human rights as codified in the International 
Bill of Human Rights and other international human rights statues. 
However, there are significant human rights concerns and violations 
associated with counterterrorist policies in the region. The main 
concern is that since 2005, nearly two thirds of countries in the region 
are either ‘partly free or not free’ and therefore cannot guarantee 
respect for human rights in counterterrorist policies. The importance 
of protecting human rights when responding to terrorism in the 
region is illustrated by the fact that countries which are ‘not free’ 
experience three times as many terrorism incidents as countries which 
are ‘partly free’. This implies that increasing the space occupied by 
human rights in counterterrorist policies is likely to enhance their 
effectiveness in the fight against terrorism in the region. Therefore, we 
can conclude that as far as counterterrorism and human rights in sub-
Saharan Africa are concerned, the key task for empirical research is to 






4. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
PROPOSITIONS  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
Chapter two established what manifests as terrorism in sub-Saharan 
Africa, noting that jihadi terrorism is the most complex security threat 
that affects the region. Chapter three discussed in depth responses to 
the problem and the human rights issues, concerns and violations 
associated with counterterrorism in the region.  
 
Based on the understanding that increasing the space occupied by 
human rights in counterterrorist policies is likely to enhance their 
effectiveness in the fight against terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
the assumption that the degree of human rights violations co-varies 
with certain macro social conditions inherent in society (Park, 1987, 
pp. 405-406), this chapter explores the factors and conditions that are 
predicted to facilitate or impede human rights in counterterrorist 
policies. 
 
Specifically, the chapter examines prepositions advanced by liberal 
democratic and constructivist theoretical perspectives and extant 
empirical studies that have examined the relationship between 
terrorism, counterterrorism and human rights. The key objective is to 
identify and isolate specific variables thought to be significant and 
closely approximate macrosocial conditions that can be hypothesised 




4.2. Theoretical Propositions  
 
4.2.1. Liberal Democratic Theory 
 
Liberal democratic theorists are rationalist in orientation. They 
emphasize the structure of domestic interests, actors (individuals, 
private groups, courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, NGOs 
etc.), power and incentives as the main pathways to identifying 
conditions that determine state compliance with human rights 
(Guzman, 2002, pp. 1838-1839; Kingsbury, 1998, p. 356; Moore, 2002, 
p. 880; Raustiala, 2000, pp. 399, 406-399). According to liberal 
democratic theory, states are rational, strategic, interdependent and 
utility maximising actors who have  analytic capacity to choose the 
best feasible alternative based on available information on well-
defined, complete and transitive subjective preferences (Chayes & 
Chayes, 1993, p. 177; Geisinger & Stein, 2007, p. 1131; Guzman, 2002, p. 
1836; Kingsbury, 1998, pp. 349-351; Raustiala, 2000, p. 399). Therefore, 
according to liberal democratic theorists, the aggregate of subjective 
interests (e.g. display of power through military prowess; safety of its 
citizens etc.) moderated by a rational calculation of costs (e.g. 
monetary and political expense for an independent judiciary etc.) and 
benefits (e.g. unrestrained action, reputation, credibility, status etc.) 
determine whether counterterrorism measures adopted by a state will 
facilitate or impede human rights (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, pp. 177, 187; 
Geisinger & Stein, 2007, p. 1137; Guzman, 2002, p. 1837; R. B. Mitchell, 
1993, p. 327; Moore, 2002, pp. 883-885; Raustiala, 2000, p. 402). 
Further, liberal democratic theorists argue that the presence of 
democratic institutions (elected legislatures, judiciary, NGOs etc.) 
facilitate human rights because they secure important civil liberties 
(e.g. freedom of speech, assembly and the press), and permit the 
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existence of constitutional provisions that place political costs, 
constraints and retributions in the way of governments inclined to 
impede human rights in the fight against terrorism (Cross, 1999, pp. 
89-91; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004, p. 540; De Mesquita, Downs, 
Smith, & Cherif, 2005, p. 456; Evans, 2001, pp. 625-626; Kingsbury, 
1998, p. 357; Raustiala, 2000, pp. 409-411; Shor et al., 2014, p. 305; 
Simmons, 1998, p. 83). In sum, liberal democratic theory emphasises 
the importance of power and security as the primary locus of interests 
that determine whether a state is likely to prioritise human rights in 
the fight against terrorism. 
 
Several limitations plague liberal democratic theory as a framework 
for identifying and understanding macro social conditions associated 
with violations or respect for human rights in society. The notion of 
subjective interests fails to explain why states devote huge amounts of 
resources (time, financial, political and human) in developing 
international human rights norms that, according to liberal 
democratic theorists, will nevertheless be disregarded  (Chayes & 
Chayes, 1993, pp. 187-188, 197; Geisinger & Stein, 2007, p. 1131; Guzman, 
2002, p. 1837; R. B. Mitchell, 1993, p. 328; Moore, 2002, p. 885; O. R. 
Young, 2013, p. 1). Thus, liberal democratic theory does not account 
for social influences that may override subjective interests of the state 
and which may be decisive in determining the extent of a 
government’s compliance with human rights in counterterrorism. See 
also Phillips (2007, p. 63). Democracy in its pure form constitutes the 
central pillar of liberal democratic theory. This presents empirical 
problems because, as a variable, democracy is plagued by 
epistemological deficiencies. It is monolithic and over encompassing. 
According to Dahl (1998, p. 48); Morlino (2004, pp. 12-18); Schmitter 
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and Karl (1991, pp. 79-80) democracy is not only a system of governing, 
it is also inherently a system of rights. The analytical problem with 
democracy as a variable is that it is endogenous to our dependent 
variable i.e. human rights and to many possible explanatory variables 
leading to reverse causality, also known as granger causality. See 
Granger (1988); Roberts and Whited (2013, p. 499). In addition, 
democracy is afflicted by the academic danger of conceptual 
stretching because there is not one but many democracies even within 
in sub-Saharan Africa, shaped by differences in internal, sub-regional, 
colonial (French, British, Portuguese), ethnic and religious 
characteristics of states (Ake, 1993, p. 239; Alesina et al., 2003, p. 163; 
Chabal, 1998, p. 295; Sartori, 1970; Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p. 76). 
 
4.2.2. Constructivist Theory 
 
Constructivist theorists are Sociological in orientation. They 
emphasize the role of socialization in the construction of states and 
their interests through influences that are intersubjective, 
endogenous and not merely reducible to material costs and benefits  
(Kingsbury, 1998, p. 358; Raustiala, 2000, pp. 399-409; Simmons, 1998, 
p. 85). Constructivists argue that states, the principal units of analysis, 
are not necessarily irrational and obey rules perceived to have come 
into being in accordance with the right process but are not obliged to 
obey rules they did not consent to (Guzman, 2002, pp. 1833-1834; 
Harrison, 2004, p. 526; Raustiala, 2000, p. 406; Simmons, 1998, p. 87). 
Thus, state consent which is determined by perceived fairness and 
procedural legitimacy of international human rights norms generates 
a legal obligation to promote and protect human rights at home in the 
fight against terrorism (Kingsbury, 1998, p. 355; Raustiala, 2000, p. 
406). For example, rights involving bodily integrity are widely 
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accepted as legitimate transnationally and cross-culturally because 
they resonate with basic ideas of human dignity common to most 
cultures (Simmons, 1998, p. 87). According to constructivist theory, 
the socialisation of human rights norms occurs through norm 
entrepreneurs (e.g. multinational corporations, NGOs, international 
organizations and private individuals) who generate and drive 
patterns of behaviour from which international norms emerge, are 
internalized and incorporated within domestic legal and political 
institutions of the state leading to formation of identities around 
those norms and ultimately to state compliance (Guzman, 2002, pp. 
1835-1839; Harrison, 2004, p. 526; Moore, 2002, p. 880; Raustiala, 2000, 
p. 406; Simmons, 1998, p. 87). Further, constructivist theorists assert 
that the general propensity of states to comply with international law 
is not only determined by the need to recalculate the costs and 
benefits of such a decision but also by the transaction costs of the 
decision to comply (Guzman, 2002, p. 1831; Kingsbury, 1998, p. 352). 
Thus, operational factors e.g. lack of administrative and or financial 
capacity, ambiguity in treaty terms, unforeseen changes in conditions 
exogenous to treaty processes etc. are important in determining the 
extent of a government’s respect for human rights in counterterrorism 
(Alvarez, 1997, p. 309; Guzman, 2002, p. 1831; Kingsbury, 1998, p. 352; 
Moore, 2002, p. 880; Raustiala, 2000, p. 407).  
 
Constructivist theory is also plagued by inadequacies that limit its 
explanatory power as a theoretical framework for identifying and 
understanding macro social conditions that predict respect for human 
in counterterrorism. The notion of social construction of states and 
their interests through intersubjective influences is problematic 
because it presupposes that world cultures are rigid yet compatible 
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structures that enable states to socially acquire intersubjective 
behavioural properties. This notion ignores that in the absence of 
effective enforcement, states are unlikely to facilitate human rights 
when responding to terrorism if compliance comes at greater costs 
e.g. political costs, public safety and security etc. (Kingsbury, 1998, p. 
352; Moore, 2002). Diametrically opposite to the inadequacies of the 
notion of subjective interests in liberal democratic theory, the notion 
of intersubjective interests fails to explain why states disregard 
international human rights norms that they collectively develop in a 
process of intersubjective influences. Thus, it does not explain 
variances in human rights outcomes between proximate states and 
between states in the same geopolitical region. For example, African 
Union human rights instruments are indigenous to sub-Saharan 
Africa; enshrine African cultural conceptions of rights and all member 
states of the AU participated in their development. From a 
constructivist perspective, these instruments are expected to receive 
full unreserved ratification by African states. However, it turns out 
that not all instruments are fully ratified and only six states in sub-
Saharan Africa (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritania, Rwanda, 
South Africa) have ratified all the instruments.  Constructivist theory’s 
notion of intersubjective influences and socialisation of states fails to 
explain this discrepancy as much as it fails to explain why Rwanda has 
no legislation on terrorism yet it shares common borders with the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi which have ten 
legislations each.  The notion of consent presents ontological and 
epistemological problems. What does state consent to international 
human rights instruments mean and how should it be measured in 
empirically? Does it mean signing, ratification or observed human 
rights behaviour of states? Some states which are either signatories or 
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have ratified key international human rights instruments have poor 
human rights records. Empirical studies that have incorporated 
ratification as a measure of consent have yielded mixed and 
inconclusive results (Hathaway, 2002, p. 2022; Keohane, 2000, p. 126; 
Neumayer, 2005, pp. 925-926; Risse & Sikkink, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 
Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999, pp. 5-8). It could be that, ratification is 
better proxy for external rather than internal behaviour of states to 
which consent is most relevant. 
 
4.3. Empirical Propositions  
 
A considerable body of empirical literature has examined the 
relationship between macro-s0cial conditions and human rights. 
Many of these studies use variables suggested by liberal democratic 
and constructivist theories. Davenport and Armstrong (2004, p. 540); 
Henderson (1991, pp. 121-127); Park (1987, p. 142); D. Schneider (2004, 
pp. 424-430); Shor et al. (2014, p. 305) find that military control, size 
of the military, size of the police, military expenditures, military 
dependence on the U.S. are negatively associated with respect for 
human rights. Argueing that democracies make it easier for citizens 
and opposition leaders to publicize locally and internationally human 
rights violations, Poe and Tate (1994, p. 854) find that democracy has 
substantively important and statistically significant effects on 
repression. Klingemann and Hofferbert (1998, p. 167) show that as the 
proportion of respondents satisfied with democratic performance in 
18 post-communist Central and Eastern European countries declines, 
the proportion of citizens positively rating the human rights 
performance of their government also declines. According Foot (2007, 
p. 493); Hathaway (2002, p. 2022); Neumayer (2005, pp. 925-926); 
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Risse-Kappen et al. (1999, pp. 5-8), governments in a region that has a 
higher number of domestic and international actors engaged in the 
diffusion of international human rights norms are more likely to have 
better human rights records when responding to security challenges. 
They argue that domestic and international human rights actors 
support local opposition which exposes and puts pressure on norm 
violating governments by shaming them. Cross (1999, p. 95) finds that 
the number of lawyers and judicial independence in a country are 
significantly associated with greater political freedom and human 
rights protection. Davenport and Armstrong (2004, p. 551); De 
Mesquita et al. (2005, p. 456) show that only high levels of aggregated 
dimensions of democracy are associated with improvements in 
human rights outcomes, and below a certain level democracy has no 
impact on human rights violations. This finding exposes empirical 
weaknesses in liberal democratic theory’s reliance on democracy as a 
major explanatory condition for human rights outcomes. It raises 
some pertinent empirical questions. For example, what is the 
objective threshold for high and low levels of democracy? Certainly, 
in the absence of a scientific widely acceptable method, determining 
what is a high or a low level of democracy dependents subjective 
judgement, influenced by among other things how democracy is 
defined and operationalised. 
 
According to constructivists theory, operational factors such as lack 
of administrative or financial capacity are important determinants of 
state compliance with human rights imperatives. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004); Henderson (1991, p. 124); N. J. Mitchell and McCormick (1988, 
pp. 479-497) find that governments of poor countries facing 
substantial social and political tensions exuberated by economic 
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scarcity are more likely to resort to state repression to maintain 
control. According to Cross (1999, p. 94); N. J. Mitchell and 
McCormick (1988, p. 479); Neumayer (2005, pp. 932-933); Park (1987, 
p. 407), low levels of economic growth and development represent the 
principal economic conditions that may be associated with human 
rights violations. Friedman (2006, p. 18) argues that economic growth 
and development is expected to provide governments with financial 
resources necessary to procure technologies that enable security 
agents to respond to security challenges in ways that facilitate human 
rights. Bohara, Mitchell, Nepal, and Raheem (2008, pp. 9-11); 
Clutterbuck (1995, pp. 88, 90-92); Pearson (2001, p. 52); Pilapitaya 
(2005, pp. 10-18); Thuo (2009, p. 125); Vorster (2012, p. 137) find that 
low-income countries have high rates of corruption and are associated 
with government use of torture and poor human rights records. They 
argue that corruption disables a state from exercising its 
administrative capacity and control over bureaucratic agents, limiting 
its ability to respect, fulfil and protect the human rights at all levels. 
While Landman (2005, p. 3); Risse-Kappen et al. (1999, pp. 5-8) show 
that treaty ratification is positively associated with greater protection 
of human rights, Hathaway (2002, p. 2022); Moore (2002, p. 881); Shor 
et al. (2014, pp. 297, 307) find that countries that ratify human rights 
treaties appear not to have better human rights practices compared to 
those that do not ratify and may in fact be associated with worse 
human rights records. Contending that human rights treaties 
empower local NGOs to acquire greater legitimacy and political 
prominence which enables individuals to conceptualise abuses 
previously committed against them, Goodman and Jinks (2003, pp. 
172-175) show that China's ratification of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights influenced human rights policies of 
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Burma, Indonesia, North Korea, and Singapore. However, Neumayer 
(2005, pp. 925-926) argues that the beneficial effect of ratification of 
human rights treaties is conditional on the extent of democracy and 
the strength of an internationally linked civil society.  
 
Though there is an abundance of empirical literature that has 
examined the relationship between macro-s0cial conditions and 
human rights, to the best of our knowledge, only the study by Shor et 
al. (2014) examines macro social conditions that predict states’ human 
rights behaviour in relation to counterterrorist policies. Relying on a 
theoretical framework that brings together actor-oriented 
(rationalist) and socio-cultural (constructivist) explanations and a 
longitudinal cross-national analysis of panel data for the years 1981-
2005, the study finds substantial evidence for the effects of both 
explanations. Specifically, Shor and colleagues find that terrorism; 
higher levels of economic and military dependence on the United 
States; high levels of domestic unrest and countries in regions with 
high average repression levels are associated with repressive 
counterterrorist policies. They also establish that connection to the 
global system (economic, political, and social openness and 
dependence on the international community); higher levels of 
democracy and economic growth are significant predictors of less 
repressive counterterrorist policies. However, they also find that 
ratification of global human rights treaties has no significant effect in 
either direction and argue that the ability of transnational agents and 
legislation to reduce serious violations of basic human rights when 




4.4. Conclusion   
 
Considering the theoretical and extant empirical propositions 
discussed in this chapter, we can conclude that, variables that predict 
human rights outcomes in times of counterterrorism in sub-Saharan 
Africa can be grouped into five categories of macrosocial conditions 
as indicated in table 4.1 below 
 
Table 4.1: Macro social conditions and variables  
 
Macro Social Condition  Variables  
1. Democracy  Level of democracy, elected 
legislature, independent judiciary, 
human rights NGOs, rights 
protective constitutional 
provisions, laws, population of 
lawyers etc. 
 




GDP, corruption, poverty levels, 
inequality etc. 
 
3. State and human 
security 
Welfare expenditure, military 
expenditure, military control, size 





Ratification of international human 
rights instruments, repression 
levels of neighbouring countries, 
military and economic dependence 
of powerful rights espousing 
countries etc. 
 
5. Terrorism and internal 
unrest 
Terrorism incidents, internal 
conflicts (civil war, insurgency, 




Thus, we can postulate that democracy; good economic and 
administrative capacity; preference for human over state security; 
high levels of integration into the international community and a low 
level of terrorism and internal unrest are necessary macro social 
conditions to facilitate human rights in counterterrorist policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 











5.1. Introduction  
 
 
Chapter four we hypothesised that: - 
 
− democracy;  
− good economic and administrative capacity;  
− preference for human over state security;  
− high levels of integration into the international community 
and  
− a low level of terrorism and internal unrest  
 
are necessary conditions to facilitate human rights in counterterrorist 
policies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
This chapter outlines the empirical procedure for establishing which 
of these macro social conditions or combinations of conditions are 
necessary to facilitate or impede human rights when governments in 
sub-Saharan Africa respond to terrorism.  
 
Specifically, it describes the research design, selection of cases, 
selection and measurement of variables, sources of data, methods of 






5.2. Analytical Design 
 
5.2.1. Social Science Methods 
 
The fundamental empirical problem that confronts our analysis is 
how to control for confounding factors not subject to the analysis in 
order to isolate as far as possible conditions or combinations of 
conditions necessary to facilitate or impede human rights in 
counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa. See Lijphart (1971, pp. 
683-685); B. G. Peters (1998, p. 26). Scientists have over the years 
developed four research methods designed to overcoming this 
problem i.e.  experimental, statistical, comparative and case study 
methods (Lijphart, 1971, p. 683; Marsh & Stoker, 2002, p. 176; Rihoux 
& Grimm, 2006, p. 48).  
 
The experimental method isolates necessary relationships between 
variables by exposing one group of cases (experimental group) to a 
stimulus and any observed difference between this group and the 
other (control group) is attributed to the stimulus (Crombie, 1955; 
Lewin, 1947, pp. 8-9; Lijphart, 1971, p. 683; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002, pp. 12-18). Because of practical and ethical impediments, the 
experimental method is rarely used in the analysis of human 
behaviour in the Social Sciences even though it is the most ideal 
design for scientific enquiry (Lijphart, 1971, pp. 683-684).  
 
The proximate alternative to the experimental method is the 
statistical method which models (mathematically manipulates) 
empirically observed data of a large number of individual cases to 
discover the patterns, directions and magnitude of the most 
important controlled relationships among variables by means of 
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partial correlations  (Hanushek & Jackson, 2013, pp. 1-3; Lijphart, 1971, 
p. 684).  
 
The third in the order of things is the comparative method which is 
suitable for the study of large macro social units as opposed to 
individual cases and resembles the statistical method in all respects 
except that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit 
systematic control by means of partial correlations (Lijphart, 1971, pp. 
684-685; B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 28; C. Ragin, 1987, pp. 32-38; Rihoux & 
Grimm, 2006, p. 49). The comparative method is useful for identifying 
cross societal differences and similarities at more than one level of 
analysis (Flick, 2014, p. 150; A. Przeworski & H. Teune, 1970, p. 36; C. 
Ragin, 1987, p. 32).  
 
Last in the scheme of things is the case study method which is an 
intensive study of a single unit with an aim to describe the case; 
interpret empirical theory; develop theoretical hypotheses where no 
theory exists; confirm or infirm a theory or reveal why a case deviates 
from established patterns of causal relationships i.e. to uncover 
relevant additional variables that were not considered previously 
(Gerring, 2004, p. 341; Lijphart, 1971, pp. 691-693).  
 
Since this is a regional study involving a small number of cases, the 
analysis combines the comparative method, specifically Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) with the application of Crisp Set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) and an in-depth case 










Developed in the late 1980s by C. Ragin (1987) and programmer Kriss 
Drass, csQCA dichotomizes a case as either belonging to or not 
belonging to a set (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009, p. 33; Saka-Helmhout & 
Piekkari, p. 14). For this specific analysis, we rely on version 3.0 of the 
open source fsQCA software developed by C. C. Ragin and Davey 
(2016)54.  
 
5.2.2. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a variant of the 
comparative method that permits systematic control by means of 
partial correlations, overcoming a fundamental limitation of the 
comparative method (Lijphart, 1971, pp. 684-685; C. Ragin, 1987, pp. 
32-38; C. C. Ragin, 1999, pp. 1233-1234; Rihoux & Grimm, 2006, p. 49).  
QCA is designed to analyse cases as holistic configurations of 
attributes to identify conditions or combinations of conditions that 
cause observed changes in social phenomena and to group cases that 
share given causal conditions or combinations of conditions into 
meaningful empirical categories (Legewie, 2013, p. 3; Mahoney & 
Goertz, 2006, p. 236; C. C. Ragin, 1998, p. 107; Rihoux & Grimm, 2006, 
                                                 
54 See www.compasss.org or www.fsqca.com  
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pp. 17-18, 54; Rihoux, Rezsöhazy, & Bol, 2011, p. 13). QCA is based on 
the logic that in the Social Sciences, causality is complex. As observed 
by Kruck and Schneiker (2017, pp. 127-128); Legewie (2013, p. 3); 
Mahoney and Goertz (2006); Mello (2012, p. 428); Rihoux et al. (2011, 
p. 13); C. Q. Schneider and Wagemann (2012, p. 382) this implies that 
in QCA causality is: 
 
a) conjectural i.e. causal factors can combine leading to the 
occurrence of a phenomenon;  
b) equi-final i.e. different combinations of causal factors can lead 
to the occurrence a phenomenon; 
c) diametric i.e. causal factors can have opposing effects and  
d) an identified relationship between a condition and the 
outcome does not mean that the inverse relationship must also 
be true.  
 
5.2.2.1. Operational Mechanics of QCA 
 
The operational mechanics of QCA is grounded on the formal logic of 
Boolean Algebra which is the algebra for variables that have only two 
possible values true (present) or false (absent), formulated by the 
British Mathematician and logician George Boolean in the 19th century 
(Kruck & Schneiker, 2017, p. 124; B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 166). Two 
fundamental Boolean operators are used to guide the analysis and 
define the nature of the relationship between causal conditions and 
outcomes (Ibid).  
 
The additive operator referring to the logical OR, denoted by (+) 
implies that, if A, B and C are the hypothesized causal conditions for 
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an observed change in social phenomena Y, then A + B + C = Y means 
that if any one of the conditions A or B or C is present Y will be present 
or have a positive value i.e. any of the three conditions could be 
sufficient to produce the observed change although none is a 
necessary condition (Kruck & Schneiker, 2017, p. 126; Legewie, 2013, p. 
9; Mello, 2012, p. 428; B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 166; C. C. Ragin, 1998, p. 
116; 1999, pp. 1226-1227; 2009, p. 109). In other words, a condition A or 
combination of conditions X is sufficient for the outcome Y if Y will 
always occur when A or combination of conditions X are present, but 
other conditions or combinations of conditions besides A or X may 
also produce Y i.e. a condition A or combination of conditions X  is 
sufficient if it is definitely or almost definitely followed by the 
outcome Y (Legewie, 2013, p. 9; C. C. Ragin, 1999, pp. 1226-1227; 2009, 
p. 109).  
 
The multiplicative operator referring to the logical AND, denoted by 
(*) implies that, if A, B and C are the hypothesized causal conditions 
for an observed change in social phenomena Y, then A * B * C = Y 
means that each one of the conditions A or B or C can be said to be 
necessary but probably not sufficient to produce the observed 
outcome (Kruck & Schneiker, 2017, p. 126; Legewie, 2013, p. 9; Mello, 
2012, p. 428; B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 166; C. C. Ragin, 1998, p. 116; 1999, 
pp. 1226-1227; 2009, p. 109). In other words, a condition A is necessary 
for an outcome Y if the occurrence of Y is not possible without the 
presence of A, but A alone is not enough to produce Y i.e. the 
occurrence of A does not guarantee that Y will occur (Legewie, 2013, 






A rightward arrow () is used to refer to a sufficient condition and a 
leftward arrow () is used to refer to a necessary condition (Kruck & 
Schneiker, 2017, p. 126; C. C. Ragin, 1999, pp. 1226-1227)55. In QCA 
solution terms, capital letters are used to express explanatory and 
outcome conditions and tilde (~) is used to refer to the logical NOT, 
as a negation or absence of a condition (Kruck & Schneiker, 2017, p. 
126).  
 
The operation of QCA proceeds in three distinct and successive stages 
in which causal conditions are logically reduced until only those 
conditions that clearly differentiate between outcomes are included 
in parsimonious explanations (Blackman, Wistow, & Byrne, 2013, p. 
132; Hicks, 1994, p. 96; C. C. Ragin, 1998, p. 121; Seawright, 2005, p. 5). 
The first stage involves the constitution of a property space by 
defining the cases; theoretically identifying relevant causal conditions 
and gathering data on these conditions for each case (Blackman et al., 
2013, p. 137; Greckhamer, Misangyi, Elms, & Lacey, 2008, p. 698; C. C. 
Ragin, 1998, p. 121). In the second stage, a truth table which lists the 
different logically possible combinations of causal conditions along 
with the cases conforming to each combination is used to analyse the 
property space to systematically identify causal conditions sufficient 
for the outcome of interest to occur (Greckhamer et al., 2008, p. 698; 
B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 163; C. C. Ragin, 1998, p. 121; 1999, p. 1232; Rihoux 
& Grimm, 2006, p. 19; Seawright, 2005, p. 5). Causal conditions are 
represented in the truth table using presence/absence dichotomies 
                                                 
55 Ragin (p. 1237) cautions that, the properties of sufficiency and necessity 
notwithstanding, QCA configurational analysis is non-causal and no use should be 
made of the language of causation or causal reasoning. 
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with 0 indicating absence (the case is not in the set-in question) and 1 
indicating presence (the case is in the set-in question) (C. C. Ragin, 
1998, p. 109; 1999, p. 1230; Seawright, 2005, p. 5)56. The truth table is 
then logically minimized to represent in a shorthand manner the 
prime implicants (combination of conditions necessary and sufficient 
for the observed outcome) denoted as minimal/parsimonious 
formulas (B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 166; C. C. Ragin, 1999, p. 1233; Rihoux 
et al., 2011, p. 15). The minimization process begins with the selection 
of rows displaying the outcome which are then compared to each 
other, with the objective of simplifying them through a bottom-up 
process of paired comparison based on the logic that if a Boolean 
expression differs in only one causal condition yet produces the same 
outcome then the causal condition that distinguishes the two 
expressions can be considered irrelevant and discarded (Amenta & 
Poulsen, 1994, p. 1; B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 166; C. C. Ragin, 1999, pp. 1233-
1234). In other words, rows that differ on only one causal condition 
but produce the same outcome are combined minus the differing 
causal condition to generate the "prime implicants chart” (C. C. Ragin, 
1999, pp. 1233-1234). The third and final stage of QCA analysis, is the 
evaluation and interpretation of the parsimonious formulas in 
congruence with the relevant theoretical background (Greckhamer et 
al., 2008, p. 698; C. C. Ragin, 1998, p. 121; Seawright, 2005, p. 5).  
5.2.2.2. Application and Strengths of QCA 
 
There are several reasons for using QCA in this analysis. First, QCA 
incorporates credible in built mechanisms to establish controls for 
                                                 
56 Binary coding in QCA converts qualitative data into forms suitable for quantitative 
analysis and systematic testing of hypotheses (B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 166; Berg-
Schlosser et.al. (2009) in Rihoux et al., 2011, p. 16).  
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small to intermediate N studies (about 15 to 50 cases) in similar 
experiment like fashion as statistical cross-tabulation (Greckhamer et 
al., 2008, p. 722; Legewie, 2013, p. 5; Lijphart, 1971, p. 685; C. C. Ragin, 
1999, p. 1225; Rihoux et al., 2011, pp. 13-14). Thus, it is optimal for the 
comparative analysis of 49 sub-Saharan Africa countries.  Second, 
QCA stands in the middle of qualitative and quantitative methods 
therefore offering the combined advantages of both (Amenta & 
Poulsen, 1994, p. 3; Blackman et al., 2013, p. 130; Greckhamer et al., 
2008, pp. 696-697; B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 165; Rihoux & Grimm, 2006, 
p. 17). Third, QCA’s conjectural analysis is suitable for our theoretical 
approach which combines liberal democratic and constructivist 
theoretical traditions. See also Rihoux and Grimm (2006, p. 17). 
Fourth, QCA’s dichotomous/categorical coding allows for the analysis 
of ordinal variables that vary qualitatively. In this case for example, 
independence of the judiciary and specific anti-terror legislation 
explicitly focusing on terrorism . See Berg-Schlosser et.al. (2009) in 
Rihoux et al. (2011, p. 16). Fifth, the study is a regional/area study in 
the sense discussed by Lijphart (1971, p. 688). Based on the geopolitical 
scope of this study, QCA offers real possibilities for developing 
empirically grounded mid-range theories, systems of classification 
and typologies relevant to the understanding of counterterrorism in 
sub-Saharan Africa and similar geopolitical regions. See Flick (2014, p. 
33); Legewie (2013); Stein Rokkan (1966) in Lijphart (1971, p. 686); B. 
G. Peters (1998, p. 26); Pierce (2008, p. 55); Rihoux et al. (2011, p. 14). 
Sixth, the set theoretic logic of QCA identifies causal regularities that 
are parsimonious in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the occurrence of events which allows for the possibility that a bad 
policy outcome can be prevented by removing or blocking one of its 
necessary conditions or improving a good outcome by enhancing its 
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necessary conditions (Amenta & Poulsen, 1994, p. 1; Blackman et al., 
2013, p. 129; B. G. Peters, 1998, p. 167; C. C. Ragin, 1999, p. 1228; Rihoux 
et al., 2011, pp. 14-17; Sibeon, 1999, p. 142). Therefore, QCA offers the 
study the possibility of contributing actionable empirical knowledge 
relevant for counterterror policy in sub-Saharan Africa.  
5.2.2.3. Limitations of QCA 
 
Some limitations are however noted. Since QCA is designed for 
analysis in small to intermediate-N studies, some in the scholarship 
such as Amenta and Poulsen (1994, p. 29); Lijphart (1971, p. 686); 
Mahoney and Goertz (2006, p. 238); C. C. Ragin (1998, p. 106); Teune 
and Przeworski (1970, p. 5) have raised concerns over the external 
validity or generalisability of results it generates. Because this study is 
a regional study and theoretical claims are limited to sub-Saharan 
Africa, concerns over external validity or generalisability of results do 
not arise. Besides, being a regional study QCA enables an in depth 
understanding of the conditions that come into play to facilitate or 
impede human rights during counter-terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This reasoning is supported by Hicks (1994, pp. 97-98); Mahoney and 
Goertz (2006, p. 237); B. G. Peters (1998, p. 5) who argue that in 
empirical research, in depth understanding of a case(s) is a useful 
trade-off for external validity or generalisability and should not 
necessarily be considered a weakness. In depth understanding of the 
conditions that facilitate or impede human rights during counter-
terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa can illuminate areas for future 
research and in this case, test the applicability of existing theoretical 
explanations. Moreover, as discussed by Lijphart (1971, p. 687) a 
longitudinal dimension in the design of the study which incorporates 
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a 20-year time frame (1998-2017) circumvents the problem of a limited 
number of cases and improves the external validity of the results.  
 
A problem that confronts empirical research in the Social Sciences is 
that whereas the number of cases is sometimes small, especially in 
qualitative studies, the universe of possible conditions/variables is 
often too large. This is one of the main limitations of QCA because 
combinations of causal and outcome variables grow exponentially 
from a base of two, making many causal variables not only wildly but 
also less likely that any given combination will have an empirical 
referent or will have only one case and therefore not theoretically 
interpretable (Amenta & Poulsen, 1994, p. 29; Mahoney & Goertz, 
2006, p. 238; C. C. Ragin, 1998, p. 106). Lastly, QCA’s, dichotomous 
coding is not amenable to all social phenomena and can lead to loss 
of valuable information by lumping together cases that may be in 
many significant ways dissimilar (Blackman et al., 2013, p. 140; B. G. 
Peters, 1998, p. 169; C. C. Ragin, 1999, pp. 1236-1237).  
 
5.3. Selection of Cases 
 
The analysis is based 0n 43 out the 49 states that make up sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Five states i.e. Comoros, Djibouti, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Somalia and South Sudan data are excluded from the analysis because 
for these states, full data for all the variables is not available.  A sixth 
state, Liberia is excluded because it is not possible to dichotomise its 
human rights score. This is because the value for human rights score 
as derived from the Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World index’ is 
the median for states that cannot be coded as either 1 = free/present 
or 0 = not free/absent as required in csQCA. See section 5.4.1.  
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The analysis is limited to sub-Saharan Africa because North African 
states tend to draw their historic, cultural, political and religious 
identity and heritage to the Middle East. Therefore, much of what 
influences their political development and in turn terrorism, 
corresponds to political realities occurring in the social-political block 
collectively known as the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA). Such 
influences include for example, the Israeli/Arab-Palestinian conflict 
and the grievances affecting the Muslim Umma, in the MENA region. 
See Chabal (1998); Cooper (1994); de Melo and Tsikata (2015); 
Feldman (2009); Gasiorowski (2016); Glickman (2003, p. 74); P. 
Kagwanja (2006, p. 165); Lijphart (1971, p. 688); B. G. Peters (1998, p. 
36); Teune and Przeworski (1970, p. 8). This analytical separation is 
not peculiar to this study. For instance, the U.S. state Department 
separates those who deal with counterterrorism in North Africa, from 
those who deal with it in sub-Saharan Africa (Lyman & Morrison, 
2004, p. 86; Piombo, 2007, p. 8). In any case, according to Mill (1843); 
B. G. Peters (1998, pp. 5-6); Pierce (2008, p. 55); Adam Przeworski and 
Henry Teune (1970, pp. 4-9), comparison between units that share as 
many similarities as possible i.e. most similar systems design (MSSD), 
is the true comparative method because any observed changes in 
social phenomena can be attributed to their differences.  
 
The main objective of the analysis is not to interpret, clarify, confirm, 
infirm or develop new theoretical propositions (See Gerring, 2004, p. 
341; Lijphart, 1971, pp. 691-693) but to establish the conditions or 
combinations of conditions that facilitate or impede human rights 
when implementing counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In any event, since this is a regional study based on a small number of 
cases (N = 43), there is no point in inviting academic controversy by 
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seeking to make theoretical generalisations from the results. Based on 
this understanding, selection of the case for in depth analysis is tied 
to the results of the QCA analysis and guided by the criteria that the 
case is ideal to illustrate results and or it deviates from the pattern of 
causal relationships established by the analysis. 
 
5.4. Variables, Calibration and Data 
 
5.4.1. Dependent Variable/Outcome 
 
The dependent variable is ‘human rights’. It has been argued that 
physical integrity rights (torture, detention and imprisonment 
without due process, disappearances suspected to result from the 
workings of state agents, and extrajudicial killings perpetrated by 
government officials etc.) face the highest risk of abuse by the state 
when implementing counterterrorism measures (James A Piazza & 
Walsh, 2009, 2010). This argument suggests that the best 
counterterrorism measures are those that maximise the protection 
and promotion of the category of human rights known as physical 
integrity rights. However, consensus in human rights scholarship is 
that human rights are indivisible, interconnected, complementary 
and mutually reinforcing (Boyle (1995) and Donnelly (1999a) in 
Brown, 2016, p. 29; Foot, 2007, p. 499; Hoffman, 2004, p. 934; Jawad, 
2015, p. 109; Khan, 2016, p. 9; Kielsgard, 2005, p. 262; Landman, 2003, 
p. 10; Omotola, 2008, p. 42; Warbrick, 2004, p. 999). Therefore, there 
is no ontological basis for empirical research to study macro-social 
conditions that only facilitate or impede certain categories of rights 
exclusive of others. See Brown (2016, p. 29); Boyle (1995) and Donnelly 
(1999a) in Landman (2003, p. 10); Warbrick (2004, p. 999).  
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Based on this reasoning, here the measurement of the outcome 
‘human rights’ (H) is based on data obtained from Freedom House 
‘Freedom in the World index’. The index is an annual combined 
measure of political rights (PL) and civil liberties (CL) enjoyed by 
individuals rather than governments for countries and a select group 
of territories rated according to their degrees of freedom or human 
rights status where free = 1.0 - 2.5; partly free = 3.0 - 5.0 and not free = 
5.5 - 7.057. While this rating scheme is widely applied in academic and 
policy analysis without modification, it is not amenable to csQCA 
analysis which requires binary coding of data. In this case, the 
outcome human rights must be coded as 1 = ‘free/present’ or 0 = ‘not 
free/absent’.  
 
The difficulty in dichotomising Freedom in the World index data arises 
because countries with political rights (PL) and civil liberties (CL) 
scores that range between 2.6 – 5.4 which includes countries that are 
ranked as partly free = 3.0 - 5.0 present a third category which 
obviously has no coding reference consistent with csQCA. In our data, 
twenty-seven countries fall into this category. To dichotomise the data 
for these countries, the median value of their average political rights 
(PL) and civil liberties (CL) scores for the period of analysis (1998 – 
2017) is used as a numerical threshold below which countries are 
coded 1 = ‘free/present’ and above which they coded 0 = ‘not 
free/absent’. Liberia whose average political rights (PL) and civil 
liberties (CL) score is 4.1 is not coded and therefore excluded from the 
analysis that follows. This calibration strategy is optimal and free of 
                                                 
57 See https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2019 for 
detailed information on methodology.  
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bias because the median is considered a neutral statistic which 
distributes the cases in question evenly on both extremes.  
 
Table 5.1. illustrates the dichotomisation of the outcome human rights 
for the group of countries that were not amenable to binary coding 
based on the on Freedom in the World index data. 
 





PL + CL Binary code 
1. Senegal 2.7 1 
2. Lesotho 3 1 
3. Seychelles 3 1 
4. Mali 3.1 1 
5. Sierra Leone 3.4 1 
6. Malawi 3.5 1 
7. Mozambique 3.5 1 
8. Tanzania 3.5 1 
9. Madagascar 3.7 1 
10. Zambia 3.8 1 
11. Niger 3.9 1 
12. Burkina Faso 4 1 
13. Kenya 4 1 
14. Liberia 4.1 Median 
15. Nigeria 4.2 0 
16. Guinea-Bissau 4.5 0 
17. Togo 4.8 0 
18. Uganda 4.8 0 
19. Gabon 5.1 0 
20. Gambia, The 5.2 0 
21. Central African Republic 5.3 0 
22. Cote d'Ivoire 5.3 0 
23. Mauritania 5.3 0 
24. Burundi 5.4 0 
25. Congo, Rep. 5.4 0 
26. Ethiopia 5.4 0 
27. Guinea 5.4 0 
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Source: (House, 2018) 
 
 
5.4.2. Independent Variables/Explanatory Conditions 
 
Based on theoretical and empirical propositions, chapter four 
concluded that in sub-Saharan Africa, states’ human rights behaviour 
in relation to counterterrorist policies can be predicted by variables 
that fall into five broad categories of macro social conditions i.e. 
democracy, economic and administrative capacity, state and human 
security, international integration, terrorism and internal unrest (see 
table 4.1).  
 
For each of these implicated macro social conditions there are at least 
three suggested variables. That would mean that the QCA analysis 
would have at least 15 variables. As observed earlier, in QCA 
combinations of causal and outcome variables grow exponentially 
from a base of two. As a result, many causal variables would make the 
analysis wildly and less likely that any given combination will have an 
empirical referent or will have only one case and therefore not 
theoretically interpretable (Amenta & Poulsen, 1994, p. 29; Mahoney 
& Goertz, 2006, p. 238; C. C. Ragin, 1998, p. 106). As a first step to solve 
this problem, only variables suggested by theory and found to be 
significant in extant empirical studies are included in the QCA 
analysis as suggested by Amenta and Poulsen (1994, p. 25); Mahoney 
and Goertz (2006, p. 244); B. G. Peters (1998, pp. 168-170); C. C. Ragin 
(1999, pp. 1230-1231); Rihoux et al. (2011, p. 16).  
 
Other factors also come into play to determine which variables are 
included in the final analysis. In sub-Saharan Africa, publicly available 
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information and data on security agencies is generally brief, 
accompanied with caveats on usage, difficult to verify, shrouded in 
secrecy and normally protected by secrecy laws, making it scarce 
(Gupta et al., 2001, pp. 752-753; Pyman, 2017, p. 513; Sidibe, 2018, p. 47; 
Sigsworth, 2019, pp. 3, 7; Thuo, 2009, pp. 155-156). Based on lack of 
adequate and useful data some variables such as military control, size 
of the military and size of the police must be excluded. For some 
variables such human rights NGOs, rights protective constitutional 
provisions and population of lawyers, no centralised data exists 
making collection of data for all the cases logistically difficult and 
expensive. Others such as level of democracy and elected legislature 
are plagued by measurement and endogeneity problems.  While 
elected legislature is a component of democracy, level of democracy is 
open to bias and prone to the danger of conceptual stretching. 
Besides, democracy is endogenous to the outcome variable ‘human 
rights’ and other explanatory variables. The macro social condition 
that has a generous amount of data available for most variables is 
economic and administrative capacity. Over the years the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Transparency 
International (TI) and many UN agencies such as the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) have collected 
and centralised country level data on GDP, corruption, poverty levels, 
inequality, population etc. Except for poverty levels, full data is 
available on these variables for nearly all countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, Cross (1999, p. 93); Park (1987, p. 407); Poe and Tate 
(1994, p. 867) find the effect of economic capacity or development on 
lowering repression as reflected by growth in GDP is modest and 
insufficient. Some studies such as Henderson (1991, pp. 125, 132); Park 
(1987, p. 410) find that high levels of inequality are associated with 
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repression and argue that the gap between the rich and poor in society 
creates strife and instability provoking governments to respond to 
with brute force. However, there is much empirical disagreement 
about the effect of inequality on economic growth and vice versa (Mo, 
2000, p. 312; Nel, 2003, p. 611), therefore suggesting that the pathways 
through which economic variables affect human rights outcomes are 
unclear and may even work in opposing directions. The effect of 
corruption on human rights outcomes has been found to be 
significant in most studies. Besides, it is reasonable to argue that no 
matter the level of economic resources at the disposal of governments, 
prudent use and transparent management of such resources not only 
extends the boundary of possibilities but also generates political 
support that is necessary to win the war against terrorism. The effects 
of ratification of international human rights instruments and 
repression levels of neighbouring countries on human rights 
outcomes are also plagued by inconsistent findings and lack of 
significance in extant empirical studies. 
 
Based on these insights and the fact that version 3.0. of fsQCA 
software used for this analysis can only accommodate up to 5 
explanatory conditions (in line with the QCA imperative to keep the 
number of variables low), corruption (C), net expenditure on welfare 
over military (M), judicial independence (J), terrorism (T) and anti-
terror legislation (A) are used as proxies for the macro social 
conditions suggested in chapter four. For each of these variables, the 










Corruption (C) is used as a proxy for economic and administrative 
capacity. It is measured using the annual transparency, accountability, 
and corruption in the public-sector (CPIA) index of the World Bank58.  
According to the World Bank, CPIA assesses the extent to which the 
executive can be held accountable for its use of funds, and the extent 
to which public employees within the executive are required to 
account for administrative decisions, use of resources, and results 
obtained. The CPIA rates states on a scale that ranges from 1=low to 
6=high. For our measurement, states with an average CPIA rating for 
the period 1998 – 2017 ranging between 3.1 – 6.0 are coded 1 and those 
between 1.0 – 3.0 are coded 0. CPIA data for eight states (Botswana, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles 
and South Africa) is not available. The problem of missing data is not 
unique to this study. Previous studies suggest imputing missing data 
from closely correlated dataset. For example, Acuña and Rodriguez 
(2004); Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000, pp. 6, 26); Kalton (1983); Kalton 
and Kasprzyk (1986); Kim and Curry (1977); Tarling (2008); Tsikriktsis 
(2005); Yaffee and McGee (2000) have employed or suggest this 
solution for populating variables with missing data.  
 
                                                 
58 World Bank CPIA database accessed from http://www.worldbank.org/ida on 
14/2/2019  
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Here we impute missing data from Transparency International (TI)59 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) dataset. CPI is a country-year 
assessment of the perceptions of corruption in the public sector, 
measuring how corrupt country public sectors are seen to be 
according to experts and business people.  It rates countries on a 100-
point scale where 0 = highest level of perceived corruption and 100 = 
lowest level of perceived corruption. states with an average CPI rating 
for the period 1998 – 2017 ranging between 40 – 100 are coded 1 and 
those between 0 – 39 are coded 0. Though our preferred dataset for 
corruption is World Bank’s CPIA index because of its broader 
operational definition which covers a wider spectrum of governance 
parameters, Transparency International’s CPI index does not differ 
much from the World Bank’s CPIA index. The two datasets have a 
high correlation coefficient of 0.78. This indicates that they are 
qualitatively similar and roughly measure the same empirical fact.  
5.4.2.2. Net Expenditure on Welfare Over Military 
 
Net expenditure on welfare over military (M) is used as a proxy for the 
preference between state and human security. It is measured and 
dichotomised using data from the World Bank Group. The World 
Bank compiles annual data on the average government expenditure 
on welfare and military as percentages of total government 
expenditure. Because there is no data on an aggregate measure of 
welfare, the average government expenditure on health is used as a 
proxy for overall government expenditure on welfare for two reasons. 
First, only data on health expenditure is complete. Second, according 
to Maslow and Lewis (1987), health needs precede all other needs in 
                                                 
59 Source: Transparency International (TI) accessed from 
https://www.transparency.org/ on 14/2/2019 
 133 
the hierarchy of human needs. Ordinarily therefore, it would be 
expected that faced with budgetary constraints, governments would 
prioritise the fulfilment of the health needs for their citizens. The net 
difference between the average government domestic expenditure on 
heath and the average government domestic expenditure on military 
for the period 1998-2017 is used to dichotomise this condition. If the 
difference has a positive sign (+) a state is coded 1, and if the sign is 
negative (-) a state is coded 0.  
5.4.2.3. Judicial Independence  
 
Judicial independence (J) is used as a proxy for democracy. It is 
measured using the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance (IIAG). The IIAG is a tool that measures and 
monitors governance performance in African countries since 2008. It 
defines governance as the provision of political, social and economic 
public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect 
from their state, and which a state has the responsibility to deliver to 
its citizens. Judicial independence is one of the governance measures 
of the safety & rule of law component. See Foundation (2018, 2019). 
Using 2008 as the base year, states which recorded improvement in 
judicial independence in 2017 are coded 1 and states whose judicial 
independence declined are coded 0.  
5.4.2.4. Anti-terror Legislation  
 
Anti-terror legislation (A) is used as a proxy for international 
integration. This is because among other things, the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) and UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) adopted under 
chapter VII of the UN Charter require member states to draft 
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comprehensive national and regional strategies; develop legislation to 
criminalise acts and the financing of terrorism; implement legislation 
through law enforcement and criminal justice processes etc. Andrew 
and Silke (2018, p. 8); (Ford, 2011, p. 24; Sigsworth, 2019, p. 5; Sturman, 
2002, p. 104; Whitaker, 2007, p. 1018). It is measured and coded using 
existing information on national counterterrorist legislations 
obtained from the United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime 
counterterrorism legislation database. Additional information is 
obtained from the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). 
See (Counterterrorism, 2019; Studies & CSIS, 2018). A state is coded 1 
if it has legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism and 0 if such 
legislation is lacking.  
5.4.2.5. Terrorism  
 
Terrorism (T) is used as a proxy for internal unrest. Besides existence 
of empirical evidence showing that terrorism pushes governments 
towards repressive tendencies (James A. Piazza, 2015; James A Piazza 
& Walsh, 2009), it was established in section 2.4 in chapter two that 
much of what manifests as terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa occurs in 
the context of communal and organized armed violence where none 
of the parties is the government of a state. See table 2. This not only 
shows the correlation between non-state conflicts and terrorism (r = 
.83, p = .00, 1-tailed) but it also implies that in the context of sub-
Saharan Africa, the incidence of terrorism is a good proxy for internal 
unrest. This variable is measured using data obtained from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), which is the largest and most extensive 
open source of information on domestic and international terrorist 
attacks around the world since 1970 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007, p. 198). 
The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of 
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illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation. The GTD provides a mechanism for researchers to filter 
and truncate data according to definitions of terrorism that meet their 
research needs. Here, only successful incidents of essentially no doubt 
of terrorism that resulted into at least ten deaths are included. This 
assumes that, states are more likely to impede human rights if the 
intensity and severity of terror attacks is high. States that record at 
least 10 incidents in the period 1998-2017 are coded 1 and states have 
less than 10 incidents of terrorism for this period are coded 0. 
 
Table 5.2 summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables; tables 
5.3 and 5.4 display the raw and dichotomised data respectively for all 
the countries included in the analysis where N = 43.  
 
5.5. Primary Data 
 
To understand in depth the nature of terrorism, counterterrorism and 
human rights in sub-Saharan Africa, primary data and information is 
was obtained through key informant interview at the African Union 
Commission in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, the African Center for the Study 
and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) in Algiers Algeria, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) in Banjul 
Gambia and in Mali for the case study. See the anonymised interview 
transcripts in annex 2. 
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Source N Years Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Outcome 
 
Human rights (H) 
< 4.1 = 1 
> 4.1 = 0 
 
 
Annual measure of political rights (PL) and civil 
liberties (CL), where 1.0 - 2.5 = free, 3.0 - 5.0 = 
























Necessary Conditions  
  
      
Corruption (C) 
CPIA 
3.1 – 6.0 = 1 
1.0 – 3.0 = 0 
 
CPI 
50 – 100 = 1  
0 – 49 = 0. 
 
 
Annual transparency, accountability, and 
corruption in the public-sector (CPIA) index. 
Extent to which the executive can be held 
accountable for its use of funds (1=low, 6=high) 
 
Corruption perception index (CPI). How corrupt 
country public sectors are seen to be according 
to experts and business people  
























































Net expenditure on welfare 
over military (M)  
Positive sign (+) = 1 
Negative sign (-) = 0. 
 
Average government expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total government expenditure 
minus average government expenditure on 
military as a percentage of total government 






























Judicial independence (J)  
Improvement = 1 
Decline = 0 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). The 
average improvement or decline in judicial 





















Terrorism (T)  
More than 10 = 1 
Less than 10 = 0 
 
Annual number of successful domestic and 
international terrorist attacks of essentially no 





























Anti-terror legislation (A)  
Present = 1 
Absent = 0 
National counterterrorist legislation explicitly 























Table 5.3:Raw data for the sample where N = 43 
 
state Code C M J A T H 
Angola AGO 2.5 -2.1 9.7 0 21 5.7 
Benin BEN 3.5 0.1 -0.8 0 0 2.1 
Botswana BWA 60* 0.8 -5.7 0 0 2.2 
Burkina Faso BFA 3.4 0.2 4.9 1 3 4 
Burundi BDI 2.2 -2.5 -24.2 1 18 5.4 
Cabo Verde CPV 4.5 2.6 1.8 0 0 1.1 
Cameroon CMR 2.5 -0.6 -6.1 1 30 6.1 
Central African Republic CAF 2.5 -0.7 -1.4 0 36 5.3 
Chad TCD 2.2 -2 3.8 1 16 6.1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. COD 2 -0.7 -5.2 1 72 6.1 
Congo, Rep. COG 2.3 -1.7 -4.3 0 3 5.4 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 2.6 -0.7 22.6 1 2 5.3 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 19* -1.2 -1.6 0 0 6.8 
Eritrea ERI 2.1 -23.2 -11.3 0 2 6.6 
Eswatini SWZ 35* 2.2 -3.4 0 0 5.9 
Ethiopia ETH 2.8 -1.1 0.2 1 15 5.4 
Gabon GAB 33* -0.2 -4.5 0 0 5.1 
Gambia, The GMB 2.1 1.1 16.7 1 0 5.2 
Ghana GHA 3.8 1.4 4.7 1 0 1.9 
Guinea GIN 2.4 -2.2 23.5 0 3 5.4 
Guinea-Bissau GNB 2.3 0.5 -3.6 0 1 4.5 
Kenya KEN 3 0.3 6.6 1 21 4 
Lesotho LSO 3.4 1.1 -1.2 0 0 3 
Madagascar MDG 2.8 1 2 1 0 3.7 
Malawi MWI 2.9 1 4.3 0 0 3.5 
Mali MLI 3.3 -0.5 -3.1 1 11 3.1 
Mauritania MRT 2.7 -2.4 3.9 1 1 5.3 
Mauritius MUS 52* 1.7 -2.7 1 0 1.5 
Mozambique MOZ 2.9 1 -6.6 1 0 3.5 
Namibia NAM 46* 2.7 -7.3 0 0 2.2 
Niger NER 3 0.6 -0.3 1 14 3.9 
Nigeria NGA 3 -0.2 -3.3 1 389 4.2 
Rwanda RWA 3.5 1.2 -9.5 0 2 5.9 
Senegal SEN 3.3 0.1 8.2 1 2 2.7 
Seychelles SYC 50* 2 -0.3 1 0 3 
Sierra Leone SLE 2.9 0.1 14.2 1 5 3.4 
South Africa ZAF 45* 2.2 -1.4 1 0 1.8 
Sudan SDN 1.7 -2.1 3.2 1 48 7 
Tanzania TZA 3.1 1.5 1.7 1 2 3.5 
Togo TGO 2.4 -0.6 -6.7 0 0 4.8 
Uganda UGA 2.5 -0.5 -11 1 28 4.8 
Zambia ZMB 3 -0.1 -0.7 0 0 3.8 
Zimbabwe ZIM 1.5 -1.4 14.6 0 0 5.9 
Source: Own table (see table 5.2 for sources of data). Data marked with asterisks 
(*) in the column C is CPI index from Transparency International. 
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Table 5.4:Dichotomised data for csQCA  
 
State  C M J A T H 
Angola 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Benin 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Botswana 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Burkina Faso 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Burundi 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Cabo Verde 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Cameroon 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Central African Republic 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Chad 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Congo, Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Eswatini 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Ethiopia 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gambia, The 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Ghana 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Guinea 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Lesotho 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Madagascar 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Malawi 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Mali 1 0 0 1 1 1 
Mauritania 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Mauritius 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Mozambique 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Namibia 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Niger 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Nigeria 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Rwanda 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Seychelles 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Sierra Leone 0 1 1 1 0 1 
South Africa 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Sudan 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Tanzania 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Togo 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Uganda 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Zambia 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Own table.  
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5.6. Summary   
 
This chapter has outlined the empirical procedure for establishing 
which macro social conditions or combinations of conditions 
identified in a review of extant theoretical and empirical propositions 
in chapter four i.e. democracy, economic and administrative capacity, 
state and human security, international integration and terrorism and 
internal unrest are necessary to facilitate or impede human rights in 
counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Since it is a regional study involving a small number of cases, the 
chapter has described in depth a research design that combines the 
comparative method, specifically Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) with the application of Crisp Set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (csQCA) using version 3.0. of fsQCA software, and an in-
depth case analysis. The operational mechanics of QCA, its 
application in academic and policy spheres, its strengths and 
limitations have been discussed. Based on ontological and 
epistemological considerations and the technical requirements of 
fsQCA version 3.0. software, a set of five explanatory variables that 
proxy each of the hypothesised macro social conditions have been 
identified for the ensuing QCA analysis. These are i.e. corruption (C), 
net expenditure on welfare over military (M), judicial independence 
(J), terrorism (T) and anti-terror legislation (A). For each variable, the 
source of data and procedure for dichotomous coding (calibration) 
have been explained.  
 
The chapter has also highlighted the method for collecting primary 
data and presented raw and dichotomised data for all variables, for all 
countries included in the analysis where N=43.  
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6. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Relying on version 3.0 of the open source fsQCA software developed 
by C. C. Ragin and Davey (2016) and five explanatory 
variables/conditions i.e. corruption (C), net expenditure on welfare 
over military (M), judicial independence (J), terrorism (T) and anti-
terror legislation (A), this chapter begins with an analysis of necessary 
conditions followed by an analysis of combinations of conditions 
sufficient for the outcome variable/condition ‘human rights’ and an in 
depth analysis of one case. 
 
In QCA an identified relationship between a condition and the 
outcome does not mean that the inverse relationship must also be true 
or that the results for one analysis can be inferred from the other 
(Greckhamer et al., 2008, p. 697; Hicks, 1994, p. 97; Kruck & Schneiker, 
2017, pp. 127-128; Legewie, 2013, p. 3; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006; Mello, 
2012, p. 436; Rihoux et al., 2011, p. 13; C. Q. Schneider & Wagemann, 
2012, p. 382). In this case therefore, the ensuing csQCA analysis tests 
for both conditions that facilitate and conditions that impede human 
rights outcomes in counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
QCA stands in the middle of quantitative and qualitative analysis, 
incorporating aspects of traditional statistical analysis to the 
understanding of qualitative relationships between variables. Like the 
notion of parameters of fit in statistical analysis, QCA uses consistency 
and coverage scores to assess how well cases in a data set fit a relation 
of necessity or sufficiency. The consistency score resembles the notion 
of significance in statistical models and measures the degree to which 
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a relation of necessity or sufficiency between a causal condition or 
combination of conditions and an outcome is met within a given data 
set, where 0 = no consistency and 1 = perfect consistency (Legewie, 
2013, p. 9; Mello, 2019a, 2019b; C. C. Ragin, 2006, p. 293). The coverage 
score is analogous to the notion of R2 and measures the degree to 
which a condition or combination of conditions accounts for 
instances of an outcome i.e. its empirical relevance or importance, 
where 0 = no empirical relevance and 1 = perfect empirical relevance 
(Ibid). Based on the recommendation that thresholds for necessary 
conditions should be placed as close to 1.0 and not below 0.75 
(Legewie, 2013, p. 19; C. C. Ragin, 2006, p. 293)60 and following Legewie 
(2013, p. 19); Mello (2012, p. 436); C. C. Ragin (2006, p. 293), in this 
analysis, the threshold for consistency scores set at a 0.90 and 
coverage of 0.75. According to C. C. Ragin (2006, p. 293) below 0.75 it 
is difficult on substantive grounds to maintain that even a very rough 
subset relation exists.  
 
6.2. Necessary Conditions for Human Rights 
 
It is recommend that the analysis for necessary conditions precedes 
the analysis for sufficient conditions (Legewie, 2013, p. 19; C. C. Ragin, 







                                                 
60 Legewie and Ragin argue that this is because claiming that a condition is necessary 
is a bold statement.  
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 Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
M* 0.90* 0.82* 0.17 0.18 
~M 0.10 0.10 0.83 0.90 
C 0.65 0.93 0.04 0.07 
~C* 0.35 0.24 0.96* 0.76* 
J 0.35 0.39 0.48 0.61 
~J 0.65 0.52 0.52 0.48 
A 0.65 0.54 0.48 0.46 
~A 0.35 0.37 0.52 0.63 
T 0.15 0.23 0.43 0.77 
~T 0.85 0.57 0.57 0.43 
Notes: Corruption (C), Net Government Expenditure on Welfare over Military (M), 
Terrorism (T), Judicial Independence (J), Anti-Terror legislation explicitly focusing 
on terrorism (A), Human Rights (H). Tilde (~) indicates the absence of a condition. 
An asterisks (*) indicates a necessary condition.  
 
 
Results in table 6.1 show that more government expenditure on 
welfare than military (M) is a necessary condition to facilitate human 
rights in counterterrorist policies at a consistency of 0.90 and 
coverage of 0.82. The absence of transparency and accountability 
coupled with a high level of corruption in the public sector (~C) is a 
necessary condition for the impediment of human rights at a 
consistency of 0.96 and coverage of 0.76. Since both conditions have 
consistency and coverage scores greater than or equal to 0.90 and 0.75 
respectively, we can conclude that they are ‘almost’ necessary to 






6.3. Sufficient Conditions for Human Rights 
 
The basic instrument used for the analysis of sufficient conditions is 
the truth table which  identifies pathways that are sufficient for the 
outcome i.e. produce the outcome (Legewie, 2013, p. 11; C. C. Ragin, 
2009, p. 110). In the truth table, each logical configuration corresponds 
to an individual path towards the outcome or combination of 
conditions leading to the outcome and is represented by each row in 
the table.  
 
Each truth table represents a property space with 2k potential logical 
configurations, where k is the number of explanatory conditions 
included in the model. Here, each truth table with five explanatory 
conditions i.e. net expenditure on welfare over military (M), 
corruption (C), independence of the judiciary (J), anti-terror 
legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism (A) and terrorism (T) i.e. 
2(M, C, T, J, A) contains 32 potential logical configurations. In each truth 
table, only 18 out of the 32 logical configurations (rows) representing 
empirically established paths towards either of the outcomes are 
displayed. The remaining 14 rows not displayed in the truth tables 
(because they are not filled with cases) represent hypothetical 
configurations (paths) that would exist under specific logical 
assumptions. They are however useful in generating parsimonious 
solutions (not presented here) of the outcome in question from which 
theoretical prepositions can be derived. The consistency column in 
each truth table indicates the proportion of cases in each row  that 
display the outcome.  
 
After constructing the truth table, the second step in the fsQCA 3.0 
software is the preparation of the table for analysis by selecting the 
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rows to be analysed based on a frequency threshold and a consistency 
threshold. Because the total number of cases in the analysis is 
relatively small, the frequency threshold i.e. the number of cases in a 
row is set at 1 and the consistency threshold is set at 0.80 C. C. Ragin 
(2009, pp. 106-107); See C. C. Ragin (2010, pp. 39-41). Based on this 
rule, all rows with no case are deleted and in the outcome column, 
each configuration whose consistency level is above 0.80 is coded 1 
and those below 0.80 are coded o.  
 
In the final step of the analysis, sufficient combinations of conditions 
for the outcome are identified by the software using Boolean algebra 
to minimise the truth table to complex, parsimonious, and 
intermediate solution terms (Legewie, 2013, pp. 13-15; Mello, 2012; C. 
C. Ragin, 2009, p. 111; C. Q. Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 172). Here 
only complex solution terms are presented. In each table representing 
the complex solution, to the left are listed combinations of conditions 
that comprise alternative sufficient paths that lead to the outcome. 
The third column shows the relation of each causal path to the 
outcome i.e. whether it is sufficient to cause the outcome. The fourth 
column shows the consistency score of each path i.e. the extent to 
which each path can explain the outcome. The fifth column displays 
the paths' raw and unique coverage i.e. the proportion of cases that 
can be explained exclusively by that path. Finally, the sixth column 
shows the countries that display each casual path.  
 
Below the list of causal paths is the solution consistency and coverage 
scores which indicate the overall fit and empirical relevance of the 
solution term or model  (Legewie, 2013, p. 21). The higher the 
consistency and coverage scores, the higher the empirical relevance of 
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a causal path and or solution term/model. See Legewie (2013, p. 19); C. 




Table 6.2 displays the truth table for conditions that facilitate human 
rights in counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa and table 6.3 
displays the complex solution for sufficient combinations of 
conditions.  
 
Consistent with the analysis of necessary conditions, theoretical and 
empirical expectations, more government expenditure on welfare 
than on military (M) is present in all paths except path 4. Path 1 
(M*C*~T) where more government expenditure on welfare than on 
military (M) combines with a low level of corruption (C) and a low 
level of terrorism (~T) is the most empirically relevant at a consistency 
of 0.92 and a coverage of o.60. Path 3 (M*~C*A*T) representing Kenya 
and Niger and Path 4 (~M*C*~J*A*T) representing Mali are 
empirically interesting because they incorporate a high incidence of 
terrorism contrary to theoretical expectations and previous empirical 
studies suggesting that terrorism pushes governments towards 
repression. The only other similarity between the paths is that they 
incorporate anti-terror legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism (A). 
It appears that the presence of anti-terror legislation explicitly 
focusing on terrorism (A) present in all the three countries with a high 
incidence of terrorism has a facilitating effect on the human rights 
outcomes. This reasoning is consistent with the UN Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (2006) and the UN Security Council Resolutions 
1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) which requires states to draft 
and implement comprehensive legislations to criminalise acts and the 
 146 
financing of terrorism as legal tools for protecting human rights 
during counterterrorism.  
 
Overall, the model is robust at a consistency of 0.94 and coverage 0.85. 
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Table 6.2:Truth table for conditions that facilitate human rights 
 
Row M C J A T H Consistency  N Cases  
1.  1 1 0 1 0 1 1 5 Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania,  
2.  1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 Ghana, Senegal  
3.  1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 Malawi  
4.  1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 Benin  
5.  1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 Mozambique  
6.  1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 Niger  
7.  0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 Mali  
8.  1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 Kenya  
9.  1 1 0 0 0 1 0.8 5 Botswana, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda 
10.  1 0 1 1 0 0 0.67 3 Gambia The, Madagascar, Sierra Leone,  
11.  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 6 Congo,Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
12.  0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 Burundi, Cameroon, Congo,Dem.Rep., Ethiopia, Sudan  
13.  0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 Chad, Nigeria, Uganda  
14.  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Eswatini, Guinea-Bissau  
15.  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 Guinea, Togo  
16.  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania  
17.  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 Central African Republic  
18.  0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 Angola  
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Corruption (C), Net Government Expenditure on Welfare over Military (M), Terrorism (T), Judicial Independence (J), Anti-
Terror legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism (A), Human Rights (H). Countries in italics have a positive human right 
outcome. Rows with logical remainders are not shown. 
Table 6.3:Complex solution for conditions that facilitate human rights  
 
    Coverage 














Benin, Botswana, BurkinaFaso, 
CaboVerde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania  
 
2 M*J*~A*~T H 1.00 0.10 0.05 Benin, Malawi  
 
3 M*~C*A*T H 1.00 0.10 0.05 Kenya, Niger  
 
4 ~M*C*~J*A*T H 1.00 0.05 0.05 Mali  
 
5 M*~J*A*~T H 1.00 0.30 0.00 Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania  
 
6 M*~C*~J*A H 1.00 0.10 0.00 Mozambique, Niger  
 
 Solution consistency: 0.94      
 Solution coverage: 0.85      
Tilde (~) indicates the absence of a condition; multiplication (*) refers to a logical ‘and’; addition (+) represents a logical 
or’; () indicates a necessary condition; () indicates sufficient configuration (alternate paths). Corruption (C), Net 
Government Expenditure on Welfare over Military (M), Terrorism (T), Judicial Independence (J), Anti-Terror legislation 






6.3.2. Impeding  
 
Table 6.4 displays the truth table for conditions that impede human 
rights in counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa and table 6.5 
displays the complex solution for sufficient combinations of 
conditions.  
 
Consistent with the analysis of necessary conditions, theoretical 
expectations and previous empirical findings, a high level of 
corruption (~C) is presents in all the three paths in table 19. This 
implies that a high level of corruption is almost absolutely required 
for the impediment of human rights in counterterrorist policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of empirical relevance, paths 1 and 2 are 
the most relevant, each having a consistency score of 1 and coverage 
of 0.43.  Both paths display in common the configuration ~M*~C i.e. 
a combination of less government expenditure on welfare than on 
military (~M) and a high level of corruption (~C).  
 
Path 2 which combines less government expenditure on welfare than 
on military (~M) and a high level of corruption (~C) with a high level 
of terrorism is the most theoretically and empirically relevant despite 
having the same consistency and coverage score as path 1. The 
implication of path 1 (~M*~C*J) is that in an environment where the 
state spends more on military than on welfare (~M) and state agents 
are highly corrupt (~C), independence of the judiciary cannot 
safeguard human rights as the last gatekeeper. Court orders may be 
ignored and justice miscarried even before matters reach courts. Path 
3 (~C*~J*~A*~T) is particularly interesting. This path combines a low 
level of terrorism (~T) with a high level of corruption (~C), lack of 
judicial independence (~J) and absence of anti-terror legislation 
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explicitly focusing on terrorism (~A). Except for Zambia, the countries 
in this path (Congo,Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Gabon, 
Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe) are essentially dictatorships seemingly 
supporting the argument that extremely authoritarian regimes 
experience lower levels of terrorism. See for example Li (2005, pp. 278-
279). 
 
Overall, the model is robust at a consistency of 0.95 and coverage 0.91. 
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Table 6.4: Truth table for conditions that impede human rights 
Row M C J A T ~H Consistency N Cases  
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 Burundi, Cameroon, Congo,Dem.Rep., Ethiopia, Sudan  
2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 Chad, Nigeria, Uganda,  
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 Eswatini, Guinea-Bissau  
4 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 Guinea, Togo  
5 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania  
6 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 Central African Republic  
7 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 Angola  
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.83 6 Congo,Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Zambia, Zimbabwe  
9 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.33 3 Gambia The, Madagascar, Sierra Leone 
10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 5 Botswana, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda  
11 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania 
12 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 Ghana, Senegal  
13 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 Malawi  
14 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 Benin  
15 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Mozambique  
16 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 Niger  
17 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 Mali  
18 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 Kenya 
Corruption (C), Net Government Expenditure on Welfare over Military (M), Terrorism (T), Judicial Independence (J), Anti-
Terror legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism (A), Human Rights (~H). Countries in italics have a negative human right 
outcome. Rows with logical remainders are not shown. 
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Table 6.5:Complex solution for conditions that impede human rights  
 
      Coverage    














Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Congo,Dem.Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Mauritania, Sudan, Togo   
 
2 ~M*~C*T ~H 1 0.43 0.17 Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Dem.Rep., Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan, 
Uganda  
3 ~C*~J*~A*~T ~H 0.88 0.30 0.30 Congo,Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Eswatini, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe  
 Solution consistency: 0.95      
 Solution coverage: 0.91      
       
Tilde [~] indicates the absence of a condition; multiplication [*] refers to a logical ‘and’; addition [+] represents a logical 
or’; [] indicates a necessary condition; [] indicates sufficient configuration (alternate paths). Corruption (C), Net 
Government Expenditure on Welfare over Military (M), Terrorism (T), Judicial Independence (J), Anti-Terror legislation 








6.4. Case Study (Mali) 
 
6.4.1. Case Selection 
 
Since the results of the analysis of conditions that are sufficient to 
facilitate human rights in counterterrorist policies cannot be used 
to infer the inverse conditions that are sufficient to impede human 
rights and vice versa, analysis of both outcomes was done. Ideally 
therefore, the in-depth case analysis should include at least one 
case that displays conditions that are sufficient to facilitate human 
rights and one case that displays conditions that are sufficient to 
impede human rights. However due to cost and logistical 
constraints, the analysis must be restricted to only one case. 
 
Several theoretical and empirical considerations weigh on the 
selection of the case. Extant theories and findings of empirical 
studies such as James A. Piazza (2015); James A Piazza and Walsh 
(2009); Poe and Tate (1994); Walsh and Piazza (2010) suggest that 
violations of human rights are positively associated with the 
intensity and scope of terrorism. In chapter three it was observed 
that the main concern for sub-Saharan Africa is since 2005, nearly 
two thirds of countries in the region are either ‘partly free or not 
free’ and therefore cannot guarantee respect for human rights in 
counterterrorist policies. it was established that countries which 
are ‘not free’ experience three times as many terrorism incidents as 
countries which are ‘partly free’. Thus, it was concluded that as far 
as counterterrorism and human rights in sub-Saharan Africa are 
concerned, the key task for empirical research is to identify factors 
that facilitate human rights in counterterrorist policies. Based on 
this conclusion, the case can only be selected from the group of 
countries displayed in the complex solution for conditions that 
facilitate human rights in table 6.3.  
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Since our principal interest is on conditions that facilitate human 
rights in times of counterterrorism, the selection must further be 
limited to those countries that display the presence of terrorism as 
operationally defined i.e. countries that recorded at least one 
successful incident of essentially no doubt of terrorism that 
resulted into at least ten deaths per incident for the period 1998 – 
2017. Only three countries in table 6.3 meet this criterion i.e. Kenya 
and Niger which display the configuration represented by path 3 
(M*~C*A*T) and Mali which displays the configuration 
represented by path 4 (~M*C*~J*A*T). 
 
Compared to Kenya and Niger, Mali presents a more complex 
theatre of terrorism (arguably the most complex in the region). It 
lies along the historic transatlantic trade route passing through the 
vast Sahara Desert, generating a complex insecurity mixture of 
terrorism, banditry, illegal trade, transnational crime, local 
community conflicts, Taureg insurgencies etc. These factors alone 
would compel a good researcher to find out why Mali displays 
relatively better human rights outcomes when ordinarily it is 
expected that the government in Bamako would adopt repressive 
policies to deal with a complex security threat that it faces.  
 
In any case also, considering the group of countries in the complex 
solution for conditions that facilitate human rights in table 6.3, 
Mali is a deviant case because it is the only case that displays less 
government expenditure on welfare than on military (~M). It is 







Contrary to theoretical expectations and findings of extant 
empirical studies, Mali displays a combination of more 
expenditure on the military than on welfare (~M) and a judiciary 
that is not independent (~J). These factors are expected to impede 
human rights in the country. However, it also displays low levels 
for corruption (C) and the presence of anti-terror legislation 
explicitly focusing on terrorism (A) which are expected to facilitate 
human rights in the country even though they have been found 
not to be necessary. Given that these two conditions were not 
found to be necessary for improvement of human rights, the 
empirical question is, what else seems to explain human rights 
outcomes in Mali? Thus, the main objective of the case study is to 
uncover relevant additional variables not previously considered or 
predicted by theory that probably add to the explanation of Mali’s 
relatively better human rights outcome. The analysis will also 
endeavour arrive at meaningful explanations for the configuration 
displayed by Mali i.e. ~M*C*~J*A*T.  
 
6.4.3. Country Background 
 
6.4.3.1. Geography, Society and People    
 
Mali is a landlocked country covering an area of 482,077 sq miles 
or 1,248,574 sq km, sharing long porous borders with Algeria (1,376-
km, 855 miles) on the north, Niger (821-km, 510 miles) and Burkina 
Faso (1,000-km, 621 miles) on the east, Ivory Coast (532-km, 330 
miles) and Guinea (858-km, 533 miles) on the south and Senegal 
(419-km, 260 miles) and Mauritania (2,237-km, 1390 miles) on the 
west (Francis, 2013, p. 4; Heisbourg, 2013; Schulz, 2012, p. 1; Stewart, 
2013, p. 6). The capital Bamako is located on West Africa’s largest 
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river (the Niger) which originates in the highland of Guinea, 
flowing more than 1,000 miles in the country through Bamako, 
Ségou and Mopti in the south and Timbuktu and Gao in the north 
(Heisbourg, 2013, pp. 7-8; Keita, 1998, p. 5; Schulz, 2012, p. 2; 
Stewart, 2013, p. 5). Administratively, the country is divided into 
eight (8) regions: Tombouctou, Koulikoro, Mopti, Kidal, Segou, 
Gao, Sikasso and Kayes. French is the official language for 
administration, business, education and mass media.  
 
Three distinct vegetation and climate zones characterise its largely 
harsh ecology. To the north is the desert or semi-desert where 
rainfall is virtually absent, daytime temperatures range from 117o F 
to nearly 140°F (40°C to 60°C) and night-time temperature drops 
to 39o F (4°C); To the south the arid Sahelian zone where average 
temperatures rage between 73o F and 94o F (23oC and 36°C) and at 
the canter is the Sudanic zone where temperatures range between 
75o F and 86°F (24°C to 30°C) and has alternating dry and rainy 
seasons  (Diarra, 2012, p. 6; Heisbourg, 2013, pp. 7-8; Keita, 1998, p. 
5; Schulz, 2012, p. 3; Stewart, 2013, p. 5).  
 
According to the United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, as at the end of 2018, Mali had 
a mid-year population of ca. 19.7 million, which is predominantly 
(90 percent) Sufi Muslim and which Ethnologists classify into five 
or six separate ethno-linguistic groupings subdivided further into 
about 12 ethnic groups, each speaking its own language  (Francis, 
2013, p. 10; Keita, 1998, p. 5; Schulz, 2012, pp. 4-6; Stewart, 2013, pp. 
25-27). These are Manding, Mandé, Bambara or Malinka speaking 
peoples found in the South (50%), the Peulh (also called Fula or 
Fulani) found alone the Niger delta (11%); Seina or Senoufo in the 
South-East (10%); the Soghai or Soninké in the North-west (8%); 
the Berber (Tuareg, Maure or Moor) speaking peoples in the North 
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(10%) and minority groups (11%) such as the Dogon, Bozo, Diawara 
and Xaasongaxango (Heisbourg, 2013, pp. 7-8; Keita, 1998, p. 5; 
Schulz, 2012, p. 7; Stewart, 2013, pp. 25-27).  
 
Figure 6.1:Map of Mali  
 
 
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. copied from 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali on 26/03/2020 
6.4.3.2. Political Development  
 
Mali as we know it today is a successor of the Mali empire founded 
by Sundjata Keita (c. 1217-55) after he led the Mandingo to conquer 
the Soussou led by Sounangourou at the battle of Kirina in 1235 
(Heisbourg, 2013, p. 7; Imperato & Imperato, 2008; Ki-Zerbo, 
Mokhtar, Niane, Boahen, & El Fasi, 1984, p. 118; McCall & Stewart, 
1974, p. 41; Roberto et al., 2013, p. 71; Stewart, 2013, pp. 9, 16). At the 
time, Mali Empire was the epicentre of West Africa’s great empires 
i.e. Empire of Ghana, the Empire of Mali, and the Songhai Empire 
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that chronologically succeeded one another from the 9th to the 
17th Century ending with the arrival of French colonialists (Diarra, 
2012, p. 6). At its peak, under the reigns of Mansa Müsä I and 
Mansa Sulaymän, Mali Empire was a hegemony wielding political, 
military and economic influence over the entire Sudan-Sahel 
region of West Africa, stretching from the central Sahara to the 
Atlantic Ocean, an area covering present day Mali, Ghana, Senegal, 
Gambia, and Southern Mauritania (Keita, 1998, p. 2; Ki-Zerbo et 
al., 1984, p. 156; Roberto et al., 2013, p. 71; Schulz, 2012, p. xiii; 
Stewart, 2013, pp. 9, 16). In 1998, its great cities of Timbuktu, Gao 
and Djenne renowned in the Islamic world for wealth and 
scholarship were recognized as world heritage sites by the United 
Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization 
(UNESCO) (Arieff, 2013, p. 6; Keita, 1998, p. 2; McCall & Stewart, 
1974, p. 41; Schulz, 2012, p. xiii; Stewart, 2013, p. 10).  
 
In 1892, France declared the area of contemporary Mali a distinct 
colony named the French Sudan, and later granted it limited self-
government in 1956, before joining contemporary Mali with 
Senegal in January 1959 to constitute the Sudanese Republic which 
jointly achieved independence from the French as the Mali 
Federation on June 20, 1960  (Keita, 1998, p. 2; Roberto et al., 2013, 
p. 73; Schulz, 2012, p. xiv; Stewart, 2013, pp. 9, 16-23). 
Disagreements over political orientation and economic policy, led 
to the dissolution of the federation two months later, and on 
September 22, 1960, Mali declared its independence as the 
Republic of Mali and in 1961 established a national army (Roberto 
et al., 2013, p. 73; Schulz, 2012, pp. XV-2).  
 
Mali’s post-independence political landscape is marked 
chronologically by a shift from civilian dictatorship (first president 
Modibo Keita, 1960 – 1968); to a military/civilian dictatorship 
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(Colonel Moussa Traore, 1968 – 1991); to military/civilian 
democratic rule (Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), 1991 – 
1992; Alpha Oumar Konare, 1992 – 2002; Amadou Toumani Touré 
(ATT), 2002 – 2012); back to military dictatorship (Captain 
Amadou Sanogo, 2012 – 2013) and then back to civilian democratic 
rule (Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK), 2013 to 2023) (Arieff, 2013, p. 
6; Bøås, Diallo, & Cissé, 2019, p. 5; Coulibaly et al., 2019, p. 20; Filiu, 
2015, pp. 110-111; Heisbourg, 2013, p. 12; Keita, 1998, p. 4; Lecocq, 
2013, p. 59; Schulz, 2012, p. 2; Stewart, 2013, p. 23; Stigall, 2015, p. 10; 
Tull, 2019, p. 409; Wing, 2013, p. 477). Since returning to 
democratic rule in 1992, many considered Mali as a “beacon” of 
democratic example in Africa, especially because until recently, 
many states in sub-Saharan Africa were plagued by civil war, 
authoritarian regimes and political crises for which Mali had 
largely avoided  (Arieff, 2013, p. 4; Boeke, 2016, p. 915; Boeke & de 
Valk, 2019, p. 2; Francis, 2013, p. 4; Keita, 1998, p. 5; Schulz, 2012, p. 
2; Stewart, 2013, p. 24; Stigall, 2015, p. 10; Venter, 2018, p. 75; Wing, 
2013, p. 476).  
 
6.4.4. Emergence and Proliferation of Terrorism 
6.4.4.1. Taureg Insurgency  
 
Terrorism in Mali is rooted in five decades of Taureg insurgency 
and criminality in the north of the country (Kone, 2017, p. 53).  
Tuaregs61, ‘Lords of the Desert’ (also known as the “Blue Men of the 
Desert”  because of the indigo traditional garments used by men to 
cover their faces);  are a nomadic Berber ethnic minority, who 
historically live in and dominate the geographically remote Sahel 
and Central Sahara desert region (Ajjer, Hoggar, Aïr, and Adagh n 
                                                 
61 The word ‘taureg’is an Arabic term that means ‘abandoned by God’, ‘but the 
Taureg refer to themselves as ‘Imohag’ which translates to  ‘free men’(Venter, 
2018, p. 65).   
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Ifoghas—as well as the adjacent Sahel-Saharan plains on the 
southern edge of the desert and the interior bend of the Niger 
River); but are divided along colonial boundaries among five 
territorial states (southern Algeria, western Libya, northern Mali, 
northern Niger and northeast Burkina) and call the Tuareg 
homeland ‘Azawad’  (Arieff, 2013, p. 6; Atallah, 2013; Francis, 2013, 
p. 4; Keita, 1998, p. 6; Kone, 2017, p. 56; Lecocq & Klute, 2013, p. 
424; Lecocq et al., 2013, pp. 21-22; Roberto et al., 2013, p. 74; Stewart, 
2013, p. 31; Stigall, 2015, p. 5; Venter, 2018, p. 65). Similar to Somali 
irredentism in the Horn of Africa, Tuareg irredentism and 
insurgency in the Sahelian states (Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, 
Libya and Mauritania), is characterised by over a century of viscous 
resistance to separation; interference into the Taureg way of life 
and neglect by both colonial and post-colonial governments 
(Arieff, 2013, p. 6; Atallah, 2013, p. 66; Boutellis & Zahar, 2017, p. 7; 
Diarra, 2012, p. 11; Lecocq & Klute, 2013, p. 424; Lecocq et al., 2013, 
p. 22; Roberto et al., 2013; Solomon, 2015, p. 68; Stewart, 2013, p. 28; 
Stigall, 2015, p. 5; Venter, 2018, p. 66). Since independence from 
France in 1960, Taureg rebellions in Mali have always been 
grounded on long-standing grievances over the concentration of 
political and economic resources in the south and its non-Tuareg 
population, and the projection of Malian identity as synonymous 
only to that of Bambara and other Mande ethnicities (Boutellis & 
Zahar, 2017, pp. 4-7; Francis, 2013, p. 4; Schulz, 2012, p. 5; Solomon, 
2015, p. 68; Stewart, 2013, p. 31; Stigall, 2015, p. 5; Venter, 2018, p. 
72). One key informant during the field research in Bamako on 22 
May 2019 observed that:  
 
‘Some ethnic groups are marginalised e.g. the 
Touareg group.  Most people feel that most of the 
country resources have been invested in central 
and south part of the country, this is their feeling. 
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Concerning the sharing of resources of the country, 
there is a gap in the north and south of the 
country.’ 
 
To date, Mali has experienced four waves of Taureg rebellions i.e.  
the first wave (1963 – 1964), the second wave (2006 - 2009), the 
third wave (1990 - 1996) and the forth wave (2012 - 2015) that also 
ushered in the current Jihadi terrorism crisis (Atallah, 2013, p. 67; 
Boutellis & Zahar, 2017, p. 3; Briscoe, 2014, p. 20; Diarra, 2012, p. 10; 
Dowd & Raleigh, 2013, p. 506; Heisbourg, 2013, p. 9; Lecocq, 2013, 
p. 65; Lecocq & Klute, 2013, p. 426; Lecocq et al., 2013, p. 22; Maïga, 
2016, pp. 1-2, 6-8; Schulz, 2012, pp. xv-i; Stewart, 2013, pp. 31-32; 
Stigall, 2015, p. 8; Venter, 2018, p. 72). See figure 6.2.   
 
It was during the third wave that internationally affiliated jihadi 
terrorist groups (namely Al Qaeda) began to mobilise in northern 
Mali, later proliferating and consolidating their presence during 
the fourth wave. 
 162 
Figure 6.2:Timeline of Taureg insurgency and rise of jihadi terrorism in Mali 
 
1st Taureg rebellion (1963 -
1964):
- Small hit-and-run raids of
about 200 fighters.
- Harsh military repression
supported by the Soviet Union.
- Tuaregs grievances galvanised
from the 1970s onwards.
2nd Taureg rebellion (1990 -
1996):
- Led by Iyad ag Ghali's Popular
Movement for the Liberation of
Azawad (MPLA).
- Main fighters were Tuareg
and Arab exiles living in
Algeria.
- Coincided with turbulent
political developments in
Malian society as a whole.
- Peace Agreement and
National Pact signed in
Tamanrasset Algeria.
- 42% of national revenue
allocated to Tauregs and the
North.
3rd Taureg rebellion (May -
July 2006 - 2009):
- Led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga's
Popular Movement of Azawad
(MPA).
-Three main military bases
(Kidal, Menaka and Tassilit)
attacked.
- Peace Agreement signed in
Algeria in July 2006.
- Peace agreemnet ammended
and MOU signed in Libya in
2008.
4th Taureg rebellion and rise
of Jihadi terrorists (2012 -
2015)
- Led by the Mouvement
National de libération de
l’Azawad’ (MNLA) joined by
AQIM, MUJAO and Anser Dine
terroeists.
-Catalysed by fall of Gadhafi as
thousands Tauregs return from
Libya with Arms.
-Aguelhok massacre of at least
100 Malian soldiers.
- Peace Agreement signed in
four stages in Ouagoudogou,
Algiers and Bamako.
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6.4.4.2. Proliferation of Jihadi Terrorism 
 
Jihadi terrorism in Mali has its origin in the Algerian civil war that 
broke out in 1992 after a broad Islamist movement (the Front 
Islamique du Salut) and its armed wing the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) were robbed of an impending election victory by a military 
coup that cancelled the elections, leading to the death of 
approximately 200,000 people (Bassou, 2018, p. 5; Boeke, 2016, pp. 
916-919; Venter, 2018, pp. 25, 104). It was during this civil war, the 
Salafist for Preaching and Combat group- GSPC (Salafist pour la 
Predication et le Combat) split from GIA in 2006 and rebranded 
itself to ‘Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) on 
26 January 2007 (Bassou, 2018, p. 5; Boeke, 2016, p. 919; Laub & 
Masters, 2015, p. 3; Stewart, 2013, pp. 39-40). Thereafter AQIM was 
pushed out of Algeria by successful Algerian counterterrorism 
forcing its militant to flee into northern Mali where they began to 
engage in criminal and social activities e.g. kidnapping for ransom, 
recruiting militants, imposing transit fees and providing security 
escorts to criminal enterprises, building reliable community 
relations with local populations through kinship and provision of 
social welfare programmes etc. (Boeke, 2016, pp. 927-928; Diarra, 
2012, p. 14; Filiu, 2015, 2017; Laub & Masters, 2015, pp. 2-3; Stewart, 
2013, pp. 39-40). 
 
Later, as the fourth wave of the Taureg rebellion that coincided 
with a military coup led by Captain Amadou Sanogo was 
underway, AQIM and its jihadi allies (Ansar Dine and the 
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa-MOJWA) joined 
Taureg MNLA fighters to root out government forces from major 
cities in the north (Boeke, 2016, p. 915; de Orellana, 2017, pp. 1021-
1022; Francis, 2013, p. 2; Lecocq & Klute, 2013; Maïga, 2016; Stewart, 
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2013, pp. 25, 31-27; Stigall, 2015, p. 10; Wing, 2013, p. 476). Soon after, 
the coalition of Jihadists turned against their secular partner 
MNLA, expelled its fighters from Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu and 
instituted a punitive brand of Sharia law in  northern Mali  (Arieff, 
2013, p. 1; Atallah, 2013, p. 73; Boeke, 2016, p. 923; Francis, 2013, p. 
4; Maïga, 2016, p. 3; Stewart, 2013, pp. 31-37; Stigall, 2015, p. 11; 
Venter, 2018, p. 79). Since then, terrorism in Mali has been 
characterised by a multidimensional complex mixture of long as 
well as short-term grievances, strategic agendas, criminal 
motivations (trafficking of drug62, humans and arms; smuggling of 
cigarettes and other contrabands; kidnapping for ransom, mostly 
Western nationals for ransom etc.) and an endless cycle of 
mutation, formulation, reformulation and fragmentation of 
terrorist groups (Arieff, 2013, p. 7; Boeke, 2016, p. 915; Briscoe, 2014, 
pp. 20-22; Dao, 2019, p. 23; Diarra, 2012, pp. 1-2; Dowd & Raleigh, 
2013, pp. 499, 507; Stewart, 2013, p. 25; Stigall, 2015, pp. 2, 5; Venter, 
2018, p. 26). This complexity is made worse by geographic (large 
swathes of ungovernable spaces, vast desolate stretches of desert 
sand, rock, rugged mountain ranges and porous borders), 
ethnographic and political realities present in the north of the 
country and the Sahel-Sahara region in general (Boeke, 2016, p. 915; 
Bullejos, 2019; Dowd & Raleigh, 2013, pp. 499, 507). Worse still, 
northern Mali’s strategic location along the historic transatlantic 
trade route makes it a lucrative hub that attracts foreign fighters 
and Islamist extremists committed to establishing an Islamic 
theocracy in Mali specifically, and Western Sahel Sahara generally 
(Boeke, 2016, pp. 923, 927; Francis, 2013, pp. 4-5; Wing, 2013, p. 481). 
In addition, the ability of jihadi terrorist groups operating in 
                                                 
62 The example of “Air Cocaine” in 2009 at Kidal is illustrative, in which an 
airplane, containing ten tons of cocaine, was easily discharged and dispatched 
in the desert of Mali and neither did security forces seize the drug nor the 
investigations into achieved any successful results (Dao, 2019, p. 24).  
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Northern Mali to harness local issues, conflicts, agendas and 
establish kinship ties enables them to remain clandestine threats 
and recruit militants along ethnic lines catalysing deadly ancestral 
‘tit-for-tat’ local conflicts e.g. between the Dogon who are 
traditionally farmers and hunters and the Fulani who are 
traditionally semi-nomadic herders   (Boeke, 2016, p. 925; Diarra, 
2012, p. 14; Lecocq & Klute, 2013, pp. 431-432; Maiga, 2018, p. 3; 
News, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; Sangaré & McSparren, 2018, pp. 22-23; 
Stewart, 2013, pp. 31-37; Tronc et al., 2019, pp. 10-11).  
 
In sum, it was the arrival of AQIM in northern Mali during the 
third wave of the Taureg rebellion (2006 – 2009) and 
circumstances of the fourth wave (2012 - 2015) that transformed 
Mali into a complex theatre of jihadi terrorism whose variables 
constantly change and remain unknown (Ammour, 2013, p. 6; 
Francis, 2013, p. 4; Lecocq et al., 2013, p. 23; Maïga, 2016, p. 6; 
Venter, 2018, p. 70). Figure 6.3 displays a non-exhaustive network 
of terrorist and armed groups operating in Mali as at January 2020. 
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 Splinter to new group 
 Merger to new group 
AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb  
MNLA: Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad’  
MUJWA: Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa  
ISGS: Islamic state in the Greater Sahara  
IMA: Islamic Movement for Azawad 
MLF: Macina Liberation Front  
KKiW: Katibat Khalid ibn Walid  
JNIM: Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Wa al-Muslimin 
































6.4.5. Counterterrorism and Human Rights 
 
6.4.5.1. Negotiated Peace Agreements  
 
Any discussions of counterterrorism in Mali must begin with the 
government response to Taureg rebellions since 1963.  
 
Analytically, only the first wave of the rebellion (1963-1964) ended 
with a decisive but ‘repressive’ military solution (Atallah, 2013, p. 
68; Boutellis & Zahar, 2017, p. 1; Keita, 1998, p. 1; Schulz, 2012, pp. 
xv-i; Stewart, 2013, pp. 23, 31-27). The other three waves (1990 - 
1996; 2006 - 2009 and 2012 - 2015) ended with negotiated peace 
agreements hampered by continuously mutating and multiplying 
numbers of armed groups, lack of will on both sides, poorly and 
hurriedly  designed programs63, conflicting interests, suspicions 
over the real agendas of parties and mediators and the legacy of 
each round of agreement affecting successive rounds of rebellion 
and negotiations (Alexander, 2015, p. 10; Ammour, 2013, p. 2; Arieff, 
2013, p. 14; Boeke & de Valk, 2019, p. 11; Boutellis & Zahar, 2017, pp. 
1, 6; Briscoe, 2014, p. 46; DeRouen et al., 2010, p. 341; Diarra, 2012, 
p. 4; Kone, 2017, pp. 55, 66-57; Laub & Masters, 2015, p. 3; Sow, 2018, 
p. 17; Stewart, 2013, pp. 39-40; Venter, 2018, p. 31; Wing, 2013, p. 
478).   
 
Some legacies of negotiated peace agreements have been linked to 
the proliferation of organised crime and terrorism in northern 
Mali. For example, Boeke (2016, pp. 923-927); Diarra (2012, pp. 1-2, 
9,16); Francis (2013, pp. 4-5, 12); Marchal (2013, p. 493); Stigall (2015, 
p. 2); Thurston (2013, p. 4) observe that among other things, the 
                                                 
63 Such as Programme Spécial pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement du 
Nord-Mali - Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in 
Northern Mali, PSPSDN 
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Tamanrasset accord provided for complete withdrawal of military 
forces from the north which freed the region for criminal activities, 
illicit trafficking, corruption and entrenchment of terrorist 
elements, most notably the entry of AQIM. See also DeRouen et al. 
(2010) who discusses in depth advantages and disadvantages of 
peace negotiations as strategies of ending armed conflicts where 
the state is a party to the conflict.  
6.4.5.2. Military Measures 
 
Apart from Mali’s military (Forces Armées et de Sécurité du Mali - 
FAMA) counterinsurgency efforts in the north, there are several 
international military interventions that have existed on the scene 
since the emergence of AQIM in the region. For example, the 
Common Operational Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CEMOC) 
spearheaded by Algeria and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP) established in 2005 by the United states   
(Boutellis & Zahar, 2017, p. 9; Chauzal & van Damme, 2015, p. 22; 
Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, pp. 34-35; Diarra, 2012, p. 19; Gilmour, 2019, 
pp. 2-5; Laub & Masters, 2015, pp. 6-7; Lecocq et al., 2013, p. 23). 
Recent international military interventions include the French led 
operation Barkane (Sahel, 2014) which moped up previous French 
military operations in the Sahel Sahara i.e. operations Serval (Mali, 
2013); Licorne (ivory coast, 2002-14); Èpervier (chad, 1986-2014); 
Sabre (Burkina Faso, 2012-2014); the UN Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the G5 - 
Sahel initiative comprising of the Sahalian states (Burkina Faso, 
Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) established in 2014 under the 
auspices of France (Boeke, 2014, p. 19; Boeke & de Valk, 2019, p. 11; 
Boutellis & Zahar, 2017; Diarra, 2012, p. 20; Heisbourg, 2013; Laub & 
Masters, 2015, pp. 6-7; Lecocq et al., 2013, p. 23; Lounnas, 2018; 
Venter, 2018, p. 19). Some scholars have raised critical questions 
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over international military operations in the region. For instance, 
other than the intervention in Mali on invitation of the caretaker 
President in 2013, Busher (2014, p. 2); Ford (2013, pp. 1, 4); Shuriye 
and Ibrahim (2013) argue that previous French military exploits in 
the Sahel Sahara, were motivated by the need to prevent terrorist 
sanctuaries from thriving close to its uranium exploits in Niger.  
 
During the field visit in Bamako in May 2019, some respondents 
also raised concerns over recent international military 
interventions in Mali. For example, some noted that:  
 
‘I sometimes ask myself this question. It is as if they 
are taking profit from the situation. Look at 
MUNISMA, they should be in the battle field to 
prevent terrorist attacks in the north. But they are 
not doing this. They are accommodated in Bamako 
driving big cars and I wonder how they can do 
peace keeping if they are not between the terrorist 
and the population.  So how can you explain this, 
that they have so many people, financial and 
material resources and still the population is under 
the fire of terrorists. This I cannot understand 
these people who may protect us are here to go to 
the night clubs in the district of Bamako, taking 
more beautiful girls, eating in big restaurants 
because they are well paid. I think honestly they 
should not be here.’ 
 
‘The international organisations made their best 
but really Malians are disappointed. We see no 
improvement in the security situation. They are 
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here but the populations do not see any impact. 
There is always attack, violations, everywhere in 
Mali despite their presence practically there are 
always the killings.’ 
 
‘Apparently MINUSMA is here to establish peace in 
the country but we see the contrast.  The arriving 
of MINUSMA and G5 Sahel has created more 
violations. And we ask ourselves are they here to 
maintaining peace or what are they doing? 
Sometimes they impose things on us. For example, 
the Malian army does not allow them to go in 
Meneka, in Kidal and nevertheless even if there is 
an attack there, they say that this is not in our 
mandate. So how can they establish peace and 
secure human right?’ 
 
However, another respondent expressed a different 
opinion.  
 
‘If they were not here the situation would have been 
worse. MINUSMA don’t have many forces to 
protect the population, they support the 
government and play a great role and have great 
influence on the government. They also put a check 
on the government so they cannot act as they like.’ 
 
 
At different times Malian, French and MINUSMA forces have 
incorporated non state armed groups e.g. MNLA, Ganda Koy and 
Ganda Iso in counterinsurgency operations against jihadi terrorist 
groups in the North (Arieff, 2013, p. 10; Boeke, 2016, p. 923; Dao, 
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2019, pp. 73-74; Kone, 2017, p. 58; Kozera, 2018, p. 20; Maïga, 2016, 
pp. 3, 7; Sow, 2018, p. 25; Thurston, 2013, p. 5).   
6.4.5.3. Criminal Justice Measures  
 
Mali has enacted 18 pieces of legislation to combat terrorism and 
its financing. These legislations are spread out in the following 
laws: 
 
− Law No. 08/025 of July 23, 2008 on the Suppression of 
Terrorism in Mali;  
− Decree No. 2015-0723 / P-RM of November 9, 2015 
establishing the organization and operating procedures of 
the specialized judicial center for combating terrorism and 
transnational organized crime; Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Law No. 01-80 of August 20, 2001);  
− The 2016 Uniform Act on the Fight against Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (2016) and the 
Penal Code.  
 
Some agency measures include the creation of specialised anti-
terrorism units such as the Intelligence Center for Terrorism 
and Organizational Crime (CITCO) created by decree No. 
873/2014 by merging two intelligence services, namely the 
National Center for Anti-Terrorist Coordination and the 
Intelligence Center for Organized Crime and the Special 
Counter-Terrorism Security Force (FORSAT) composed of 
members of the National Police, the National Gendarmerie, 
and the National Guard  created by decree No. 2016-0592 / 
MSPC-SG (Dao, 2019, p. 93; Maiga, 2018, p. 38; Tour, 2018, p. 
37). According to  Telisinghe et al. (2016, pp. 3-4), in 2014 Mali 
had 58 prison facilities with a prison population of 5,209 (222% 
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of full capacity) of which remand prisoners accounted for 
52.8%. The 2018 country report by Human Rights Watch 
observes that the Malian judiciary is plagued by neglect, 
mismanagement and inability to adequately process cases 
leading to hundreds of detainees being held in extended pre-
trial detention64. It also notes that insecurity led many judicial 
personnel to abandon their posts in northern and central Mali. 
The state of neglect and mismanagement explains Mali’s 
display of an absence of judicial independence (-J). 
 
The European Union (EU) through the police, rule of law 
mission (EUCAP-Sahel Mali) and the EU military training 
mission in Mali-EUTM is involved in training of civilian and 
police staff engaged in counterterrorism especially in the area 
of human rights (Bøås et al., 2019, p. 5; Briscoe, 2014, p. 44; 
Sangaré & McSparren, 2018, p. 15; Shuriye & Ibrahim, 2013; Tull, 
2019, p. 407) 
6.4.5.4. State of Human Rights and Emerging Issues 
 
Since returning to democratic rule in 1992, Mali many have been 
regarded as a hopeful and stable African democracy, where 
political and civil liberties enjoy much progress. One of the key 
informants noted that: 
 
‘Like revolutions that occurred in the Arab world 
e.g. in Egypt in Algeria…we fought the dictator 
President Moussa Traoré in 1991. Since that time 
there is a conscious awakening among the citizen 
to defend their rights. For example, in 2012 when 
rebels and terrorists encroached in Gao, the first 
                                                 
64 See https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/mali 
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people who stood up against violations of human 
right, were children, youths and women and until 
now these structures exist in Gao, in Timbuctu, 
everywhere in Mali’.  
 
Constitutional provisions guarantee the sanctity of life, integrity 
and privacy of the person; prohibit torture or inhuman, cruel, or 
ill-treatment; freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, worship, 
opinion, expression, creation, press, information, association, 
assembly, procession and demonstration   (Arieff, 2013, p. 4; Bleck, 
2011, pp. 1-5; Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 17; International, 2017, p. 7; 
Keita, 1998, p. 5; Schulz, 2012, p. 2; Wing, 2013, p. 476). An 
important feature of Mali’s constitution is that human rights 
precede the provisions that establish the state and any other 
provisions65. This attribute was expressed by one of the key 
informant (a senior judge with over 30 years in the judiciary) who 
noted as follows:  
 
‘Human rights in Mali finds its essence in our 
constitution. The first 22 articles of our 
constitution focus on the rights and duties of the 
human being. Yes correct. In the constitution, 
human right come before the whole constitution. 
That means human right comes before the 
president and the republic institutions. The first 20 
articles are on state obligations for human rights 
and the remaining two articles are on the duties 
imposed to people. So, it’s our choice we have done 
it this way. This came during our revolution of 1991. 
                                                 
65 See https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992.pdf?lang=en  
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It’s extremely important. That is why there is a 
resilience in Mali that concern on human right’. 
 
According to this key informant, the constitutions of Mali and 
Benin are the most rigid constitutions in West Africa.  
 
‘The constitution did not change. Presidents have 
tried to change the constitution but they are failed 
to change it. Let me tell you the most rigid 
constitutions are in West Africa: Mali and Benin. 
The two constitutions we cannot change without 
referendum even one iota. In France the 
constitution is flexible, they change it 24 times but 
in Mali none since 1991 till now Presidents try to 
change but no.’  
 
Mali has ratified all relevant United Nations (UN) and African 
Union (AU) human rights instruments except the Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights aiming to the abolition of the death penalty.  
 
The institutional framework for the protection of human rights is 
made up of the following agencies:  
 
− The National Commission for Human Rights or 
Commission Nationale des Droits De L’homme du Mali 
(CNDH) created by law n ° 09-042 of November 19, 2009. 
According to one key informant: 
 
‘The commission is a national institution in 
accordance with the France principle and the UN 
resolutions. Our work is to ensure effective 
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protection and the promotion of human rights. We 
coordinate all activities of human right in Mali. We 
work within the framework of peace, security and 
development’.  
 
− The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, created 
by law n ° 2014-003/PR-M of 2014, with a mandate to 
investigate crimes and root causes of violence dating back 
to 1960; 
− The Ministry for the Management of National 
Reconciliation and Social Cohesion and the Ministry of 
Human Rights. There is national policy on human rights 
that was developed by the ministry in 2017.  
− A vibrant network of civil society organisations that freely 
engage in human rights work in the country. At the end of 
March 2020, there were three Malian NGOs with observer 
status at the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights (ACHPR).  
 
One key informant noted that: 
 
‘I think the civil society in Mali is very powerful but 
there is also another movement called Islamic 
movement. This is also very powerful and they led 
the revolution in Mali in 1991. When they remove 
the former president Moussa Traoré until now 
people don’t want to miss democracy, so I think 
this why any attempt to change the constitution, 
the civil society organs, political party and the 
Islamic movement block these attempts.’ 
Though it was not possible to establish the exact number, it is 
estimated that there are at least 40 NGOs and civil society groups 
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engaged in the protection and promotion of human rights in Mali. 
According to two key informants:  
 
‘Sometimes the 51 Associations of human right do 
not agree with the different international 
community demands and their supporting of 
human right in Mali.’ 
 
‘There more than 42 human rights organisations in 
Mali.’ 
 
Terrorism has poses the greatest threat to human rights in Mali. 
As shows in figure 14, increases in the number of terrorism attacks 
have consistently been accompanied by a deterioration of human 
rights outcomes. Between 1998 and 2006 (at the start of the third 
Taureg rebellion and entry of jihadi terrorism in the north) Mali 
experienced continuous improvements in human rights as shown 
by the falling line in figure 6.4.  
 
Figure 6.4: Terrorism and Human rights in Mali (1998 – 2017) 
 
Source: Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-




















































From 2006, onwards proliferation of jihadi terrorism in the north 
triggered a decline in human rights outcomes as indicated by the 
rising line, hitting a peak in 2011 when the terrorism crisis nearly 
spiralled out of control accompanied by a military coup. As the 
level of terrorism began to fall in 2013 following decisive 
international intervention, human rights outcomes improved as 
indicated by the falling human rights scores and line between 2013 
to 2017.  
 
A similar observation has been made by the Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance (IIAG), which shows that Mali’s score on 
protection of human rights declined from a score of 66.5 in 2008 
to 51.9 in 2013 and improving to 53.4 in 2017.  
 
Counterterrorism in Mali has been accompanied by several 
instances of human rights violations involving Mali security forces 
and international (French, MINUSMA and G5) military 
interventions. These include but not limited to: extrajudicial 
executions, enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests and 
holding suspected militants incommunicado without charge or 
trial in official and unofficial places of detention (e.g. military 
camps, General Directorate of Public Security and the National 
Youth Service, Mobile Security Group or Groupement mobile de 
sécurité, GMS), inhumane prison conditions (overcrowding, 
insufficient medical care and poor sanitation), racial and 
indiscriminate attacks on Tuareg, Arabs and Peul civilian 
population, sexual violence including rape, inhumane prison 
conditions (overcrowding, insufficient medical care and poor 
sanitation), arrests and intimidation of journalists, inhumane and 
degrading methods of interrogation, detaining child soldiers with 
adults without any rehabilitation safeguards in place etc.  
(Caparini, 2015, p. 13; Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 19; Gilmour, 2019, pp. 
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7-8; International, 1991a, p. 2; 1991b, pp. 1-2; 1994a, p. 1; 1994b, p. 1; 
2012a, p. 6; 2012b, p. 5; 2012c, p. 13; 2012d, p. 1; 2012e, pp. 4-5; 2013a, 
p. 17; 2013b; 2013c, p. 8; 2013d, pp. 17-18; 2014a, p. 6; 2017, p. 7; Mills, 
Lang, & Lunn, p. 1; Tour, 2018, p. 28; Tull, 2019, p. 406). 
 
Some violations have been attributed to non-state armed groups 
that join the Malian military, the French Army and MINUSMA in 
counterinsurgency at different times e.g. indiscriminate reprisals 
against Tuareg populations, demanding money from Tuaregs 
before killing them, confiscating livestock of victims, recruitment 
and use of child soldiers, sexual violence against women and girls 
etc.  (Dao, 2019, pp. 73-74; International, 2012b, p. 12; 2012c, p. 20; 
2012e, p. 6; 2014a, p. 11; Rupesinghe et al., 2019, p. 4). See also Cigar 
(2014); Kozera (2018)  
 




The analysis of sufficient conditions showed that Mali’s relatively 
better human rights outcomes result from  the configuration 
~M*C*~J*A*T represented by path 4 in table 17 which combines 
less government expenditure on welfare than on military (~M), low 
levels of corruption (C), absence of judicial independence (~J), 
presence of anti-terror legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism 
(A) and a high level of terrorism (T).  
 
This section explores how and why these factors manifest in Mali 
and the pathways through which they affect the overall human 
rights outcomes for the country.  
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6.4.6.1. Necessary Conditions  
 
It was established that more government expenditure on welfare 
than military (M) is a necessary condition to facilitate human 
rights in counterterrorist policies. In Mali, the government spend 
more on military than on welfare (~M). In figure 6.5, the 
deleterious effect on human rights outcomes by Mali’s higher 
expenditures on the military than on welfare (~M) does not appear 
to be obvious. For example, between 2013 and 2017 there was 
massive investment in the military as opposed to welfare but the 
human rights scores dropped compared to 2012 indicating 
improving human rights outcomes.  
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Figure 6.5: Human rights, health and military expenditure in Mali 
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Between 2010 and 2012 Mali’s higher investments in welfare as 
opposed to military do not appear to have yielded positive 
dividends because human rights outcomes continued to 
deteriorate as indicated by rising scores. Though higher 
investments in the military than on welfare we accompanied by 
better human rights outcomes, it is possible that improvements in 
human rights conditions were because of the presence of 
international actors who intervened in the country in 2013.  
According to one key informant:  
 
‘If they were not here the situation would have been 
worse. MINUSMA don’t have many forces to 
protect the population, they support the 
government and play a great role and have great 
influence on the government. They also put a check 
on the government so they cannot act as they like.’ 
 
Analysis of necessary conditions also established that a high level 
of corruption in the public sector (~C) is a necessary condition for 
the impediment of human rights. Mali displays a relatively low 
level of corruption (C). According to Transparency International’s 
(TI) corruption perception index (CPI), higher scores indicate 
lower levels of corruption.  Based on the results of the test for 
necessary conditions, we would expect by inference that Mali’s low 
levels of corruption (C) would have a facilitating effect on human 
rights outcomes. However, based on figure 15, the facilitating 
relation of a low-level corruption does not also appear to be clearly 
obvious. For example, a decrease in the level of corruption between 
2006 and 2007 was accompanied by a deterioration of human 
rights outcomes similar to the years 2011 and 2012. On the contrary, 
increased levels of corruption between 2012 and 2013 were 
accompanied by a significant improvement in human rights 
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outcomes. Again, this is probably because of international 
intervention.  
 
This examination of necessary conditions in the case of Mali 
underlines QCA’s logic that though necessary conditions must be 
present for an outcome, their presence does not guarantee that the 
expected outcome will be observed i.e. they are not sufficient to 
cause observed changes in social phenomena. 
Ordinarily, when corruption is not evenly distributed in the 
security sector, it exposes poorly paid, equipped and trained 
security agents to the brutality of security threats causing them to 
express their frustrations and low morale as sadistic passions that 
violate human rights indiscriminately (Ayodeji, 2016, p. 22; Bohara 
et al., 2008, p. 4; Clutterbuck, 1995, p. 83; Miller, 2014, p. 173; 
Newham, 2002, pp. 2-3; Pearson, 2001, p. 33; Pilapitaya, 2005, p. 18); 
Vorster (2012, p. 137). However, in Mali’s case, it appears that even 
though the level of corruption (C) in the country is generally 
relatively lower, it may be argued that it is the combined effect of 
more expenditure on military than on welfare (~M) and a culture 
of wide spread corruption in the military that for some time 
mitigated against repressive impulses among the rank and file of 
security agents. Allocating more resources to the disposal of 
corrupt military officers who allow their juniors to benefit from 
illegal enterprise in the north of the country, enabled the rank and 
file of security agencies to compensate for their ‘insufficient’ 
salaries to escape frustrations (poor training, lack of adequate 
equipment, work in dangerous environment etc.) that would 
otherwise invite repressive impulses.  
 
For example, during the term of deposed President Amadou 
Toumani Touré also known in short as ATT (2002-2012), 
particularly the second term (2007-2012), patronage networks, 
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political elites and cronies enriched themselves, by among other 
things, participating in the growing international drug trade 
passing through the country, in connections that linked customs 
officers, soldiers, bureaucrats, politicians and armed groups e.g. 
AQIM, Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo (Amadou, 2019, pp. 149-150; 
Bleck & Michelitch, 2015, pp. 602-603; Briscoe, 2014, p. 28; Cold-
Ravnkilde, 2013, p. 18; Lecocq et al., 2013, pp. 25, 65; Shelley, 2014, 
p. 16; Shipley, 2017, pp. 8-9; Sordi, 2019, p. 38; Varga, 2018, p. 65). 
Military officers appointed through corrupt and patronage links 
could indulge in wheeling and dealing in exchange for their loyalty 
to the regime and return of rents to Bamako with little or no 
consequence (Bøås & Torheim, 2013, p. 1284; Briscoe, 2014, pp. 35-
36; Caparini, 2015, p. 17). The most widely cited case is that of the 
Boeing 727, the so-called “Air Cocaine” whose burnt wreckage was 
discovered in the desert near Tarkint in 2009, in the region of Gao 
that could not have landed and off loaded up to 10 tonnes of 
cocaine without the government’s knowledge (Briscoe, 2014, p. 38; 
Caparini, 2015, p. 17; Shelley, 2014, p. 249).   
 
 
In some countries, secrecy around high military expenditures is 
designed to present more opportunities for corrupt use of the 
funds (Mauro (1997), (1998); Morgan (1998) in Ayodeji, 2016, p. 23; 
Gray, 2015, p. 387; Pearson, 2001, p. 35; A. Peters, 2015, p. 17). In 
Mali’s case, prior to the wide-ranging reforms that began after the 
election of a new president in 2013, the situation had been 
compounded by weak parliamentary oversight due to lack of 
expertise and information about military expenditure (Maiga, 
2018, pp. 24-28; Sidibe, 2018, p. 50; Tour, 2018, pp. 38-39).  
 
Recent security sector and general reforms beneficial to 
counterterrorism, anti corruption and human rights can be noted. 
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For example, in 2012, a new military law, the ‘Loi d’orientation et 
de programmation militaire-LOPM (2012) and its amendment 
Ordinance No. 2016-020 (2016) are designed to improve 
management, functioning of the military and the situation of 
Malian soldiers (Caparini, 2015, p. 19; Tour, 2018, pp. 43-44). Other 
include: amendments to the penal code through Law No.2016-039 
to strengthen the anti-money laundering framework (2016); Law 
on the Prevention and Repression of Illicit Enrichment requiring 
government officials to declare their assets (2014); the 2016 
Uniform Act on the Fight against Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism (2016); creation of an independent 
oversight body, ‘the Bureau du Vérificateur Général (BVG)’ to 
combat financial and economic crime; the  strengthening of the 
auditor general’s office; the creation of and appointment of senior 
staff to the anti-corruption agency  ‘l'Office central de lutte contre 
l'enrichissement illicite (OCLEI) - Central Office in the Fight against 
Illicit Enrichment’; establishment in 2007 of the La Cellule 
nationale de traitement des informations financières (CENTIF) - 
the financial intelligence unit and the economic and financial unit 
of the public prosecutor’s office responsible for the administration 
of intelligence relating to money laundering and terrorist financing 
etc. (Bleck, 2011, p. 11; Caparini, 2015, p. 19; Mathieu, 2017, p. 74; 
Shipley, 2017, pp. 6, 16; Sidibe, 2018, p. 53; Tour, 2018, p. 29; Tull, 
2019, p. 410).  
 
 
Asked what some of characteristics of the legal system that 
promote human right in Mali, one key informant observed that:  
 
‘First there is the constitution. It is the principle 
guardian of human rights.  We also have a penal 
code. Police are not allowed to hold any suspect in 
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custody beyond 24hrs without charge. For crimes, 
whose maximum sentence is 3 years, our laws do 
not allow suspects to be held in remand without a 
sentence beyond 6 months. As a commission, the 
law allows us to visit any penal institution e.g. 
prisons, without informing the Attorney General or 
the examining magistrate, for ensuring there is no 
human right violation at the level of the prisons.’  
 
6.4.6.2. Sufficient Combination of Conditions   
 
Mali configuration of sufficient conditions i.e. ~M*C*~J*A*T 
includes the absence of judicial independence (~J) and the 
presence of anti-terror legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism 
(A).  
 
Judicial independence is compromised by the fact that it is the 
President who appoints the President of the Supreme Court, three 
members of the Constitutional Court (others appointed by the 
National Assembly and the Superior Council of the Magistracy) 
and the Minister of Justice, who in turn appoints and supervises 
judges and law enforcement (Bleck, 2011, p. 9; Shipley, 2017, pp. 9-
10).  This kind of arrangement obviously violates the principle of 
separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. The 
2018 country report by Human Rights Watch observes that the 
Malian judiciary is plagued by neglect, mismanagement and 
inability to adequately process cases leading to hundreds of 
detainees being held in extended pre-trial detention66. It also notes 
that insecurity led many judicial personnel to abandon their posts 
                                                 
66 See https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/mali 
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in northern and central Mali. The state of neglect and 
mismanagement explains why Mali’s configuration of sufficient 
conditions for human rights includes the absence of judicial 
independence (-J). 
 
Theoretical expectations and assumptions of the UN Global 
Counterterrorism Strategy (2006) and UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) adopted under 
chapter VII of the UN Charter suggest that anti-terror legislations 
are important legal tools for the protection of human rights in the 
fight against terrorism through law enforcement and respect for 
the rule of law (RoL) Andrew and Silke (2018, p. 8); (Ford, 2011, p. 
24; Sigsworth, 2019, p. 5; Sturman, 2002, p. 104; Whitaker, 2007, p. 
1018). According to the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) ‘Database of Legislation on Terrorism’,  Mali has 18 
legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism (A). See SHERLOC 
(2019). The pathways through which the presence of legislation 
explicitly focusing on terrorism (A) impact favourably on human 
rights outcomes is not clear. This is because judicial independence 
cannot be guaranteed (~J). In chapter three sub-section 3.2.2.2.2 it 
was noted that the principle role of courts in modern democracies 
is to review legislation, policies and actions of other arms of 
government (legislature and executive) to ensure that they comply 
with the law (Fabbrini, 2009, p. 666; Krebs, 2016, p. 42; Mersel, 
2005, pp. 68, 91; Scheinin, 2016). It was also noted that as guardians 
of the constitution, courts set limits on counterterrorism measures 
by clarifying, tracking and interpreting applicable sources of 
authorization for executive power or action which include the 
constitution, statutes, international laws, human rights laws  and 
administrative regulations (Benvenisti, 2007, pp. 1, 7-8; Boateng & 
Adjorlolo, 2018, p. 1692; Fabbrini, 2009, pp. 666, 694; Krebs, 2016, 
pp. 42, 49-51; Mersel, 2005, pp. 90-92; Murray, 2016, p. 91; Scheinin, 
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2016). Given that judicial independence cannot be guaranteed in 
Mali, the ability of courts to maximise the gains attributable to the 
presence of legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism (A) is 
limited. However, we observed that Mali as a strong constitutional 
provision for human rights which precedes all other provisions67. 
Given that this constitution is rigid and there exists a vibrant civil 
society and strong religious movement, it could be the case that 
these factors mitigate against possible infringements of anti-
terrorism legislations that would otherwise lead to worse off 
human rights outcomes.  
6.4.6.3. Additional Variables that Facilitate Human Rights 
 
The only variables in Mali’s configuration of sufficient conditions 
that appear to have a facilitating effect on human rights in 
counterterrorist policies are a relatively low level of corruption (C) 
and the presence of anti-terror legislation explicitly focusing on 
terrorism (A). However, based on the analysis this far, the 
pathways through which these factors enhance human rights in 
counterterrorism in Mali are not clear. In any case, results of the 
analysis of necessary conditions shows that none of them is 
necessary.  
 
Field research in Bamako in May 2019 suggests that ancient 
cultural norms and traditional value systems that emphasise 
consensus and mutual respect make significant additions to 
explanations of Mali’s relatively better human rights outcomes. 
According to one respondent:  
 
                                                 
67 See https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992.pdf?lang=en 
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There are some common historical factors. We 
used to have historic empire that connect people to 
each other: Manding Empire, Shongoi Empire, 
Ghana Empire…. They contained more than two or 
three Ethnics group so since those times people 
were living together, they are sharing some values 
and most people have the same religion “Muslim” 
this is one factor. 
 
The basis of these cultural norms and traditional values is found in 
Mande peoples ancient oral constitutions known as the Charter of 
Mandé (1222) and the Kurukan Fuga (1236) which are Mande 
people ancient oral constitutions (de Sardan, 2015, p. 2; Diabaté, 
2018; Jansen, 2016; Nesbitt, 2014, p. 11; Niang, 2006; Odamtten, 
2016, p. 152; UNESCO, 2006; Uwizeyimana, 2016, p. 44; R. Weber, 
2010, p. 136). The Charter of Mandé (1222) also known as the 
Donsolu Kalikan, (the “Oath of the Hunters”) traces its origin to 
present day Guinea and was first transcribed by Youssouf Tata 
Cissé in 1965 who later translated it into French in 2003 (Nesbitt, 
2014, p. 11; R. Weber, 2010, p. 137).  The Kurukan Fuga (1236) traces 
its origin to the establishment of the great empire of Mali (which 
is the basis of present day Mali), by Mansa (Emperor) Sundjata 
Keita (Mali), who proclaimed it at the assembly of 12 allies at 
Kurukan Fuga (in the Circle of Kangaba, two kilometers north of 
Kangaba and ninety five kilometers south of Mali's capital Bamako, 
close to the border with Guinea) one day after his victory in Kirina 
over the Soussou led by their witch king Sounangourou Kanté (de 
Sardan, 2015, p. 2; Diabaté, 2018; Diarra, 2012, p. 6; Keita, 1998, p. 2; 
Ki-Zerbo et al., 1984, p. 118; Niang, 2006; Odamtten, 2016, p. 152; 
Schulz, 2012, p. xiii; UNESCO, 2006; Uwizeyimana, 2016, p. 44; R. 
Weber, 2010, p. 136). Both oral constitutions are thought to precede 
the Bill of Rights (1689), the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
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of the Citizen (1789) and the Magna Carta (1215-1297) (Amselle, 
2013, pp. 79, 81; Nesbitt, 2014, p. 11). According to one key 
informant:  
 
 ‘What you must understand is that the 1236 
charter is the oldest constitution that was not 
written. It is an old tradition.  
 
Their discoveries are also widely considered the most significant 
cultural events of the late twentieth century in contemporary sub-
Saharan Africa and foundations of political thought in Africa that 
paved way for the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(Amselle, 2013, pp. 84-85; de Sardan, 2015, p. 2; Diabaté, 2018; 
Jansen, 2014, p. 110; Nesbitt, 2014, pp. 11-12; Niang, 2006). Because 
of its links to the formation of the Mali Empire, the Charter of 
Kurukan Fuga receives more cultural prominence and national 
attention (celebrated as a national heritage) in Mali as compared 
to the Charter of Mandé   (Amselle, 2013, p. 86; Heisbourg, 2013, 
pp. 7-8; Keita, 1998, p. 5; Nesbitt, 2014; Schulz, 2012, p. 7; Stewart, 
2013, pp. 25-27). One key informant observed that: 
 
‘Generally, in society, respect for other human 
beings is linked to our history of the 
KOUROUKANFUGA’. 
 
The Charter of Kurukan Fuga contains seven chapters and forty 
four articles advocating for social peace in diversity, the 
inviolability of the human being, education, the integrity of the 
motherland, food security, the abolition of slavery by razzia (or 
raid), freedom of expression and trade, tolerance, individual rights 
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and duties, the right of sanankunya (the rights of jokes)68, the 
rights of women in the society, material possessions and ways of 
obtaining and transmitting them, marriage and the question of 
dowries, inheritance, the organisation of labour within families 
and according to age, land rights, the prohibition of human 
sacrifice, the safeguard of foreigners, succession to chiefdom, rules 
concerning violent conflict and murder, oaths and ordeals, the 
calendar etc. (Amselle, 2013, pp. 81, 84-85; Diabaté, 2018; UNESCO, 
2006; R. Weber, 2010, pp. 136-137). See appendix 2 for the 
reconstructed Charter of Kouroukan Fuga, as published by Siriman 
Kouyaté.  
 
One key informant observed that:  
 
‘First our country was led by the king during the 
time of the Empire of Mali. We had Kouroukanfuga 
charter. This charter Mali had already written the 
defenders of human right, the population was ruled 
as: the hunters had their rules and right, the story 
tellers had their rules and right, the children, 
women, Marabous were so structured and 
everyone had his duty.’  
  
Nevertheless, both charters contain provisions that refer to human 
rights issues that contemporary Social Science research has 
established to be strongly correlated to the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism. For example, James A Piazza and Walsh (2010); 
Poe and Tate (1994); Walsh and Piazza (2010) find that protecting 
                                                 
68 The right to ridicule is a social practice which allows members of one family, 
or members of certain ethnic groups to mock or insult each other, but this will 
have consequences: these verbal barbs are actually forms of social strife and 
conflicts management. 
 191 
physical integrity rights increases the effectiveness of 
counterterrorist policies. In the Charter of Kurukan Fuga, several 
articles refer to physical integrity rights.  
 
For example: -  
 
− Article 5: “Everybody has a right to life and to the 
preservation of its physical integrity. Accordingly, any 
attempt to deprive one’s fellow being of life is punished with 
death”;  
− Article 24: the twenty fourth clause “In Mande do never 
wrong foreigners” and  
− Article 40: forty first clause “You can kill the enemy, but not 
humiliate him”  
 
One respondent observed that:  
 
‘In the charter, the human being is sacred and must 
not be violated.’ 
 
According to Nesbitt (2014, p. 13), the first clause of the Mande 
Charter of 1222 states that “Every life is one life” and the second 
clause, “every wrong caused to a life demands reparation. If every life 
is one life, if every life counts as one, then all injustice, anything that 
renders humans’ unequal, must cease.”  
 
In contemporary Mali, cultural norms and traditional values 
associated with the Charter of Kouroukan Fuga are conveyed orally 
through generations by elders or Djelis or griots (custodians of the 
Malinke history) in form of oral history, storytelling, poems, and 
musicians (Amselle, 2013, pp. 81, 84-85; Diabaté, 2018; UNESCO, 
2006; R. Weber, 2010, pp. 136-137). The elders or Djelis or griots are 
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seen as a source of law and as promoting a message of love, peace 
and fraternity, which has survived through the ages (UNESCO, 
2006). The Malian association of griots and the Nko literacy 
movement69 provide important institutional structures through 
which the traditions of the Kouroukan Fuga are socialised in 
contemporary Malian society Amselle (2013); Jansen (2014, p. 111). 
The Malian association of griots is also an influential political actor 
in the country.  The social and political influence of the Malian 
association of griots was aptly captured by two key informants who 
observed that: 
 
‘Usually in the society everyone tries to do his or 
her duties and pass on these traditions down the 
generations through oral history.’  
 
‘Yeah, traditional leaders are officially recognised 
in government because there is a national 
association of all those stories tellers and whenever 
the government has difficulties in dealing with 
conflict or in dealing with social demand like 
strikes or protests, they call on these association to 
send their delegation trying to speak to the 
government. e.g. the conflict between Teachers and 
government or ethnics group.’ 
 
‘We have also Story Tellers who intervene in the 
resolution in conflicts, marriages, naming 
ceremonies, funeral ceremonies. They have a large 
place in society and we called them peacemakers.’ 
                                                 
69 According to Jansen, Nko literacy movement is based on the Nko alphabet 
invented by Souleymane Kante (1922-1987), a Guinean marabout who was 
inspired by the Kurukan  
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Referring to the influence of religious leaders, two key informants 
noted that:  
 
‘Religious leaders have a great capacity of 
mobilisation more than the politicians. Like 
Mahmoud Dicko the president of the national 
Muslim council. This leader called for a meeting 
and a great number of people come out to support 
Islam in the Ogosagou massacre.’ 
 
‘I think the civil society in Mali is very powerful but 
there is also another movement called Islamic 
movement. This is also very powerful and they led 
the revolution in Mali in 1991.  
 
The influence cultural and traditional factors in contemporary 
politics of Mali has been widely canvased in the scholarship. For 
example, Arieff (2013, p. 14); Bleck (2011, pp. 4, 9); Chauzal and van 
Damme (2015, p. 20); Jansen (2014, p. 111); Kone (2017, p. 59); 
Stewart (2013, p. 27); Wing (2013, p. 477) observe that Mali’s 
democratic foundation is built on the 13th century Soundjata Keita 
political philosophy that advances dialogue as a central aspect of 
the political culture and conflict resolution mechanism, which 
empathizes forgiveness and is suspicious of actions that avoid 
dialogue. Concerned about ethnic violence between the Fulani and 
the Dogon, one respondent observed that:  
 
‘In the past people would not think about regions.  
In each region you can have two, three ethnicities 
living together. But now all this is vanishing and 
what is coming up is ethnicity for example: I am 
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Fulani and you are Dogon so Fulani is shepherd 
Dogon is a farmer, we have been living for centuries 
together, as Fulani is keeping the cattle: cows’ 
sheep, goats of those Dogon will share with Fulani 
what they harvest after Dogon let Fulani come and 
settle in their farm but now regarding the situation 
they are against one another.’ 
 
Other respondents observed that: 
 
‘Though there are many ethnics groups, we still 
have a kind of connection between all those ethnics 
group. Even in the armies it is difficult to them to 
eliminate one specific ethnic group. This social 
connection and cultural values maintain people 
together.’  
 
‘The second reason is that we have tolerance 
between ethnic groups. We have managed between 
different ethnics group so this helps to maintain 
people together.’ 
 
It is not surprising therefore that according to Bleck (2011, p. 4), the 
2005 Afrobarometer survey, Malians prefer consensus (70 percent) 
more than most African citizens (compared to only 40 percent in 
Namibia, Uganda, Kenya, and Botswana).  According to Bleck 
(2011, p. 4); Kone (2017, p. 59); Stewart (2013, p. 27), Mali’s 
contemporary social and political culture also incorporates a 
system of cousinage i.e. a cross-cutting cleavage of joking 
relationships between different ethnic and social groups that 
enhances mutual respect and mitigate against conflicts. This 
system is based on the tradition of the “sanankunya (joking 
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relationship) and the tanamannyonya (blood pact)” stipulated in 
article 7 of the Kurukan Fuga.  
Some of key informants observed that: 
 
‘At that time there were cousinship, tolerance, 
human being respect, on quarrel, no conflict.’  
 
‘I think we have two keys factors. The first one is 
how the society is built. In Mali, you will see that 
people are interlinked and the family system is 
strong. If you have such strong connections, it 
prevents you from violating others because if I 
want to hurt you and at the end of the day I realise 
that you are my long cousin or so, then I would 
think twice before hurting you.  So, this is the social 
link in Mali which helps to have this kind of human 
right that we talk it about. The second key issue is 
we have strong human right institutions e.g. 
CNDH, NCHR and civil society organisations.’  
 
‘If you come to Mali …… people are interlinked 
because there are some ethnic group who marry to 
another group, ……. we are all living together which 
is called joking with your cousin, this is very 
important in the society.’ 
 
Another factor is what we call in French 
cousinship, there are ethnics group, or family 
names, a kind of historic convention between these 
two groups that our ancestors agreed not to violate 
each other. This existed among the Songhai, Ghana 
in the north and Dogon in the centre, for example: 
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between Songhai- Dogon, coulibaly and Doumbia 
so on and so forth, start joking and no right to 
abuse or insult one another. We can just play and 
when there was a conflict we can easily resolve it 
because the elders in the villages had a meeting find 
the solutions. This cousinship has brought in the 
country solidarity, prosperity, honesty, all kind of 
happiness.’ 
 
‘With cousinship for example: I am Keita, you are 
Coulibaly if we quarrel in Downtown once I 
remember about that we are cousins and I am 
sorry.’ 
 
To many Malians, the charter of Kurukan Fuga and the traditions 
that derive from it generate intense and intimate feelings of 
belonging and heritage (Amselle, 2013, p. 86; Jansen, 2014, p. 112).  
This is why every year, the heritage of the Kouroukan Fuga is 
commemorated in a ceremony organized in the village of Kangaba 
which is the site of the historic assembly of 12 allies in a ceremony 
fully supported by government and traditional authorities 
(UNESCO, 2006). It is during this commemoration that the EID, a 
forum which allows individuals to bring human rights violations 
before responsible government official is held and broadcast by the 
local media. See also Wing (2013, p. 478). A huge monument to 
signify the value of the Kurukan Fuga in the Malian society is built 










Figure 6.6: Monument of the Kurukan Fuga in Mali  
 
 
© DNPC, déc. 2008 retrieve from https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/manden-
charter-proclaimed-in-kurukan-fuga-00290 on 21/02/2020. Located in the 
village of Karaba at the grounds where the assembly of 12 allies was held by 
Sounjata Keita, the founder of the empire of Mali. 
 
6.5. Discussions  
 
Based on review of theoretical perspectives and extant empirical 
studies in chapter four, it was initially expected that democracy; 
economic and administrative capacity; preference for human over 
state security; high levels of integration into the international 
community and a low level of terrorism and internal unrest are 
necessary conditions to facilitate human rights in counterterrorist 
policies in sub-Saharan Africa. See figure 4.1.  
 
However, relying on version 3.0 of the open source fsQCA software 
developed by C. C. Ragin and Davey (2016), the analysis in this 
chapter shows that only government preference for human over 
state security measured by more government expenditure on 
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welfare than on military (M) is a necessary condition to facilitate 
human rights in counterterrorist policies sub-Saharan Africa at a 
consistency of 0.90 and coverage of 0.82. In addition, the results 
show that poor economic and administrative capacity measured by 
the absence of transparency and accountability coupled with a 
high level of corruption in the public sector (~C) is a necessary 
condition for the impediment of human rights in counterterrorist 
policies sub-Saharan Africa at a consistency of 0.96 and coverage 
of 0.76. See table 6.1.  Both conditions are necessary but not 
sufficient to facilitate or impede human rights when governments 
respond to terrorism in the region. According to Dale (1984); 
Mackie (1965), they are INUS conditions for human rights 
outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. This implies that they are the 
most significant macro social conditions that come to bear on 
whether states in sub-Saharan Africa will facilitate or impede 
human rights when responding to terrorism. In addition, the in-
depth case analysis of Mali suggests that ancient African social 
norms, cultural practices and traditions that promote justice and 
human rights passed down the generations through socialization 
play an important role in facilitating human rights in 
counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
These findings have theoretical and policy implication that are 
worth noting. Theoretically, the results imply that in the context 
of sub-Saharan Africa, explanations for the relationship between 
counterterrorism and human rights must be based on theoretical 
frameworks that at the very least include variables that measure 
human and state security; economic and administrative capacity 
of government and rights protective African social norms, cultural 






Figure 6.7: Suggested conceptual framework 
 
Own figure  
 
The findings in this study show that mixed methods research 
designs are particularly powerful in the study of under researched 
complex social phenomena. For example, with a limit of only 5 
variables per analysis at a time, with csQCA it was difficult to 
discover additional factors seemingly significant in facilitating 
human rights in counterterrorist policies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This discovery was aided by an in-depth case study of Mali. What 
this implies for the application of QCA is that, researchers using 
QCA need to be aware of the limitation that with QCA, it is 
sometimes difficult to formulate the “larger picture” beyond the 
results produced. Especially in the study of social and political 
systems that are highly diverse such as sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
In terms of counterterrorist policy, the finding that more 
government expenditure on welfare than on military (M) is a 
necessary condition to facilitate human rights in counterterrorist 
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policies implies that governments in the region will be more 
effective in preventing and responding to terrorism if they 
prioritise criminal justice over military measures to 
counterterrorism. In other words, terrorism in the region should 
be considered a threat to human rather than state security, whose 
effective response is anchored on the rule of law (RoL) and consists 
of a compendium of policies that address the welfare needs citizens 
rather than the political and military interests of the state. The 
finding that lack of transparency and accountability coupled with 
a high level of corruption in the public sector (~C) is a necessary 
condition for the impediment of human rights in counterterrorist 
policies implies that regardless of other good things done by 
governments in the name of counterterrorism in the region, 
corruption has a significant deleterious effect on the effectiveness 
of counterterrorist policies.  For example, in the complex solution 
for conditions that facilitate human rights displayed in table 6.5, 
path 3 (M*~C*A*T) which combines more government 
expenditure on welfare than on military (M); a high level of 
corruption in the public sector (~C); presence of anti-terror 
legislation explicitly focusing on terrorism (A) and a high level of 
terrorism (T) suggests that, though the countries represented by 
this path (Kenya and Niger) have relatively better human rights 
outcomes, the facilitating effect of efforts to protect human rights 
appears to be deleted by a high level of corruption in the public 
sector. This renders counterterrorism ineffective if not impotent, 
hence the high level of terrorism (T) experienced in these two 
countries despite the relatively better human rights outcomes.  
 
Some scholars have discussed the pathways through which 
corruption erodes otherwise effective security policies. Bohara et 
al. (2008, p. 9); Miller (2014, p. 165); Pilapitaya (2005, p. 18) observe 
that systemic corruption indicates slackness in bureaucratic 
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control and presents opportunities for government agents to 
pursue hidden private goals e.g. embezzlement of security sector 
funds, fabricating evidence, protecting terrorists and organised 
criminal gangs including smuggling and selling them weapons, 
taking drug money etc. often motivated by poor pay, greed, lack of 
punishment, peer pressure etc. Clutterbuck (1995, p. 87); Feng 
(2004, p. 16); Pilapitaya (2005, p. 16); Rajagopal (1999, p. 499); H. 
Williams (2002, pp. 14-17) argue that where the judiciary and police 
are corrupt, organized crime groups can take over whole countries, 
not only paying off judges and police, but also threaten and 
intimidate honest judges and police officers as well as litigants in 
terrorism related cases. Thus, even if the judiciary is independent 
of political influence from the executive, corruption renders fair 
trial and justice a pipe dream (Pearson, 2001, p. 55; H. Williams, 
2002, p. 3). This observation probably sheds some light on why in 
our findings judicial independence did not turn out as a necessary 
condition to facilitate or impede human right in counterterrorist 
policies in sub-Saharan Africa. Bohara et al. (2008, p. 7); A. Peters 
(2015, p. 8); Rajagopal (1999, p. 499) note that corruption is often 
accompanied by impunity which refers to the exemption from 
punishment or freedom from injurious consequences of an action. 
In such circumstances, terrorist may walk free despite having 
committed serious crimes. Bundled together, the observations by 
these scholars point to the fact that, even if a country may be 
deemed to have a relatively good human rights record, corruption 
is likely to embolden terrorists by making government agents to 
look the other way or turn a blind eye to the actions of terrorists 
and magnitude of the dangers posed by terrorism. See also Cilliers 
(2003, p. 91); Edwards and Gill (2002, p. 207); Finckenauer (2005, 
p. 65); Ignatieff (2002, p. 1146); Miraglia et al. (2012, p. 6); P. 
Williams (1997, p. 1).  
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Assuming that human rights violations co-vary with certain 
macrosocial conditions mutable in the structure of society, this 
doctoral study sort to establish the conditions or set of conditions 
necessary to facilitate or impede human rights when governments 
respond to terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
First, the study explored the nature of terrorism in the region and 
what distinguishes it from terrorism in other regions. Based on 
extensive review of academic, policy and journalistic literature as 
well as secondary and primary data from key informant interviews, 
what manifests as terrorism in the region corresponds to certain 
aspects and methods of violence that feature in conflicts that 
punctuate the social and political development of the region. Thus, 
based on an interpretation of ethnically, politically and religiously 
motivated conflicts in the region, terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa 
can be classified into four broad categories or typologies i.e. anti-
colonial terrorism, terrorism in national conflicts, terrorism in 
regional conflicts and jihadi terrorism. See figure 2.2.  
 
Among the four typologies, only anti-colonial terrorism managed 
to come to a logical end with the attainment of full independence 
of the region. This makes anti-colonial terrorism the only type of 
terrorism that has ever achieved its stated objectives in sub-
Saharan Africa and in deed the rest of the once colonised world i.e. 
national independence. What seems to have replaced anti-colonial 
terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa is what we may refer to as 
‘secession terrorism’ which features terrorist like violent strategies 
in separatist/irredentist conflicts. These types of conflicts are 
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ongoing in the English-speaking regions of Bamenda and Buea in 
Western Cameroon, the Somali dominated Oromia region in 
Ethiopia and the Taureg dominated Northern region of Mali. In 
these places, insurgents continue to wage violent separatist and 
irredentist campaigns against the state, justifying their actions 
using arguments that are based on claims of a distinct heritage and 
exclusion. 
 
The other three categories of terrorism continue to manifest with 
varying degrees of complexity and prevalence. Until the late 1990s, 
terrorism in national conflicts was the most prevalent form of 
terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa, whose key feature is the heavy 
presence of politically motivated ethnic violence. Many scholars 
interested in the study of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa have 
generally missed out on terrorism that occurs in the context of 
politically motivated ethnic violence. A point that has also been 
canvased by Kaplan (2011). Here, it has been demonstrated that 
there is no qualitative difference between terrorist methods 
manifest in politically motivated ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan 
Africa and methods employed by terrorist groups proscribed by 
the UN Security Council and which have been extensively 
researched in terrorism scholarship. For example, decapitation has 
featured in politically motivated ethnic violence in sub-Saharan 
Africa perpetrated by groups such as Mungiki, Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) in Kenya, Liberia and Sierra Leon respectively.  
Similarly, proscribed international terrorist groups such as the 
Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as the 
Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) commonly decapitate their 
victims. Further, ethnic violence in sub-Saharan Africa where 
crude grotesque terrorist like killings occurs is not conceptually 
and qualitatively different from gross racial violence perpetrated 
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by armed groups such as Black Panthers, Ku Klux Klan, Aryan 
Nation, Posse Comitatus, neo-Nazi which at one time or another 
have been proscribed as terrorist organisations in Europe and the 
U.S. The only difference between the two contexts is that while 
sub-Saharan African groups commonly use the machete as the 
weapon of choice, the groups in Europe and the U.S employ guns 
and bombs in their mass killings. Evidently, terrorism in politically 
motivated ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa is an academic 
terrain that is under researched.  
 
Nevertheless, the good news is that as democratisation which 
began to gain momentum in the early 1990s continues to 
consolidate in the region, many national conflicts that began to de-
escalate around the same time have either ended or significantly 
de-escalated. The bad news is that these developments coincided 
with the arrival of Osama bin Laden in Sudan in December 1991 
who used the country to establish his al Qaeda international 
terrorist network and the region as a laboratory for the 
manufacture, testing and launching of contemporary global jihadi 
terrorism.  
 
As it stands today, jihadi terrorism presents sub-Saharan Africa 
with the most complex and serious security challenge ever in the 
history of its social and political development.  Its metamorphosis 
is a function of unknown variables except for the commitment to 
Islamist ideologies and the goal of establishing a sub-Saharan 
Africa Islamic theocracy or caliphate. The formation and 
reformation of jihadi terrorist groups is an endless cycle 
determined by any configuration of hostilities, collaboration, 
mergers and splits. Local jihadi terrorist groups do not fight one 
but many terrorisms that assume multiple local versions of global 
Jihadi influenced by competition between al Qaeda and ISIL/ISIS 
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and incorporate in their way a universe of local opportunities, 
issues, agendas, concerns, conflicts, criminal enterprise, 
community relations and kinships etc. Because of high overall 
populations and high Muslim populations which make the 
diffusion of jihadi ideologies faster and easier, jihadi terrorism is 
mainly prevalent in Eastern and Western sub-regions.   
 
Notwithstanding the complexity of jihadi terrorism in sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is not likely that an indigenous sub-Saharan African 
variant will develop and engulf the region. This is because 
increased democratisation gives opportunity for legitimate 
political expression of religious and non-religious grievances; 
many states in the region are secular in nature; there is a high 
degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity in the 
region, Sufi Islam which is predominant in the region was 
peacefully spread and Muslim populations in the region generally 
remain on the periphery of major issues affecting the global 
Muslim Umma such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, 
governments and policy practitioners in sub-Saharan Africa need 
to be weary that signs of the spread of jihadi terrorism outside its 
traditional bases in Eastern and Western sub-regions have begun 
to emerge in the South. This concern is underlined by the 
formation of ISIS/ISIL affiliated terrorist groups in Mozambique 
which have carried out deadly attacks since 2018 e.g. the Islamic 
State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) and Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamâ 
often abbreviated to al-Sunnah.  
 
Generally, what makes terrorism in sub-Saharan African distinct is 
its inward-looking nature even when it is directed towards distant 
targets geographically located outside the region.  This conclusion 
is supported by the fact that no indigenous sub-Saharan Africa 
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terrorist organization has so far ever been associated with a 
terrorist attack outside the region.  
 
Counterterrorism in the region is made up of a mix of military and 
criminal justice measures. Military measures take the shape of 
regional and international peace support operations, special 
security operations and counterinsurgency. Criminal justice 
measures are based on the notion of ‘the rule of law’ (RoL) and rely 
on enforcement of the law by criminal justice agencies i.e. 
parliament, police, courts, corrections and other government and 
community agencies involved in preventing or countering violent 
extremism (P/CVE). Several challenges plague the ability of 
criminal justice agencies to effectively implement counterterrorist 
policies. Many police organisations in the region do not meet the 
minimum threshold of 300 police officers per 100,000 suggested in 
a UN report. Compared to other regions, police organisations in 
sub-Saharan Africa have the lowest level of responsiveness to 
internal security issues; are perceived to be corrupt; are under-
resourced; stretched by terrorist organisations and insurgencies 
and the effectiveness of criminal investigations is below average. 
However, there is growing evidence that most police organisations 
in the region are undergoing large and fast improvements across 
various dimension. For example, in places like Ghana, Kenya and 
Mali significant reforms that might benefit counterterrorism have 
been noted. The most significant challenge that affects many 
judiciaries in the region as far as counterterrorism is concerned is 
lack of independence and backlog of cases. Nevertheless, though 
significant variations exist between countries, there is progressive 
overall improvement in judicial governance as indicated by the 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). In the case of 
correctional agencies i.e. prison and probation, not much can be 
canvased about probation because it is not well developed in the 
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region. The main challenge that affects prison facilities in the 
region is the problem of overcrowding and the risk posed by 
holding terrorism convicts. Overcrowding poses the danger of 
radicalisation of extremist violent ideologies among prisoners. 
Holding terrorism convicts exposes prison facilities to the danger 
of attack by terrorists e.g. the attack by Boko Haram and 
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) on prisons 
in Nigeria and Niger respectively freeing their militants and other 
convicts.  
 
In examining the nexus between counterterrorism and human 
rights in sub-Saharan Africa, several important facts, issues and 
concerns take centre stage. First, it is important to note that, long 
before the arrival in sub-Saharan Africa of contemporary notions 
of human rights codified in the International Bill of Human Rights 
and other international human rights statues, there existed early 
notions of human rights that protected individual and community 
rights, even in times of grave danger e.g. the Charter of Mandé 
(1222) and the Kurukan Fuga (1236). These early ingenious African 
conceptions of human rights generally correspond with 
contemporary notions of human rights especially on rights that 
touch on the integrity of the person. For both academic and policy 
purposes, as far as the nexus between counterterrorist policies and 
human rights in sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, the main worry 
is that overall human rights outcomes in the region have been on 
a steady decline since 2005 with nearly two thirds of countries in 
the region being either ‘partly free or not free’ and therefore cannot 
guarantee respect for human rights in counterterrorist policies. As 
a result, several instances of wide spread violations in 
counterterrorism have been documented by local and 
international human rights NGO.  
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Since empirical evidence shows that increasing the space occupied 
human rights in counterterrorist policies increases their 
effectiveness in the fight against terrorism (See figure 3.5), the task 
for academic and policy communities is to establish and enhance 
factors and conditions that facilitate human rights in 
counterterrorist policies. For its contribution towards filling this 
gap, this study has established that government preference for 
human over state security (here measured by more government 
expenditure on welfare than on military) and poor economic and 
administrative capacity (here measured by the absence of 
transparency and accountability coupled with a high level of 
corruption in the public sector) are necessary conditions that 
facilitate and impede human rights in counterterrorist policies 
respectively in sub-Saharan Africa. This means that governments 
in the region will be more effective in the fight against terrorism if 
they prioritise criminal justice over military measures by allocating 
more budgetary resources to policing; functions and operations 
that increase judicial independence and the legislative capacity of 
parliament e.g. through increased allocations for legal and policy 
research into counterterrorism and human rights. They will also 
perform better if they consistently invest more resources into 
sectors that meet the needs for human security and address the 
root causes of terrorism. In simple terms, governments in the 
region should approach terrorism as a threat to human rather than 
state security, whose effective response resides in policies and 
actions that address the welfare needs of citizens rather than the 
political and military interests of the state.  
 
However, this study is not exhaustive. Future research might be 
interested in replicating it to establish the validity of the findings. 
For example, different variables and data might be used to 
operationalise and measure the macro social conditions 
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hypothesised in this study to determine if those found to be 
necessary will still hold or a different/additional set of conditions 
will emerge as necessary to facilitate or impede human rights in 
counterterrorist polices in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, since 
this is a regional study, the findings cannot be generalised to a 
global level. Thus, future research might be interested in 
replicating it in other contexts to establish the generalisability of 
theoretical prepositions suggested here. For example, the 
preposition that in a culturally rich society, indigenous cultural 
practices are important determinants of whether state agents will 
protect and promote human rights when responding to terrorism 
requires further empirical research to determine its theoretical 
value. Even within sub-Saharan Africa alone, this preposition 
requires further empirical testing beyond the case studied here i.e. 
Mali because sub-Saharan Africa is a highly diverse region with 
many cultures and sub-cultures. See Alesina et al. (2003, p. 163). 
This diversity offers a rich context in which future research has a 
great potential to generate significant empirical findings that can 
shape theoretical thinking around counterterrorism, human rights 
and response mechanisms embedded in indigenous cultural 
practices. Generally, replicating the study in diverse contexts 
would make significant contributions toward the theoretical 
understanding of conditions that facilitate or impede human rights 
in counterterrorist policies.  
 
Nevertheless, scholars interested in replicating this study or 
generally advancing academic research on counterterrorism in 
sub-Saharan Africa should be cognisant of the constraint that 
access to reliable primary data is limited and verifying secondary 
data is equally challenging. This is because in many countries in 
the region, counterterrorism and information on security agencies 
is shrouded in secrecy and often protected by security of 
 210 
information laws. Also, as noted by Newham (2002, p. 2); Pearson 
(2001, p. 39); A. Peters (2015, p. 14) future research should be weary 
that researching concepts such as corruption in a quantitative and 
empirical manner is difficult because in many societies, corruption 
is considered a taboo subject and most incidents are never 
reported or recorded. Same problems affect researching human 
rights in sub-Saharan Africa. This is because in some countries, 
human rights issues evoke volatile political actions and reactions. 
As a result, many instances of violations also go unreported for fear 
of further or secondary violations. Researchers are therefore often 
left to rely on reports of local and international human rights 
NGOs whose findings are usual general and qualitative in nature.  
Still because of fear of victimisation verifying claims made in such 
reports and obtaining quantitative data may be a challenge. 
Nevertheless, these challenges do not preclude researchers from 
developing innovative, ethical, valid, reliable and replicable 
methods and strategies of data collection to advance academic 
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APPENDIX 1: TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEWS 
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23 May 2019 (A) 
 
Researcher: Thank you for accepting to discuss with me about my 
research. My name is Steve Wakhu from Kenya.  I read my 
doctorate at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the 
University of Erfurt in Germany. My research is on post conflict 
reconstruction in the sub-Saharan Africa. My analysis shows that 
Mali has a better human right record than other countries despite 
facing a huge security challenge. That why I am here in Mali and 
I’d like to understand why. First I would like to know how the 
structure of protection of human right is organised generally in 
Mali? Second what this commission does to advance human rights 
 
xxxxxx: Thank you that you have come from Kenya and interested 
in the security challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa and witnessed that 
Mali has better human rights. I think that’s a good observation you 
have done and thank you for this remark. I am a magistrate and I 
have worked in judiciary for 30 years. I was prosecutor, attorney 
and now I am commissioner of human right in the commission and 
overseer in the territory of Mali. 
 
The commission is a national institution in accordance with the 
France principle and the UN resolutions. Our work is to insuring 
effective protection and the promotion of human rights. However, 
I will you show you the law, here this is how the text is writing that 
makes the institution. We coordinate all activities of human right 
in Mali. We have a law and a group at the level of CNDH that I 
preside the work of coordinating the whole network of defenders 
of human right in Mali. We work within the framework of peace, 
security and development.  
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Researcher: How does the commission deal with human right 
issues that arise from counterterrorism?  
 
xxxxxxxxx: Human right in Mali finds its essence in our 
constitution. The first 22 articles of our constitution focus on the 
rights and duties of the human being.  
 
Researcher: If I understand you correctly, you say that the first 22 
articles of the constitution are dedicated on human rights?  
 
xxxxxxxxx: Yes correct. In the constitution, human right come 
before the whole constitution. That means human right comes 
before the president and the republic institutions. So, it’s our 
choice we have done. This came during our revolution of 1991. It’s 
extremely important. That is why there is a resilience in Mali that 
concern on human right. The first 22 articles are as follows: the first 
20 articles are on human right and the remaining two articles are 
on the duties imposed to people.  
 
We have a national policy on human right in Mali and an action 
plan 2017-2023. We have also a transitive national policy on justice. 
We have a national policy on the treatment of victims and suspects 
of traffic of human, violent extremism and religious radicalism. 
 
Researcher: Is there any relationship between the first 22 articles 
of the constitution and the 1236 charter of KOUROUKANFUGA?  
 
xxxxxx: Mali has the advantage that we have inherit the great 
kingdom, great empires and in 1236 we had the 
KOUROUKANFUGA. Our constitution is inspired by the charter.  
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Researcher: What are the specific factors that we can identify that 
contribute to Mali having better human rights?      
xxxxxx: Generally, in society, respect for other human beings is 
linked to our history of the KOUROUKANFUGA. Things like 
stealing, killing, rape, these are emphasis in the charter and are 
very frowned upon in our society.  
 
Like revolutions that occurred in the Arab world e.g. in Egypt in 
Algeria…we fought the dictator President Moussa Traoré in 1991. 
Since that time there is a conscious awakening among the citizen 
to defend their rights. For example, in 2012 when rebels and 
terrorists encroached in Gao, the first people who stood up against 
violations of human right, were children, youths and women and 
until now these structures exist in Gao, in Timbuctu, everywhere 
in Mali.  
 
There is a vibrant association of human rights organisations and 
civil society organizations that play the different roles as human 
rights defenders at the level of children, women, handicaps, all the 
field of health, education We also have a system of volunteer 
human rights defenders. When a human rights issue is raised, and 
has significant public attention we do communication at TV, at 
Radio to say our position regarding to the issue.  We also regularly 
brief the country on the status of human rights through the media. 
We also create the G5 of human right “Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, 
Mauritania, and Chad”. These countries to combat terrorism.  
 
Researcher: What are some of characteristic of the legal system 
that promote human right? 
 
xxxxxx: First there is the constitution. It is the principle guardian 
of human rights.  We also have a penal code. Police are not allowed 
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to hold any suspect in custody beyond 24hrs without charge. For 
crimes, whose maximum sentence is 3 years, our laws do not allow 
suspects to be held in remand without a sentence beyond 6 
months. This time frame is renewable upon application to the 
court by the prosecutor. These provisions are in place to prevent 
abuse of the judicial process.  As a commission, the law allows us 
to visit any penal institution e.g. prisons, without informing the 
Attorney General or the examining magistrate, for insuring there 
is no human right violation at the level of the prisons.  
 
Researcher: In 1991 Mali transitioned into democracy. But in 2012 
there was a military coup d’état and soon after went back to civilian 
rule. What are your views regarding these political events in 
relation to human rights? 
 
xxxxxxx: The constitution did not change. Presidents have tried to 
change the constitution but they are failed to change it. Let me tell 
you the most rigid constitutions are in West Africa: Mali and 
Benin. The two constitutions we cannot change without 
referendum even one iota. In France the constitution is flexible, 
they change it 24 times but in Mali none since 1991 till now 
Presidents try to change but no.  
 
Researcher: Do you think that if the international community was 
not present in Mali the human right would be poor? 
 
xxxxxxxxx: First our country is fragile and faces a terrorism threat. 
The international community is here to support the country, so 
they cannot diminish human right in Mali. 
 
But there there’s a problem. The population feel that there is a kind 
of federalism they want to impose in Mali and we are very watchful 
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concerning on human right. International human rights 
organisation has produced many reports. Amnesty international 
has also produced at least five or six reports. The Secretary general 
of UN produced their report. The international community 
complements the national human rights structure.   
 
We have a little problem at the political level. We feel that the 
international community is pushing so much for the peace 
agreement. But we think peace must be discussed between Malians 
themselves and the armed groups. Sometimes the 51 Associations 
of human right do not agree with the different international 
community demands and their supporting of human right in Mali. 
 
Researchers: What can you say the factors that limit the 
realisation of human right in Mali?  
xxxxxx: The main limitation is lack of means. Defenders of human 
right heavily rely on donor funding which limits the dignity of their 
independence. Another difficulty is the power sharing at the 
leadership level and it is not always secure, there is many 
perception, vision.  
 
23 May 2019 (B) 
 
Researcher: My research is interested in finding out how Mali 
responds to human rights despite facing serious security 
challenges. 
 
xxxxxx: Our program here is supporting youth and youth 
organisation to get involved in citizen action, good governance and 
human right.  It is supported by the Danish government and the 
objective is to build a peaceful Mali. 
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Steve: Why do you think Mali has a better human right records 
even though she faces more security challenges than most 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
xxxxxx: I think we have two keys factors. The first one is how the 
society is built. In Mali, you will see that people are interlinked and 
the family system is strong. If you have such strong connections, it 
prevents you from violating others because if I want to hurt you 
and at the end of the day I realise that you are my long cousin or 
so, then I would think twice before hurting you.  So, this is the 
social link in Mali which helps to have this kind of human right 
that we talk it about. The second key issue is we have strong human 
right institutions e.g. CNDH, NCHR and civil society 
organisations.  
 
Researcher: Please elaborate further what you mean by strong 
interlinked family system? 
 
xxxxxxx: If you come to Mali the family would help people to stay 
link because you this usage of families: until I married if not I 
would not go out to the compound, I would stay in meaning that 
in a modern society, I would say you cannot impose to someone at 
the age of 20, 24, 25 years to stay with his family but here in Mali 
you are 50 60, you are married or not you will still stay in the family 
every time. To get this strong tied but also people are interlinked 
because there are some ethnic group who marry to another group, 
you cannot imagine I will go to hurt you because they come to 
another family no we are all living together which is called joking 
with your cousin, this is very important in the society. 
 
Researcher: Would I be correct to say that ethnic competition has 
not featured much in the Malian society? 
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xxxxxxxxx: I don’t think so.  Right now, we are facing a problem.  
In the past people would not think about regions.  In each region 
you can have two, three ethnicities living together. But now all this 
is vanishing and what is coming up is ethnicity for example: I am 
Fulani and you are Dogon so Fulani is shepherd Dogon is a farmer, 
we have been living for centuries together, as Fulani is keeping the 
cattle: cows’ sheep, goats of those Dogon will share with Fulani 
what they harvest after Dogon let Fulani come and settle in their 
farm but now regarding the situation they are against one another. 
 
Researcher:  Why did the PM resign where there is a conflict 
between Dogon and Fulani? 
 
xxxxxxx: There are pressures of the political parties and civil 
society organisations. He didn’t resign by himself. He made an 
analysis saying including the ruling party because they are not bee 
able to handle this ethnical conflict and prevent killing so many 
people this was the issue. 
 
Researcher: Do you think there will be another conflict issue may 
be: for example something happen or the economy becomes poor 
next year and people feel the pinch of economy? 
 
xxxxxxx: It would depend on the force of each group because one 
of the factor which lead the army, there is a quarrel of frustration 
coming to some population or other group of society but the key 
problem is insecurity in the regions, I don’t think personally the 
performance in the economy was not inch up and the PM resigned. 
As I say all the economies in sub-Saharan Africa are not performing 
except some countries like Senegal, cote d’ivoire, but when you are 
in power, you will do all to demonstrate that you are performing 
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very well but if it goes to security people are away because it is their 
lives and more dangerous for you, if you are not performing in 
security and protecting your people being killed every day, soldiers 
are killing all the time, and the coalition like this one, the 
population asks you to resign. 
 
Researcher: they have tried to change the constitution three or 
four times which they were unsuccessful, so could you say 
something about that?  
 
xxxxxx: I think the civil society in Mali is very powerful but there 
is also another movement calls Islamic movement this is also very 
powerful and they led the revolution in Mali in 1991. When they 
remove the former president Moussa Traoré until now people 
don’t want to miss democracy, so I think this why any attempt to 
change the constitution, the civil society organs, political party and 
the Islamic movement block these attempts. 
 
Researcher: Is the Islamic Movement a major human rights actor 
or more political? 
 
xxxxxxx: We must consider two points of Islamic movement. 
There are the jihadist movement and the normal one. Islamic 
people are facing problem not with guns but with reflection and 
talk about the last one. I think that they are doing good things in 
the past but they are more and more getting into politics and this 
is not their role. I think when religion mixes with politics it is not 
right for democratic countries. They risk imposing Islamic laws to 
the people which becomes very dangerous. 
 
Researcher: Do you think religion contribution into civil society, 
at the same time it makes people fear and violate human rights?  
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xxxxxx: If you take the Islamic religion, it’s based-on promotion of 
sharing more than other things. Islam does not mean what they 
are imposing in the north but as people used to say these people 
were not the real Islamic.  So, the real one is sharing friendship, 
tolerance and other things and those who are practising the real 
religion will be guided by the movement. Islamic means that 
Muslims pray outside and inside the mosque and those religious 
are the same way in sub-Saharan Africa. Generally, on Friday you 
are avoided to take some streets near the mosques because people 
will pray and the none Muslims accept them it is like in 
Christianity everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Researcher: What would you say as the factors that have threaten 
human right? 
 
xxxxxxxxx: For me politic is a key factor because it will bring 
people within the same family to fight against themselves because 
of the power and corruption.  
 
The second is poverty. In the past, there were rich and poor people.  
But they were helping each other. But now, the rich one will have 
a kind of show off to demonstrate that they are rich. Do everything 
they want and no one will say nothing. It brings a frustration in the 
society and people would try to violate human right.  
 
Third is Corruption: We go to vote on election days but things are 
not done according to the will of the people. This also brings 
frustration to human right.  
 
Fourth is Extremism:  If I am a Muslim and I think everybody 
should be Muslim it is a kind of extremism or I am a catholic and I 
 249 




Researcher: Do you think the presence of international 
organisations has contributed to better human right records in 
Mali? 
 
xxxxxxx: I sometimes ask myself this question. It is as if they are 
taking profit from the situation. Look at MUNISMA, they should 
be in the battle field to prevent terrorist attack in the north. But 
they are not doing this. They are accommodated in Bamako driving 
big cars and I wonder how they can do peace keeping if they are 
not between the terrorist and the population.  So how can you 
explain this, that they have so many people, financial and material 
resources and still the population is under the fire of terrorists. 
This I cannot understand these people who may protect us are here 
to go to the night clubs in the district of Bamako, taking more 
beautiful girls, eating in big restaurants because they are well paid. 
I think honestly it should not be here.  
 
22 May 2019 (A) 
 
 
Reseacher: The principle objective of my visit here in Mali is to 
find out how the government in the country can be able to respond 
to security challenges but at the same protect human rights? 
 
xxxxxxxx: Your questions already assume that we have good 
human right situation in Mali. We have some deterioration of 
human right in some specific areas. So, this observation is valuable 
generally for the whole country, but in the region of Mopti, Segou 
and when you go up in the north Kidal we still have serious 
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violation of human right.  I think we have a balance this 
assumption.  
 
Though there are many ethnics groups, we still have a kind of 
connection between all those ethnics group. Even in the armies it 
is difficult to them to eliminate one specific ethnic group. This 
social connection and cultural values maintain people together.  
 
Researcher: Are there some specifics ethnics group who share the 
national resources at the expense of others? 
 
xxxxxx: Some ethnic groups are marginalised e.g. the Touareg 
group.  Most people feel that most of the capital of the country 
resources have been invested in central and south part of the 
country this is their feeling. Concerning the sharing of resources of 
the country, there is a gap in the north and south of the country. 
 
Researcher: Are there any social and cultural issues that affect 
how the Malian society approaches human rights issues?  
 
xxxxxxxx: There are some common historical factors. We used to 
have historic empire that connect people to each other: Manding 
Empire, Shongoi Empire, Ghana Empire…. They contained more 
than two or three Ethnics group so since those times people were 
living together, they are sharing some values and most people have 
the same religion “Muslim” this is one factor. 
 
The second reason we have tolerance between ethnic groups. We 
have managed between different ethnics group so this helps to 
maintain people together.  
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Another factor is what we call in French cousinship, there are 
ethnics group, or family names, a kind of historic convention 
between these two groups that our ancestors agreed not to violate 
each other. This existed among the Songhai, Ghana in the north 
and Dogon in the centre, for example: between Songhai- Dogon, 
coulibaly and Doumbia so on and so forth, start joking and no right 
to abuse or insult one another. We can just play and when there 
was a conflict we can easily resolve it because the elders in the 
villages had a meeting find the solutions. This cousinship has 
brought in the country solidarity, prosperity, honesty, all kind of 
happiness. We have also Story Tellers who intervene in the 
resolution in conflicts, marriages, naming ceremonies, funeral 
ceremonies. They have a large place in society and we called them 
peacemakers. 
 
Researcher: Do you think the traditional systems in modern Mali 
politics? 
 
xxxxxx: yeah, traditional leaders are officially recognised in 
government because there is a national association of all those 
stories Tellers and whenever the government has difficulties in 
dealing with conflict or in dealing with social demand like strikes 
or protests, they call on these Association to send their delegation 
trying to speak to the government. E.g. the conflict between 
Teachers and government or ethnics group. 
 
xxxx: Do you think traditional Association of story tellers 
influenced the resignation of the PM? 
 
xxxxxxxxx: I don’t any connection. The resignation of PM was 
rather political. But religious leaders put pressure. Religious 
leaders have a great capacity of mobilisation more than the 
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politicians. Like Mahmoud Dicko the president of the national 
Muslim council. This leader called for a meeting and a great 
number of people come out to support Islam in the Ogosagou 
massacre. 
 
Researcher: What you can say is the effect of international 
community regarding human right outcomes in Mali? 
 
xxxxxxxxx: Globally the international community like Sweden, EU 
incorporate human right in their interventions and in every 
development program or project. Always they ask for 
accountability.  
 
Researcher: What would you say regarding MINUSMA?  
 
xxxxxxxxxx: If they were not here the situation would have been 
worse. MINUSMA don’t have many forces to protect the 
population, they support the government and play a great role and 
have great influence on the government. They also put a check on 
the government so they cannot act as they like.  
  
22 May 2019 (B) 
 
Researcher: My research interest is to establish how Mali balances 
protection of human rights and response to terrorism?  
 
xxxxxxxxx: We have a national policy of human right which was 
developed in 2017. The policy incorporates all segments of society. 
The second one is the opening of government toward the 
international community.  
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Researcher: What would you about the nature of the Mali civil 
society and human right? 
 
xxxxxxxxxxx: We have three categories of human right defenders. 
The first is the institution of defenders which is in formal 
framework, the second category which constitutes the civil society 
organisation and the last one constitutes the individual which is 
the pillar in the framework of human right defenders in Mali.  
 
Researcher: Based on the Freedom House index, over the last ten 
years, Mali human rights score has deteriorated. Why do you think 
this has been so? 
 
xxxxxxxx: There are many factors: First the terrorist’s attacks 
created a lot of sudden fear. There is also a financial aspect. Human 
right organisation that already work in place dominated by 
terrorists could not to receive financial support.  
 
21 MAY 2019 
 
Researcher: Why do you think Mali is able to maintain a good 
human right records while still facing security challenges and 
better than the others? 
 
xxxxxxxxx: We have been facing security challenges for years but 
the problem is increased in 2012. There is Association AMDH and 
this Association is located everywhere in the regions of Mali in case 
of human right violation, our committee member can raise the 




Researcher: Would be able to tell how many human rights 
organisations are there in  Mali? 
 
xxxxxxxxx: there more than 42. 
 
Researcher: Is there anything generally in the society that you 
would say makes Malian have more respect for human rights? 
 
xxxxxxx: We are a tolerant society and try to resolve problems 
together or find solutions together.  
 
Researcher: What can you say about ethnic competition in Mali? 
 
xxxxxxxxx: Until a recent period, the ethnics group live in a great 
harmony in Mali. 
 
Researcher: What would you say is the state of Mali’s democracy 
since independence? 
 
xxxxxxxx: In 1960, we had our independence. After that was the 
President Modibo Keita’s regime. He was a socialist and at that 
time there was violations of human right. Filly Dabo Sissoko was 
killed, he was a great intellectual. Since 1992 we have a tolerance 
culture. 
 
Researcher: can you say something about the 1236 Charter?  
 
xxxxxxx: Yes, this is the first constitution in the world even though 
the western world could not recognize it. As a country, we hold 
that every president must be elected like Soundiata Keita was 
elected. With cousinship for example: I am Keita, you are Coulibaly 
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if we quarrel in Downtown once I remember about that we are 
cousins and I am sorry. 
 
 
Researcher: What do you think about the UN, EU, MINUSMA 
and others international partners regarding human right outcomes 
in Mali? 
 
xxxxxxxx: The international organisations made their best but 
really Malians are disappointed. We see no improvement in the 
security situation. They are here but the populations do not see 
any impact, there is always attack, violations, everywhere in Mali 
despite their presence practically there are always the killings. 
 
21 MAY 2019 (B) 
 
Researcher: Why do you think Mali is able to maintain a good 
human right records while still facing security challenges and 
better than the others? 
 
xxxxxxxxxxx: First our country was led by the king during the 
time of the Empire of Mali. We had kouroukanfuga charter. This 
charter Mali had already written the defenders of human right, the 
population was ruled as: the hunters had their rules and right, the 
story tellers had their rules and right, the children, women, 
Marabous were so structured and everyone had his duty. In the 
charter, the human being is sacred and must not be violated. At 
that time there were cousinship, tolerance, human being respect, 




Researcher: Do we have articles from that charter of 1236 that are 
in the present-day constitution of Mali? 
 
xxxxxxx: What you must understand is that the 1236 charter is the 
oldest constitution that was not written. It is an old tradition. 
Usually in the society everyone tries to do his or her duties and 
pass on these traditions down the generations through oral history.   
 
Researcher: what can you say about the security challenges in the 
North of Mali? How does it affect human right overall in Mali?  
 
xxxxxxxxx: This security situation is difficult but we have many 
Association of human right for the Malians that created by the 
state, the armies group. There is the national committee of human 
right and two organisations that fight for human right respect and 
these are our responsibility to bring peace. 
 
Researcher: If the MUNISMA was not present in Mali, do you 
think Mali would still have better human right outcomes? 
xxxxxxxxx: Apparently MINUSMA is here to establish peace in the 
country but we see the contrast.  The arriving of MINUSMA and 
G5 Sahel has created more violations. And we ask ourselves are 
they here to maintaining peace or what are they doing? Sometimes 
they impose things on us. For example, the Malians army does not 
allow them to go in Meneka, in Kidal and even if there is an attack 
there, they say that this is not in our mandate. So how can they 
establish peace and secure human right?   
 
Researcher: Do people feel insecurity in Bamako? Do they feel 
that may be those terrorists can come up to Bamako? 
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xxxxxxxxx: Yeah it is like an asymmetric war. You don’t see the 
enemies and the enemies see where you are. So, these people can 
come at any moment, they don’t come in group but they come by 
group of four or six persons and target the place and attack.  
 
Researcher: What could you say are the factors that prevent Mali 
from achieving good human rights outcomes? 
 
xxxxxxxxxx: It’s easy, we must dispense justice to avoid the 
impunity and bad governance. The militaries and the population 
trust each other to fight insecurity because terrorists are hidden 
among the population. If the armies consider these same 
population as terrorists, the struggle is going to be very difficult. 
We must create a climate of confidence between armies and 
population, and the population have to know that armies are there 
to protect them and not to persecute them. 
 
 
    
         
 
     

















The Charter of Kurukan Fuga, re-published here, is a version 
collected in Guinea at the end of a concerting regional 
workshop between traditional and modern communicators 
(Kankan: 3- 12 March 1998). The traditionists are those who 
declined the text; then it has been transcribed and translated, 
with the help of Guinea linguists and under the supervision 
of Mr. Siriman Kouyaté – Magistrate and traditionist (his 
family is guardian of the Sosobala, in Niagasole, Guinea). 
Afterwards S. Kouyaté structured The Charter, without 
falsifying the essential point, talking here about the modern 
juridical texts with a view to make it readable for 
contemporaries (the original text in Malinke is available on the 
digital data bank ARTO). 
 
 
The Charter of Kurukan Fuga 
 
 
1. The Great Mande Society is divided into sixteen clans of 
quiver carriers, five clans of marabouts, four groups of 
“nyamakalas” and one group of slaves. Each one has a 
specific activity and role. 
2. The “nyamakalas” have to devote themselves to tell the 
truth to the chiefs, to be their counsellors and to defend 
by the speech the established rulers and the order upon 
the whole territory. 
3. The five clans of marabouts are our teachers and our 
educators in Islam. Everyone has to hold them in respect 
and consideration. 
4. The society is divided into age groups. Belong to the same 
age-group the people (men or women) who are born 
during a period of three years in succession. The members 
of the intermediary class between young and old people, 
should be invited to take part in taking important 
decisions concerning the society. 
5. Everybody has a right to life and to the preservation of its 
physical integrity. Accordingly, any attempt to deprive 
one’s fellow being of life is punished with death. 
6. To win the battle of prosperity, the general system of 
supervision has been established in order to fight against 
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laziness and idleness. 
7. It has been established among the Mandenkas, the 
sanankunya (joking relationship) and the 
tanamannyonya (blood pact). Consequently, any 
contention that occurs among these groups should not 
degenerate, the respect for one another being the rule. 
Between brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, between 
grandparents and grand-children, tolerance and rag 
should be the principle. 
8. The Keïta’s family is nominated reigning family upon the 
empire. 
9. The children’s education behoves the entire society. The 
paternal authority in consequence falls to everyone. 
10. We should offer condolences mutually. 
11. When your wife or your child runs away stop running 
after her/him in the neighbour’s house. 
12. The succession being patrilineary, do never give up the 
power to a son when one of his fathers is still alive. Do 
never give up the power to a minor just because he has 
goods. 
13. Do never offend the Nyaras. 
14. Do never offend women, our mothers. 
15. Do never beat a married woman before having her 
husband interfere unsuccessfully. 
16. Women, apart from their everyday occupations, should 
be associated with all our managements. 
17. Lies that have lived for 40 years should be considered 
like truths. 
18. We should respect the law of primogeniture. 
19. Any man has two parents-in-law: the parents of the girl 
we failed to have and the speech we deliver without any 
constraint. We have to hold them in respect and 
consideration. 
20. Do not ill-treat the slaves. We are the master of the slave 
but not of the bag he carries. 
21. Do not follow up with your constant attentions the wives 
of the chief, of the neighbour, of the marabout, of the 
priest, of the friend and of the partner. 
22. Vanity if the token of weakness and humility is the one 
of nobility. 
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23. Do never betray one another. Respect your word of 
honour. 
24. In Mande do never wrong foreigners. 
25. The ambassador does not risk anything in Mande. 
26. The bull confided to your care should not lead the cattle-
pen. 
27. The young lady can get married early as she is pubescent. 
28. The young man can get married from 20 years old. 
29. The amount of the dowry is 3 bovines: one for the girl, 
two for her father and mother. 
30. In Mande, the divorce is tolerated for one of the following 
reasons: the impotence of the husband, the madness of 
one of the spouses, the husband’s incapability of 
assuming the obligations due to the marriage. The divorce 
should occur out of the village. 
31. We should help those who are in need. 
32. There are five ways to acquire the property: the buying, 
the donation, the exchange, the work and the inheriting. 
Any other form without convincing testimony is doubtful. 
33. Any object found without known owner becomes 
common property only after four years. 
34. The fourth bringing forth of a heifer confided is the 
property of the guardian. 
One egg out of four is the property of the guardian of the 
laying hen. 
35. One bovine should be exchanged for four sheep or four 
goats. 
36. To satisfy one’s hunger is not a robbery if you don’t take 
away anything in your bag or your pocket. 
37. Fakombè is nominated chief of hunters. 
38. Before setting fire to the bush, don’t look at the ground, 
rise your head in the direction of the top of the trees to 
see if they don’t bear fruits or flowers. 
39. Domestic animals should be tied during cultivation 
moment and freed after the harvest. The dog, the cat, 
the duck and the poultry are not bound by the measure. 
40. Respect the kinship, the marriage and the 
neighbourhood 
41. You can kill the enemy, but not humiliate him. 
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42. In big assemblies, be satisfied with your lawful 
representatives. 
43. Balla Fassèkè Kouyaté is nominated big chief of 
ceremonies and main mediator in Mande. He is allowed 
to joke with all groups, in priority with the royal family. 
44. All those who will transgress these rules will be 
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